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Soviet Politics and Culture

Timothy McClure • *George Gibian* • *Sidney Monas*

What Happened to Stalin?

Thomas Larson

Perspectives on Russia

Sidney Hook • *Boris Souvarine*

CHINA

The New Revolution

Ross Terrill

The Roots of Maoism

I-Kua Chou

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The New Revolution: II

EDITORS' NOTE: The "Cultural Revolution" in China, with all its ramifications and implications for the future of the Communist world, continues to be a major focus of international attention. In the November-December 1966 issue, Mr. Harry Gelman ("Mao and the Permanent Purge") and Professor Theodore Chen ("A Nation in Agony") viewed the Cultural Revolution as revolving primarily around internal issues. Here, Mr. Terrill presents a different interpretation which sees the genesis of the Cultural Revolution above all in Communist China's "siege mentality" and growing fear of "US imperialist aggression."

The Siege Mentality

By Ross Terrill

Privately, the Chinese Communist leaders must find much ground for criticizing Stalin. His record in aiding the Communist cause in China was poor, and his bureaucratic, even conservative, temper seems to have had little in common with the populist romanticism of the Maoist attempt to build a new heaven on earth. The Chinese' defense of him, this last decade, may owe more to their fear of de-stalinization than to their enthusiasm for Stalin the Communist. Yet, in one supreme respect, Stalin is a giant in the eyes of Peking: he put above all else the absolute necessity of safeguarding Bolshevik revolutionary power in the face of "capitalist encirclement."[1] Peking believes that the Chinese revolution is now similarly threatened. The complex nature of this threat, bound up as it is in Communist mythology, takes us to the heart of what lies behind the histrionics of the current "Cultural Revolution" in China.

Mr. Terrill, an Australian and former tutor in Political Science at Melbourne University, is presently a Knox Fellow and Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.). His extensive travels in Europe and Asia have carried him to Vietnam (1965) and Communist China (1964).

[1] See K.S. Karol's account of an interview with Chou En-lai, in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, (Paris), Nov. 9, 1966, p. 17.

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The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has always had a siege mentality. Against the Kuomintang (KMT), against the Japanese, against the KMT again, and in 1950 against the United States and its allies in Korea it has had to combine the task of waging war with that of making revolution and building socialism. Naturally, the siege mentality has become the hallmark of Chinese Communist militancy. Many of the CCP's distinctive ideological positions have been hammered out in an atmosphere of siege. That on culture, for example, received its basic, and still valid, definition in 1942, as the war against Japan raged. Mao's important concept of "people's democratic dictatorship," sharply at variance with the traditional Marxist "dictatorship of the proletariat," owes its origin and significance to the battle against Western "imperialist encroachment."

Throughout the Cultural Revolution the siege mentality has been evoked, and even intensified. Lessons have constantly been drawn, and illustrations borrowed, from the military and cultural struggles of earlier years. Heroes from earlier struggles have been held up for emulation. Unreliable elements have been blackened by digging out from the record of past struggles evidence of their unsoundness or vacillation, or by comparing them with those who proved to be renegades in earlier struggles. Writings of Mao that were the product of earlier struggles have been singled out for special attention. It is asserted that a "life and death" struggle is now under way against the twin evils of "revisionism and imperialism." The threat is said to be nothing less than "a comeback by the enemy at home and abroad." [2]

The Dual Menace

One must speak tentatively when trying to fathom the Chinese Communist mind. But the relationship between "revisionism" and "imperialism" in Peking's scheme of things seems so important that an attempt must be made to clarify it. In its crudest form, it concerns spies and traitors. Chinese Communist literature from the period of the war against Japan is full of anxiety about spies, agents, and traitors. So, too, is that from the period leading up to the Korean War: the Public Security Forces, according to the New China News Agency (NCNA), "arrested 28,000 agents of the KMT and the US" between January 1949 and October 1950.[3] Fear of collaboration with the enemy likewise runs through many key documents of the Cultural Revolution. The landlords and the reactionary bourgeoisie still have "international links," and are serving as "agents within our party and our country"; [4] they have "interacted internationally with imperialism" [5] (weapons have reportedly been found in the homes of some of them [6]). Warnings are given against the possible occurrence in China of an upheaval like the 1956 Hungarian revolt—a revolt described as "engineered by imperialism and started by a group of anti-Communist intellectuals of the Petöfi Club." [7]

A second relationship between "revisionism" and "imperialism" is the belief that corrosion by the former reduces the capacity of China to resist the latter. The new generation "must never be hothouse flowers that cannot stand the wind and rain, but must be sturdy mountain pines and dare to brave the challenge of the raging storm." [8] Mao has clothed the point in another image: "Only heroes can quell leopards and tigers." [9] This manner of thinking is based, of course, on the premise of a class theory of warfare. In "people's war" the decisive advantage over imperialism lies not in weapons, but in the "fact" that socialism is a higher stage than capitalism and must therefore win. The sense of righteousness and the assurance of history's mandate are inextricably blended in the Chinese Communist class theory of warfare.

Now it follows that, even in the heat of battle, the political struggle remains crucial. Only the "pure in class" will inherit the victory; and, more practically, only the unity that comes from class solidarity is able to ensure victory in protracted warfare. *Jen-min Jih-pao*, on August 25, 1966, gave a startlingly bold formulation of this theory: "Whether one fears imperialism and the reactionaries or not is essentially a question of whether one wants to and dares to make revolution or not." In other words, capitalists will fight war in capitalist fashion, and socialists must fight war in the socialist fashion—putting politics first. Only if they fight it this way will they be able to claim the victory promised by history.

[2] *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* (Liberation Army Daily), June 6, 1966.

[3] NCNA Daily News Release, Oct. 11, 1950.
[4] *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag), tr. in *Peking Review*, June 17, 1966.
[5] *Chieh-fang Chün Pao*, June 6, 1966.
[6] *Union Research Service* (Hong Kong), Oct. 11, 1966, p. 40.
[7] *Hung Ch'i, loc. cit. supra* (footnote 4).
[8] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), Oct. 22, 1966.
[9] Cited in *Wen Hui Pao*, May 10, 1966.

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A third relationship between "revisionism" and "imperialism" arises from Peking's view that the USSR, by taking the "revisionist" path, has opted out of the frontline of the struggle against imperialism. This is not the place to probe the complexities of the Moscow-Peking split, but an assumption made in these pages should be revealed. I believe that CCP ideology is akin to "myth": it is neither true nor completely without some roots in the truth. We cannot take these ideological orgasms at face value, but neither can we dismiss them as an autonomous realm of window-dressing that has nothing to do with reality. Moscow and Peking have simply suffered a divergence of national interest. Not an uncommon phenomenon in the world of nations, it is nonetheless one that is very difficult for Communist dictatorships to deal with. For they are states which are based upon an official gospel. It is almost impossible for real "believers" to differ with each other without robing the conflict in the full garb of religious apostasy. The vital function of ideology within each dictatorship demands it.

It is suggested that there are two fundamental aspects to the divergence of interest between China and the USSR. One is that China is far too poor to offer "goulash communism" to its people. So she finds it necessary to denounce the "revisions" that Moscow has imposed on Marxism-Leninism in the era of "goulash communism" as apostasy. Otherwise, if the Chinese people were to become infected with aspirations to comfort and abundance—testing communism, as Khrushchev said in Budapest, by its ability to provide the people with a good plate of goulash—the CCP might well lose its total control over them.

The second issue is more particular, and one that is still clouded in much uncertainty. It is the readiness, or lack of it, on Moscow's part to come to the aid of China in the event of a war involving China and the United States on opposite sides. The last top-level meeting between Chinese and Soviet leaders took place in January 1965, when Premier Kosygin stopped in Peking on his way home from Hanoi and talked with Mao. Nothing of substance was gleaned by observers at the time of the meeting, but according to a credible account that has recently come to light,[10] Mao asked the Soviet Premier to make a public declaration that Moscow would regard an attack on China as an attack on the USSR. Kosygin reportedly made no reply to this, nor to Mao's further query as to what Moscow's reaction would be if the United States should attack China. Now it is by no means certain that Moscow is as paralyzed on this issue as the above account suggests, but it is clear that Chinese bitterness towards Moscow arises partly from the fact that *Peking is not sure* that Moscow would resolutely defend China in a future war.

Peking's ideological onslaughts against the Soviets reflect the suspicion that Moscow no longer puts the defeat of "imperialism" at the top of its list of priorities. Following the logic of CCP theology, which now leaves little room for anyone in between the "saved" and the "damned," the Chinese leaders have concluded that Moscow is in "collusion" with the "imperialists." As Kang Sheng recently observed in Tirana, "to oppose imperialism one must oppose revisionism," and "to oppose China, one is bound to ally oneself with the USA." [11] To the siege mentality of the CCP, the slightest wavering of resolution in facing imperialism amounts to a transfer of loyalties and must be depicted in the ideological colors that are integral to Communist life and thought.

Power Struggle or Purge?

Now to return to the Cultural Revolution. What has it got to do with the siege mentality, and with "revisionism" and "imperialism?" First, two negative observations. It has often been argued that the Cultural Revolution is basically a struggle over the succession to a seriously-ill Mao. No one is immortal, and Mao is 73, but there is a lack of evidence that Mao is seriously ill, and much evidence that he is not. His absence from the public eye for six months ending last May (which was not his first long absence) was regarded as evidence of serious illness; but what, then, of his unprecedented string of public appearances since August 1966? I recall that in the fall of 1964 certain newspapers abroad pronounced Mao seriously ill. During the week of these reports—I was in Peking at the time—Mao attended the opera in the capital, showing himself sufficiently vigorous to mount the stage at the end of the performance and greet the singers. Since then it has seemed better to me, in this matter, to rely on direct word from Peking rather than on speculations from faraway places. Judging by his

[10] K. S. Karol, *loc. cit. supra* (footnote 1). A fuller account appears in Karol's *La Chine de Mao*, Paris, Laffont, 1966.

[11] *Peking Review*, Nov. 18, 1966.

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recent lack of output, Mao's powers as a theorist have declined. But recent communications from Peking testify that he is still active physically and shows no signs of serious illness.[12] Of course he may die at any moment, but no theory of recent *changes* in Chinese politics can validly be built upon the hypothesis of his serious illness. Back in 1938, interestingly enough, Edgar Snow remarked on the frequency with which Mao underwent "newspaper demise": "He has been repeatedly pronounced dead by his enemies, only to return to the news columns a few days later." [13]

It has also been said that the Cultural Revolution, especially the Red Guard movement, is a kind of hooliganism, a galloping rampage out of the party's control. In a recent issue of this journal, Mr. Gelman wrote of "unbridled lunacy"—although in another passage he referred to the Red Guards as a "method of conducting a purge." [14] (Can they be both?) This view may be based on an overestimation of the authoritativeness of the *tatzupao* (wall newspaper), the contents of which have led some representatives of the foreign press to build up an image at once of chaos and of a power struggle of bewildering complexity. If a *tatzupao* called for the renaming of a street or square, some reporters assumed that the renaming was a fact. If one called for the disbanding of the non-Communist political parties, some dispatches flatly announced their dissolution. An extraordinary flood of rumors has thus been disseminated abroad, creating all sorts of false impressions. *Current Scene*, for example, reported that "the few remaining churches in China have been stripped and closed"—which is an exaggeration.[15]

The Red Guards, or Red Flags, Red Eagles, and Red Banners, as some style themselves, are not new in the history of the CCP. They were in evidence as long ago as 1926,[16] and Edgar Snow recalls coming across them in civil war days.[17] Then, as now, they were neither vandals whose activity was unrelated to the wishes of the CCP, nor some kind of intended replacement for the party. Significantly, they have never attacked the rule of the party as such, but only the wrongdoings of individuals within the party. They have an official function—but it is not to rule or make decisions. They provide a therapy of social expression for a bottled-up generation which has known much discipline and little excitement. And they are amateur priests of Communist social morality. Their methods are rough and ready; orthodoxy is not always maintained. But they are probably effective in keeping the Chinese people in a state of alertness, self-criticism, and anxious concern for what the dominant elements in the CCP regard as the public good. They keep alive the kind of Boy Scout atmosphere which the foreigner finds in China today. "It is a very fine thing," commented *Hung Ch'i* (November 1, 1966), "that the masses in their hundreds of millions are paying such attention to state affairs." This politicized atmosphere of compulsory enthusiasm is the lifeblood of Communist dictatorship. But the revolutionary youth are meant only to *participate*, not to wield authority. There seems to be an element of shadow-boxing in the "titanic struggles" in which they are engaged. One wonders whether the ferociousness of the "reactionaries" is not being exaggerated so that the ensuing "victory" over them may seem the more glorious.

The Red Guards are also a weapon employed by Mao against people and institutions which do not accord with his vision of communism; and as the current symbol of the Maoist vision, they arouse the antipathy of the many people inside and outside the CCP who are not enthusiastic believers in that vision. But it is doubtful whether the Red Guards are engaged in permanently rearranging the top levels of power in the CCP. Their origin predates the August 1966 Central Committee meeting;[18] hence they cannot be seen purely as a creation designed to redress an imbalance which became evident at that meeting. Speculation about who is "in" and who is "out" in Peking is especially hazardous in a period when *tatzupao* are everywhere. And it is not certain that those who are now "out" will not be received back "in" after the struggle is over and the lessons of the Cultural Revolution have been sufficiently rammed home.

[12] In addition to private communications received by the author, there is a detailed account of Mao's vigorous activity on National Day in Anna Louise Strong's "Letter from China," Oct. 20, 1966, reprinted in *Global Digest* (Hong Kong), No. 12, 1966, pp. 55-64.

[13] *Red Star over China*, New York, 1961 Paperback Ed., p. 72.

[14] No. 6 (November-December), 1966, pp. 8 and 13.

[15] *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), Sept. 5, 1966, p. 2. French Protestant circles which recently received a visit from a Chinese Christian delegation, as well as private communications from China, deny that all Chinese churches have been closed.

[16] *Eastern Horizon* (Hong Kong), November 1966, p. 12.

[17] "The Man Alongside Mao," *The New Republic*, Dec. 3, 1966, p. 18.

[18] See *Le Monde* (Paris), Nov. 2, 1966; *Current Scene*, Sept. 5, 1966, p. 5.

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In accord with the interpretation of ideology as a kind of myth, I do not take at face value the charges against Chou Yang, P'eng Chen, Wu Han, Teng T'o, Lu Ting-yi, Lo Jui-ch'ing and the rest—let alone those which have so far been made explicitly only in *tatzupao*, against Liu Shao-ch'i for example. Chou Yang does not have a "reactionary" record, whatever Peking now says; P'eng Chen and Lu Ting-yi do not have a record of great sympathy for Moscow; Liu Shao-ch'i, indeed, has not been at all backward over the years in extolling the thought of Mao. Furthermore, the offending works of Wu Han and Teng T'o (*Hai Jui Dismissed from Office*, *Evening Chats at Yenshan*, and *Notes from the Three-Family Village*) were already five years old when attacked. The vital question is why 1966 brought the attacks. The explanation is probably that we are witnessing a "mythological" phenomenon. The guilty ones are guilty not of decades of betrayal, but simply of dissenting from a current decision or emphasis of major importance. However, the disagreement has been dressed up in mythological garb; the past is remade to fit in with the logic of the attacks on the dissenters. Only if one takes the ideology of Peking at face value can the Cultural Revolution be viewed as just a purge; if the ideology is taken as myth, the Cultural Revolution is at once less, and much more, than simply a purge.

Key to the Cultural Revolution

Why has the task of stoking up the fires of corporate spirit and ideological unity been given such high priority at this time? Certainly Mao Tse-tung, the poet, the romantic, for whom politics is the master science, has a record of impulsiveness extending back to his clash with Chen Tu-hsiu in Hunan. "Time presses," he has written. "Ten thousand years are too long. Seize the day, seize the hour!"[19] He has shown himself more restlessly ambitious than most Communist statesmen to summon heaven down upon earth by political action—even if hell is raised in the process.

Yet unilateral Leaps Forward have their risks, as Peking officials will now admit. And China is unquestionably passing through a period of crisis and anxiety in her foreign relations. A war rages at her doorstep, and it gets larger and closer to China with each year, even with each month.

[19] Cited in *Peking Review*, Oct. 28, 1966, p. 21.

On Culture and War

To defeat the enemy we must rely primarily on the army with guns. But this army alone is not enough; we must also have a cultural army, which is absolutely indispensable for uniting our own ranks and defeating the enemy.

—*Mao Tse-tung*, Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art, *1942*.

There are increasing indications that US imperialism is bent on its policy of extending its war adventure. We are bent on our policy, too. The great proletarian cultural revolution now under way in China is the biggest and best method of preparing against war.

—*"Commentator," writing in* Jen-min Jih-pao *(Peking), Sept. 17, 1966*.

Hanoi and Canton are closer than Washington and Chicago. Peking believes it likely that she will, as the Vietnam war extends more and more, find herself in a war with the mightiest power on earth, the United States—and all this at a time when a curtain of mistrust separates China from her former champion and formidable ally, the USSR. Is this a time for experimentation, for ambitious Leaps Forward with their attendant risks?

One would hardly think so, but there is another perspective in which the Cultural Revolution can be viewed. It would not make sense—given the manifest concern of Peking over the Vietnam war—to launch a new campaign at this time, *unless* the campaign were related to the Vietnam crisis and, indeed, designed to prepare China for any eventuality that might arise from that crisis. The primary reason for the Cultural Revolution, it seems to me, is precisely the dual threat of "revisionism" and "imperialism" which the dominant CCP leadership believes to be sharply accentuated by the Vietnam war. The Cultural Revolution is the Maoist fashion of girding China's loins to face possible armed struggle with the United States; it seeks to accomplish this in the "proletarian" manner consistent with CCP thinking and with the material and military limitations of China in her present stage of development. Five considerations may be briefly set forth to support this thesis.

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Peking's View of US Intentions

First, Peking must logically have been expected to make *some* response, other than mere words, to the expanding war in Vietnam. The Chinese leaders' record is not one of carelessness toward the cause of national salvation and national pride. They have long believed that it is an American plan to get at China by means of wars on her periphery. "America has decided to attack China from three main directions," declared *Jen-min Jih-pao* on November 6, 1950, "namely from Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam." In 1950 this belief led them to throw 250,000 men against MacArthur in Korea. In 1966 the signs, viewed from Peking, must appear remarkably similar. Indeed, the pattern of Chinese thinking from the latter part of 1950 bears a striking resemblance to that of 1966: the rising complaints about "air intrusions";[20] the anxiety about the role of reactionary elements within China if war comes;[21] the argument that "no nation can regard so menacing a situation near its borders without the deepest concern";[22] the "as close as lips and teeth" analogy;[23] the same complaints about Thailand and other US allies in the vicinity of China.[24]

"The fact that US military airplanes have repeatedly invaded China's territorial air," Peking cabled the United Nations Secretary-General on October 29, 1950, "proves that the US government is extending its atrocious action . . . to an encroachment on the coastal part of China."[25] There is no reason to think that China's reaction is any different today. Air intrusions—of which 1966 witnessed a number—are still regarded by Peking as the likely prelude to a bloody China-US confrontation. One might also recall the tension caused within China by the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958. Vietnam naturally gives rise to greater anxiety in China today than Quemoy and Matsu did then. Or, to take a parallel closer to home, one might recall the impact on US national thinking, both popular and governmental, of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962—or even of the Sputnik in October 1957. The Chinese are no less solicitous of their physical inviolability than other nations. Given their experiences, which are registered in the siege mentality of the CCP, they may be more so.

But does not Peking accept Washington's assurances that only North Vietnam, and not China, will be bombed? It does not seem so. The Chinese point back to 1950, when they believed themselves deceived about US intentions in Korea. In a November 19, 1950, analysis of the events there, the New China News Agency had this to say:

First, it was the story that no American troops would enter the Korean civil war. Two days after the war began, on June 27, U.P. Washington reported an Army spokesman as saying that it was not intended to send "either US army troops or marines into Korea to fight on the ground." With this useful beginning, U.P. on the next day was saying from Tokyo: "First American ground troops have been assigned to Korean war."

As it looks from Peking, Vietnam is certainly no less a threat than was Korea in the summer of 1950, and the Chinese believe that they learned valuable lessons about American intentions from the Korean experience. Armed with these lessons, they have made startling predictions about the expansion of the Vietnam war. Consider the following statement, reportedly made in confidence by a "very high official" in Peking in March 1965:

It is only the beginning. The Americans will send in hundreds of thousands of troops; they will bomb Hanoi; they will try to invade North Vietnam; then they will bomb China. . . Later, what previously happened to the Japanese will happen to them: the whole world will be against them, and they will never be able to sustain, as we can, a protracted war.[26]

Stiffening Chinese Position

Second, the record reveals that in the last two years Peking has sharply intensified the gravity and toughness of its statements on the Vietnam war. Back in January 1965, Mao told Snow that there could be an international conference on Vietnam, with the Geneva accords as the basis, without the prior withdrawal of US forces.[27] But in September 1966, Chinese Ambassador Wang Kuo-chuan reportedly told the US diplomatic representative in Warsaw that "the Geneva agreements were torn to shreds by the US Government long ago" and could no longer be used to "tie the hands of the people of Vietnam."[28] The Geneva accords were similarly described as "already non-existent" by T'ao Chu

[20] See NCNA reports, Nov. 14, 1950.
[21] *Ibid*, Oct. 2, Nov. 9 and 15, 1950.
[22] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Oct. 10, 1950.
[23] *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1950.
[24] NCNA, Oct. 6 and 18, 1950.
[25] *Ibid.*, Oct. 29, 1950.

[26] K.S. Karol in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Sept. 14, 1966.
[27] This and subsequent references to the Mao-Snow interview are based on the text published in *The Melbourne Age*, Feb. 24 and 25, 1965.
[28] *Peking Review*, Sept. 16, 1966.

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at a Peking rally soon after the first American bombing of oil facilities near Hanoi and Haiphong.[29] Moreover, Peking now requires the prior withdrawal of US forces and no longer talks of the possibility of a withdrawal *following* negotiations.[30]

Mao also told Snow in January 1965 that China would fight the United States *only* if her own territory were attacked. But in July 1966 an ominous new doctrine that the war has "no bounds" appeared. "Since by your aggressive actions you [the United States] have destroyed the bounds of the war," declared *Jen-min Jih-pao* on July 5, one week after the bombing of North Vietnamese oil installations, "all the countries and peoples that genuinely support the Vietnamese people's war of resistance against US aggression have also ceased to be subject to restrictions." Then this question: "Since you have come from the skies and the sea, why can't others fight back on the ground?" Again, celebrating the sixth anniversary of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam in December 1966, Peking announced a policy of preparedness to beat back the US "at any place and at any time." [31]

Mao told Snow two years ago that he thought the United States probably would not invade China. That hope now appears to be dead. By December 1966, Peking was flatly stating that China is included in US imperialism's criminal plan to enlarge the war." [32] Since the damage sustained by the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi on December 14, Peking's position has become even tougher, and there have been increasing references to "preparations against war." [33] The year 1966 also brought a toughened attitude in Peking towards the participation of Thailand in the US war effort. Bangkok was warned that it was "inevitably linking up Thailand with the Vietnam battlefield." [34]

Parallel Development

Third, the increasing gravity and toughness of the Chinese position on Vietnam synchronizes with the unfolding of the Cultural Revolution. Exaltation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and of its chief, Defense Minister Lin Piao, "closest comrade in arms" of Mao, has served as both the focus of the former and the vehicle for much of the latter. Space forbids a chronological treatment of the entire period of the Cultural Revolution, but the September 1965 session of the CCP Central Committee—not publicized at the time but only nine months later, in the context of the Cultural Revolution [35]—should be mentioned, as it appears to have been the springboard not only for intensified propaganda on the Vietnam war, but also for the first salvos in the cultural offensive, which were fired in November 1965 issues of *Wen Hui Pao* and *Chieh-fang Chün Pao*. Lin Piao's much-discussed essay, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," published in September 1965, and the elaborate press conference of Foreign Minister Chen Yi later the same month registered Peking's toughened international posture. "China is ready," said Chen Yi. "She has made all necessary preparations." [36] There was an increasing exaltation of the PLA as a "great school, to be imitated by all Chinese,[37] and the Fourth General Political Department Conference of the PLA (December 1965—January 1966)—like the Central Committee meeting three months previously—functioned as a powerhouse for further "cultural" attacks and for more talk of war. The PLA was called upon to "reinforce its war preparations so as to be ready at any instant to break the imperialist aggression of the USA." [38] At the same time, *Chieh-fang Chün Pao*, the organ of the PLA, assumed an importance comparable to that of *Jen-min Jih-pao* itself, publishing two of the key documents of the Cultural Revolution on April 18 and May 4. The double-barreled theme of the "cultural" offensive became the struggle against "revisionism" *and* "imperialism," in an atmosphere suffused with the siege mentality.

In their nature and historical origins the Red Guards are paramilitary,[39] and they have been taught to use grenades and bayonets, as well as to admire the spiritual greatness of the PLA. Lin Piao has called them "a powerful reserve force of the PLA." [40] The kind of solidarity embodied in the Guards smacks of the military—and their current deployment could even be viewed as a sort of test

[29] NCNA, July 22, 1966.
[30] At least since Ho Chi Minh's famous "Appeal" of July 17, 1966, and Liu Shao-ch'i's "Statement in Support of President Ho Chi Minh's Appeal" (July 22, 1966), this has been Peking's position. See T'ao Chu's insistence on "immediate" withdrawal of US forces, NCNA, July 22, 1966.
[31] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, cited in *The New York Times*, Dec. 21, 1966.
[32] *Peking Review*, Dec. 9, 1966, p. 26; also see *ibid.*, Dec. 23, 1966, p. 14.
[33] *E.g.*, *ibid.*, p. 15.
[34] *Ibid.*, May 20, 1966.
[35] *Chieh-fang Chün Pao*, June 6, 1966.
[36] *Le Monde*, Aug. 4, 1966.
[37] *Ibid.*, Aug. 21-22, 1966.
[38] *Ibid.*, Aug. 5, 1966.
[39] *Current Scene*, Sept. 5, 1966, p. 7.
[40] Quoted in *China News Summary*, (British Regional Information Office, Hong Kong) Oct. 6, 1966.

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mobilization of the nation. After one of the recent rallies, a Peking resident wrote (in a private letter seen by the author): "The impression one had was of the power and strength of the people militant." Another story points to a vital element in the whole atmosphere of the Cultural Revolution: A pro-Communist Peking resident recently received a complaint from a European visitor that it was terrible that the Chinese people should be "all of one mind." He replied that "if she lived in a city threatened by missiles from hundreds of enemy bases, she would be glad that the people were of one mind and wanting to stand together." [41] This resident, was, of course, defending the Cultural Revolution, but the argument he used significantly reflected the siege mentality prevailing in late 1966.

Several Chinese pronouncements, notably Mao's Army Day message of August 1, 1966, and an editorial in *Jen-min Jih-pao* of the same day, have placed new emphasis on the idea of "Everyone a soldier." Reminiscent of the vision of the supercession of the division of labor in *The German Ideology*, this concept requires, among other things, that every Chinese citizen be conversant with military affairs, so that the whole country will be an aspect, as it were, of the PLA. China's three nuclear tests during 1966 have also been firmly woven into the fabric of the Cultural Revolution, and in October the Chinese masses were shown a film on nuclear warfare which essentially carried the message that survival of a nuclear attack was perfectly possible if the right precautions were taken.[42] "Sturdy Pines" of the PLA like Lei Feng, who died fighting against "imperialism," are being held up as appropriate heroes to be emulated.[43] Among other more concrete signs of war preparation during 1966, it may be mentioned that China bought at least 40,000 tons of copper in the first eleven months of 1966, as compared with a 20,000-ton yearly average over the previous five years; and at least 20,000 tons of zinc in the first nine months of 1966, compared to 10,000 tons a year previously (cartridges are 70 percent copper, 30 percent zinc.) [44]

Chinese Statements

Fourth, the dominant elements in the CCP leadership have explicitly stated that an aim of the Cultural Revolution is to prepare the nation for possible war with the United States. "Good preparatory work for smashing the US imperialist war of aggression" requires study of the works of Mao, *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* wrote on June 6, 1966. "The great proletarian cultural revolution now under way in China is the biggest and best method of preparing against war," declared *Jen-min Jih-pao* on September 17. Foreign Minister Chen Yi has made many similar declarations, notably on September 6 and October 24, 1966. The vast December 18 rally in Peking, summoned to protest the December 13 and 14 bombings in North Vietnam (which apparently resulted in damage to the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi) made the link with Vietnam more explicit than ever before. "The great proletarian cultural revolution," said the declaration adopted at the rally, "is the most fundamental way for the Chinese people to make preparations against war so that they can . . . aid the Vietnamese people and oppose US . . . expansion of its war of aggression." [45]

It is already well known that at least since 1958 struggles have arisen within the CCP over questions of national defense, often with the implication that the losers were "revisionists." Late in 1966 such differences were referred to in connection with the Vietnam war. "On the question of the attitude [to be taken] towards the Vietnamese people's war against US aggression and for national salvation," Chen Yi said on December 18, "there has all along been a struggle between two lines. One is the line of resolutely supporting the Vietnamese people in the fight to the end to drive the US aggressors out of Vietnam. . . . The other is the line of . . betrayal . . . [which would allow the US] to continue its forcible occupation of southern Vietnam and perpetuate the division of Vietnam." [46] It seems that the "incorrect" line is held not only by Moscow but also by some elements in the CCP, and that these are among the "freaks and monsters" which the Cultural Revolution is designed to sweep away.

Resemblance With the Past

Fifth, there is a striking resemblance between the ideology of the Cultural Revolution and the ideology set forth in previous periods of external danger and external attack. For example, the "Sixteen Points" on the Cultural Revolution

[41] *Eastern Horizon*, Dec. 1966, p. 31.
[42] *China News Summary*, Oct. 6, 1966.
[43] *Ibid.*, Oct. 13, 1966.
[44] *The Economist* (London), Dec. 3, 1966.
[45] *Peking Review*, Dec. 23, 1966, p. 15.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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adopted by the August 1966 Central Committee meeting resemble Mao's "Policies, Measures and Perspectives for Resisting the Japanese Invasion," of July 1937:[47] "Mobilize the whole people" (1937); "Dare boldly to arouse the masses" (1966). "Give the people freedom to express their patriotism" (1937); "In the great proletarian cultural revolution, the only method is for the masses to liberate themselves" (1966). "There can be no victory in a national war without reliance on the great masses of the people" (1937); "The outcome of this great cultural revolution will be determined by whether the party leadership does or does not dare boldly to arouse the masses. . . . Trust the masses, rely on them and respect their initiative" (1966).

In the PLA, too, similar resemblances abound. The orders and slogans issued during the August 1966 PLA anniversary celebrations, for instance, might well have been plucked from the year 1941 or 1942. Earlier patterns of wartime cultural activity have also been held up for emulation. During the August Central Committee meeting, there was an exhibition illustrating the history of the World War II "Anti-Japanese Military and Political University" in Yenan,[48] coupled with an appeal in *Jenmin Jih-pao* (August 11) for the establishment of new institutions patterned after the Anti-Japanese University. Similar ideological parallels can also be found between the Cultural Revolution of 1966 and the "Resist America, Aid Korea" campaign of the Korean War period and, to a lesser extent, the line taken during the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958.

Some Further Observations

Many in the West have questioned how the turmoil which the Cultural Revolution promised to create could possibly have been expected to promote the unity which readiness for war requires. Of course, we do not know whether Mao expected as much opposition as has developed. It is difficult even to be sure how widespread the turmoil has been, since many of the reports are unconfirmed and many are couched in abstract ideological language. It does seem that some of the turmoil has been deliberately provoked by the Maoists. For example, the extension of the Cultural Revolution to industry, heralded by the suspension of the trade union organization on December 27, was apparently a calculated step.[49] It could have been a desperation move, but it is more likely to have been a move based on reasonable confidence that the Cultural Revolution was in control. It is not impossible, in other words, that the turmoil is actually serving a Maoist purpose. Peking *believes* that these witch-hunting campaigns do unite the country. "Destruction comes first, and construction comes in the course of destruction"[50]—such is one of the fundamental doctrines of Maoist theology.

The thought of Mao is regarded as a "monster detector"[51] for flushing out those who are unsound. Communist dictatorships have always tended to discipline people for sins of omission as well as of commission, as a method of strengthening social unity. The "thought of Mao" is the present weapon for achieving compulsory enthusiasm. We need not assume that the Peking leadership believes all the verbiage that is spread abroad. They probably do not talk to each other in the language of the *Peking Review*, any more than Catholic Cardinals talk to each other in the Latin chants of the mass. "There is no 'ism' in the world that transcends utilitarian considerations," Mao has written[52]—and Maoism is no exception. It has served a rational function effectively in past struggles, and it is now being extravagantly reinvoked for a new struggle.

As a means of girding China's loins for war, the Cultural Revolution accords with the understanding Mao has of how to fight a class foe who comes from outside. It is noted repeatedly that the Paris Commune fell, and the Hungarian socialist system very nearly fell, through the twin factors of ideological unsoundness and disunity within the revolutionary ranks and armed assault by enemies. "We must never, never forget these historical lessons paid for in blood," warned *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* (June 6, 1966).

A Final Assessment

So the coming of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the year 1966 is perhaps not such a paradox. Mao believes that Leninism was not "taken into the homes" of the Russian people, and that the

[47] The following six citations are alternately from Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. II (in English; Peking, 1965), p. 17; and "Decisions of the Central Committee of the CCP concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", in *Peking Review*, Aug. 12, 1966, pp. 7-8.

[48] *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), August 1966, p. 9.

[49] See *Le Monde*, Jan. 11, 1967.

[50] *Hung Ch'i*, Nov. 1, 1966.

[51] *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1966.

[52] *Selected Works* (in English), Vol. III, p. 85.

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Soviet revolution therefore remains incomplete. "Imperialism" at the gate is putting the Chinese revolution to the test; China will either win by the Maoist method of revolutionizing Chinese man himself, or fail and revert to "capitalism." There is no reason to think that China will rashly provoke battle with the United States, and several to think that she will not. But if the war in Vietnam expands much further, I believe the chances are that China will feel compelled to intervene, as she did in Korea.[53] For the Chinese Communist leaders believe that the threat at the gate, linked as it is in their minds with the dreaded class threat to the revolution, points a dagger at the heart of all that China has struggled for since the Opium Wars.

It has been suggested that those in the CCP who do not share the Maoist vision of how to meet the current threat are both on the "left" and the "right" of Mao, with Lo Jui-ch'ing as one of the "leftists" or "hardliners." [54] These terms may be misleading. Lo Jui-ch'ing's position is perhaps not so much "left adventurist" as it is one of orthodox, prudent military thinking which favors having China prepare for war much as other great states do. The "rightists" or "softliners" apparently have also advocated a "commonsense" approach to defending the country, that is, one placing considerable reliance on the might of the USSR. It may be that both positions are not so much positions to the "left" and "right" of Mao as simply varieties of disbelief in the Maoist vision of putting politics first, analyzing international relations in strictly class terms, and hence regarding the purity of the Chinese revolution as its best defense against all possible enemies, within and without. In other words, they are positions defined in terms of skepticism towards the Maoist vision. It would probably be a mistake to interpret the massive confidence which Mao has in the power and quality of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese masses as in any sense a "soft" or "dovelike" perspective on international relations. Nevertheless, one can appreciate how it could appear to be—in the eyes of "unbelievers" within the CCP—a kind of risky romanticism.

Mao's way of combatting "imperialism" is and always has been different from the Soviet way. It is a way that is more integral to Mao's understanding of building socialism within China than has been true in the case of the Soviet leaders, and the difference stems from the historical fact that the problem of "imperialism" was originally, and has continued to be, a more immediate one for the Chinese. Hence, perhaps, the eternal childhood of the Chinese revolution. Hence the siege mentality: a fortress is necessarily isolated, and China is both of those things today.

Hence, too, the increasing "offense" that the Chinese revolution causes to those abroad whose own "non-Chinese" hopes and emotions are invested in the Chinese experiment—who fondly believe China can be a model for other nations. There were even signs in 1966 that the pro-CCP foreign elements resident in or commuting to China have felt themselves a little bit cut off by the shrill "Chineseness" of the Cultural Revolution. "Making foreign things serve China" is a current cry.[55] It may be that the CCP is less interested in the rest of the world than we often fear and imagine. In the timeless haze of Peking, perhaps the Middle Kingdom is sufficient, and perhaps it matters more that foreigners come to bless than that they return to spark revolution in their own uncomprehending lands. Comrade Hill of Australia, unknown in Melbourne, but a celebrity in the world as seen from Peking and No. 1 guest at the 1966 National Day celebrations, is a kind of figment of the Maoist imagination—designed more to be an ornament than an agent. A whole generation of left-wing intellectuals drank deep at the fountains of Stalinism, only to spit it all out again when they discovered that foreign admirers can never really stand in solidarity with a great revolution that is not their own. The Cultural Revolution is perhaps teaching that same lesson to another generation of left-wing intellectuals, the "vicarious Chinamen" of our time.

But ultimately the Cultural Revolution can rightly be measured only by what it does, or does not do, for China. The Red Guards harass the people of China, no one else. Mao still quests impatiently for Communist community, built his way. Westerners, even most Western Communists, smile (if they do not curse) at this, for the Occidental quest for a community to replace liberal individualism has generally seemed to threaten more than it promised. But has not the 19th century taught us that China is not to be weighed on a Western scale? Europe and China are yet two worlds.

[53] The reasons why China has not so far intervened in Vietnam and the future possibilities of her intervention are touched upon in my "China and Vietnam," *The New Republic*, Oct. 29, 1966.

[54] In a penetrating analysis by Franz Schurmann, "What is Happening in China?", *The New York Review of Books*, Oct. 20, 1966, p. 24.

[55] *Peking Review*, Nov. 4, 1966, p. 33.

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Politics in Flux: II

EDITORS' NOTE: With the exception of Yugoslavia, the Communist regime in Hungary is the only one in Eastern Europe to have publicly recognized the need for change in the political realm in addition to institutional reforms in the economic sector. Mr. Lendvai analyzes the prospects for these reforms in the context of the October 1956 revolution and its aftermath and indicates that Hungary may well be entering a significant phase in its history. The article is the second in a series devoted to aspects of political change in the East European countries.

Hungary: Change vs. Immobilism

By Paul Lendvai

Continuity of the same political line by the same leadership was the central theme of the sober, business-like discussions of the 9th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party held in Budapest in late November 1966. The "Congress without surprises," as it has been called, was nevertheless an important event for it confirmed the impression that the Hungarian regime has firmly committed itself to significant, if not pervasive, political and economic reform. Contrary to deep-seated popular fears about a tightening of totalitarian controls, the Congress reaffirmed a middle-of-the-road policy with regard to the limits of dissent, to private initiative, to a *modus vivendi* with the Church as well as to some degree of cultural diversity. Secondly, it officially paved the way for economic reforms which will considerably increase the power of enterprise managers and remold the entire planning system. Finally, during the Congress itself, the first steps were taken toward a meaningful decentralization in the policy formation process.

Any attempt to define the essential characteristics of the present political situation or to measure the extent of possible reform must begin with the trauma of the 1956 revolt. Nothing in Hungary, par-

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ticularly the balance sheet of the ten years of Kadar's leadership, can be understood outside this context. Paradoxical as it may seem, the October tragedy of 1956 became an asset as well as a liability for the present regime. The profound disappointment with the West and the widespread political apathy which engulfed the population after the crushing of the revolt have contributed perhaps even more to the consolidation of the institutional framework of the Communist regime than the actual rooting out of the "counterrevolutionaries."

A high-ranking Communist functionary recently explained to the author in Budapest, "we both, the party and the non-Communist population, have become realists. . . ." This tacit mutual understanding of the limits beyond which there can be no maneuverability has provided the leadership with a base from which it attempts to bridge the gap between the non-Communist masses and the regime. The strategy was introduced in 1957-58, and it has been on the whole more successful than one would have expected in the dark days following the Soviet intervention. But it has not solved the dilemma of how to grant a modicum of freedom and economic satisfaction to the population without stimulating popular pressures for real liberalization and an end to the party's monopoly of power. The shifts in Kadar's approach to this basic dilemma have been inextricably bound up with the impact of the second destalinization campaign and the ramifications of the Sino-Soviet conflict on the one hand and with the relative strength of those "leftists" and dogmatists in the party who played a key role in the rebuilding of the Communist power apparatus on the other.

Wooing the Masses

The change in the psychological climate of the country which produced a period of mutual accommodation between the regime and the people actually began in 1959-1960. Despite the disastrous collectivization campaigns between December 1958 and March 1962 the emphasis in the relationship between the party and the population has shifted from coercion to persuasion, from threatening the "suspects" to wooing the "passive." The 22nd CPSU Congress, the evolving "special relationship" between Janos Kadar and a victorious Nikita Khrushchev, and the expulsion of the old Rakosi leadership from the party in August 1962—a symbolic act for many Hungarians—provided a powerful impulse toward satisfying some of the basic aspirations of the population. A noticeable change in Kadar's political style, greater responsiveness to public opinion and peripheral concessions to "the consumer" unquestionably produced a certain relaxation of tension.

None of these concessions or attempts to improve the party image has impaired the party's power, however, nor do they herald the dawn of a "liberal era." Nevertheless one should not overlook the political influence and *psychological* significance of changes such as a certain freedom of movement, the striking increase, by Hungarian standards, in consumer durables (e.g., the threefold increase in private automobiles since 1960 to 100,000 in 1965), and the influx of foreign tourists including the return of many Hungarian refugees.[1] In many instances, the principle that non-Communists can hold important managerial positions has been translated into reality. Trained administrators have to some extent replaced old party cadres in the managerial bureaucracy. Ability and academic performance rather than class origin have by and large become the conditions for university admission. Finally, private initiative has been encouraged in agriculture, commerce and small industries.[2] This "soft" line yielded its tangible fruits in October 1964 after the fall of Khrushchev, when Kadar, the very symbol of tyranny and treason in 1956, was generally regarded as *the guarantee* against a return to repression.

As time has shown, however, the population's willingness to come to terms with the regime did not imply any unconditional popular support, for no real broadening of the political basis of the political system had taken place. A few months after Khrushchev's fall, when the Hungarian party leadership admitted that it had been living on borrowed time and announced an austerity program, the popular mood changed from toleration to one of

[1] The number of Hungarians travelling to the West rose from 16,000 in 1958 to 165,000 in 1965. During January-September 1966, 2.6 million foreign tourists (half of them transit travellers) and 260,000 cars entered Hungary. Over 70,000 tourists of Hungarian origin, one-third of them "October refugees," visited the country in 1966. Under the terms of the 1963 amnesty, refugees have been pardoned provided they had not committed "serious crimes" prior to their flight. (*Nepszabadsag*, Jan. 28 and Feb. 3, 1967.)

[2] There are about 70,000 private shopkeepers and artisans. Private plots of the collective farmers and the remaining private farmers (three percent) account for 13 percent of the arable land, 60 percent of the orchards, 50 percent of the cattle and pigs and 90 percent of the poultry. According to Vice Premier Lajos Feher (*Nepszabadsag* April 8, 1966), private plots account for 23.4 percent of total agricultural production. In his speech at the party Congress, Kadar and other leaders explicitly acknowledged the "usefulness and necessity" of small private enterpreneurs in industry and retail trade as well as the importance of the private plots. (*Nepszabadsag* Nov. 29, Dec. 3, 1966.)

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growing frustration, disenchantment and anger. A higher standard of living and the hope for more concessions to the consumers proved to have been the main prop of a deceptive political stability.

The revelation that the "country was living beyond its means" [3] and the announcement that the "higher standard of living" would have to be "stabilized" rather than increased came as something of a shock to the whetted appetites of the population. Although a number of economists and experts in the top and middle party echelons had recognized the necessity for a slowdown much earlier, the leadership—following its "fateful preference for tactical concessions to strategic solutions," [4]—reacted to the deepening economic crisis too late and too timidly. Kadar had tried to proffer real, if limited, concessions in order "to release the energies of the masses" without providing permanent and reliable incentives for better work and without changing the basic components of the old command economy. In the same manner he attempted to rally Communists and non-Communists around his concept of "socialist national unity" without giving the non-party groups access to the process of policy formation, and without providing any institutional framework to deal with the diversity of interests in Hungarian society.

In his report to the recent party congress, Kadar admitted some "serious shortcomings" in the economic field, but nevertheless declared that the targets of the second five-year plan had been "basically" fulfilled. Despite the party's declared intention not to avoid "ticklish questions," the main speakers and the concluding resolution neatly glossed over the most blatant failures. Although industrial output during the 1961-65 period rose by 47 percent, performance fell short of the planned targets in the key sectors. The gross national product, for example, rose only 25 percent as against the projected 36 percent, farm output increased 10 percent instead of the planned 22 percent, and real wages nine percent instead of 13 percent.

The moment of truth actually came in late 1965 when, as a prelude to the economic reform, food prices and service charges rose sharply and higher taxes were imposed on "medium and high" income groups. Although these measures were economically justified, even overdue, their timing and implementation showed both a lack of candor and tactical dexterity. Three weeks earlier Vice-Premier Jenö Fock had flatly denied rumors about an impending price increase. When the announcement of the increase finally came, it dealt a serious blow to credibility.[5] Following a barrage of belated explanations and revelations about the distorted price structure and the extent of subsidies, the regime tried to curb the growth of discontent by reverting to threats and arrests of "rumor-mongers" and anti-state "plotters." The wave of arrests during the first half of 1966, the "vigilance campaigns" and the warnings against the invidious "loosening-up tactics of the imperialists" dramatized this loss of confidence.

The party daily described popular discontent as "unfounded" and "unjust." [6] Actually, the "temporary political difficulties"—instability and crisis of confidence—are directly related to the legacy of the October revolt, to the shaky claim of the Kadar leadership to legitimacy and consequently to the absence of any national sentiment which might have served to broaden the popular support of the regime. Kadar's centrist line was ideally suited to the task of reconstructing and consolidating the totalitarian system which was swept away in October 1956, and it skillfully fluctuated between "relative permissiveness and relative oppression." [7] The much-publicized stability, however, between 1964 and 1966 became no more than a facade. Aggravated by the burdens of rearmament and the repayment of Soviet and other bloc credits after the revolt, the Hungarian economy could simply not support a politically motivated, artificial "prosperity." With the experiences of 1956 still fresh in their minds, the Kadar leadership opted for immobilism as far as the basic issues were concerned.

The New Compromise

Kadar's new formula for change presented before and during the November Party Congress appears to mark an end to a long period of political

[3] *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, January 1966.

[4] One of the foremost Hungarian economists and member of the preparatory commission for the economic reforms to the author in an "off-the-record" conversation in October 1965.

[5] See Fock's speech and an interview with him in which he blamed "unfortunate cuts" of his prepared text for the "misunderstandings." *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 19 and Dec. 30, 1965. According to personal information from highly reliable sources, the leadership was split over the timing of the announcements.

[6] *Nepszabadsag*, April 24, July 5, July 24, and Aug. 26, 1966.

[7] See Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alternatives for Change" in *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1966.

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deadlock and economic stagnation even though it represents only a compromise between the forces of change and those of immobilism. The debate about "socialist democracy," the electoral reform, the extension of the rights of the trade unions, workers' control over plant management, and the economic reforms clearly indicates that a major attempt will be made to get the country moving again. More important than the projected new forms of genuine public participation is the leadership's public acknowledgement of the existence of group interests and group conflicts. As the Congress resolution pointed out:

The basic interests of all strata of society are identical and thus there has been formed a broad national unity with regard to the most important political issues, the building of socialism, and the defense of peace. Within this [unity], however, there may appear, for objective and subjective reasons, in some cases temporary but with respect to certain issues even more lasting differences between certain social strata, groups, or between local and public interests respectively. The contradictory interests and differences of opinion find expression also in debates. The party carefully studies these and takes them into account before the formulation of its policy.[8]

It is interesting to note that while the ideological directives of the party in March 1965 spoke only vaguely about group interests and "reconciling different interests in accordance with the principles of socialism," the party leaders have lately been much more explicit in their approach to "non-antagonistic" group conflicts in politics. For example, Istvan Szirmai, the leading ideological spokesman of the Politburo, has described "the bold fight of workers' groups to protect their interests" as an important condition for socialist democracy and for "the appropriate integration of group interests."[9] At the Congress, the trade union leader and Politburo member, Sandor Gaspar, called for bringing "the smaller and bigger differences and conflicts of interests into the open to resolve existing tensions and differences."[10]

A closer look at the new program reveals that the regime is attempting simultaneously to carry out a meaningful economic decentralization, defeat the crippling inertia in public affairs by attracting greater genuine group participation in politics, and reinforce the party's institutional primacy "by perfecting and adapting its leading role to the new state of social development."[11]

As a first step toward "broadening socialist democracy," Parliament enacted a new electoral law in November 1966 which for the first time since 1947 gives voters the possibility of choosing between two or more candidates in electoral districts instead of approving a single list.[12] Candidates can be proposed at meetings organized by the electoral committees of the Patriotic People's Front, and elected representatives may be recalled by their constituents. (Previously, the single-list procedure did not provide the possibility of recalling an incompetent or "unworthy" deputy.) The final selection of the candidates, however, will be made by local commissions of the People's Front which are dominated by the representatives of the party apparatus. Dispelling the "well-meaning anxiety" of some people who inquired about what happens if a meeting nominates two national leaders, *Nepszabadsag* explained that the validity of the nominations will be subject to final approval by the National Council of the People's Front.[13] In his closing address to the Congress, Kadar clearly defined the limits of this broadening process: "Since the party leads society, it is only natural that party members, Communists, play the main role in social life. . . . It is necessary and unavoidable in political life that the Communists will be the majority in the leading bodies of state power."[14]

Although both the new nominating and election procedures represent very limited progress indeed, especially compared with the reforms in Yugoslavia, they do constitute a step toward more genuine elections. More important, the new electoral law is only one aspect of a large "reform package" aimed at enlarging the responsibilities of the elected state bodies from Parliament to the local councils. The elections slated for the spring of 1967 will indicate how far the party is willing to transform these constitutional reforms into reality. In this respect, the proposed new law on the competence of local councils and the draft of the new constitution, due to be published shortly, will provide further clues.

Seeds of Pluralism?

The general trend toward a greater measure of genuine autonomy for Parliament and the lower- and middle-echelon state and economic organs became evident as early as August 1965 when *Tarsadalmi*

[8] *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 4, 1966.
[9] *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, November 1965.
[10] *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 2, 1966.
[11] *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 4, 1966.
[12] *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 12, 1966.
[13] *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 13, 1966.
[14] *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 29, 1966.

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Szemle, the party's theoretical monthly, published an unparalleled attack by Professor Otto Bihari on the theory and practice of "push-button" decision-making. Maintaining that "one should break with the pseudo-scientific view that calls for swift and debate-free decisions and their execution," Bihari called on the party to recognize the fact that "issues which affect the interests of the greater part of the population cannot be decided without consulting the collective bodies and the population." The Communist scholar pointed out that the small Presidential Council had been usurping the legislative and other prerogatives of Parliament for years. In 1962, for example, Parliament approved only five laws, while the Presidential Council promulgated 28 legally binding decrees (among them amendments to the Labor Law, the criminal code, along with rules affecting social courts, road building, etc.), which "because of their content and significance could have been presented to Parliament." [15]

In addition to changes in electoral procedures, Professor Bihari also suggested a more active role for the parliamentary commissions, including the right to supervise the drafting of bills and decrees, the introduction of plebiscites and unequivocal legal regulations defining the competence of local councils and their executive organs. Since the publication of Bihari's critical study, discussions on the nature of "socialist democracy" have appeared in the press, at party school conferences and in the theoretical monthlies, where they are regarded as *the* key problem facing the regime. In a sense, the discussion is no longer merely the result of the growing diversity within the body politic but a factor of perhaps even far-reaching significance in the differentiation process which ultimately leads to a more pluralistic system.

Trade Union Prospects

Apart from a considerable expansion of the responsibilities of enterprise managers,[16] the new reform will promote a certain rejuvenation of the trade unions. Before and after the revolution these had served purely as rather secondary "conveyer belts" for the party. In the future, enterprises will be controlled partly by the ministries, partly by teams of experts and supervisory boards, but participation of the workers in plant management and their control over certain non-economic activities will be assigned to the trade unions. However, the Hungarian leadership, ever mindful of the October revolt and the role of the workers' councils, is firmly and publicly opposed to any restoration of the workers' councils. As Rezso Nyers, the secretary of the Central Committee in charge of the reform projects, explained: "It would not be correct to combine the expansion of enterprise autonomy with the system of 'workers' self-government' because we could expect from it neither the increase of economic efficiency, nor the development of socialist democracy." [17]

Any optimism about the future role of the unions should be tempered with a healthy dose of caution, especially if one remembers the fate of the "factory councils" set up after the 1956 revolt.[18] Nevertheless, with respect to the present lively debate about the role of the unions, it is necessary to place the projected changes in proper context. There are, after all, two fairly important *new* factors to be taken into account: first, the leadership has now publicly acknowledged the existence of conflicting group interests and the need to cope with their diversity; second, the framework within which the unions operate—above all, the autonomy at the enterprise level—will be broadened to a considerable extent.

According to Sandor Gaspar, the rights of the unions will be expanded at all levels. One of his most intriguing suggestions concerns the possibility of a public airing of disputes between the unions and the state organs or between the Trade Union Council and the government. In Gaspar's words: "If the unions keep silent or gloss over contradictory interests, these might become sharper and cause grave political, economic problems." Consequently trade unions at the enterprise level will be accorded certain rights of "decision, consent and opinion." While unions will only have the right to decide cultural, health, and social matters, managers can make decisions on issues such as the wage fund, and the size of the labor force, only with union consent. On other matters management must con-

[15] Otto Bihari, "A Képvisekti demokrácia" in *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, August 1965.

[16] *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 21, 1965, and May 29, 1966.

[17] Nyers' speech in *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 21, 1965.

[18] Factory councils with two-thirds of the members delegated by the trade union committees were set up on Nov. 17, 1957. Their role was expanded as "organs of factory democracy and workers' self-government" on May 23, 1963. They lacked influence, however, and were dissolved in 1966, their activities taken over by union organs "at the request of old union members since the councils failed to fulfill their role." *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 2, 1966.

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sult the unions before announcing a decision, but is not obliged to accept the union's opinion. Union representatives will also be consulted in the case of appointments and dismissals of managers.[19] The exact delineation of their authority, including the right of veto and mediation procedures, will be laid down in the new enterprise code and collective bargaining agreements currently being drawn up by the government and the trade union bodies.

Both Gaspar and other trade union spokesmen have made a point of repeatedly stressing that "there are not and cannot arise any conflicts between the unions and the supreme state organs since they serve identical class interests." The unions are "independent non-party organizations . . . guided and controlled by the party. Their independence means that they carry out the party policy under special circumstances as a mass organization. Thus they cannot form any kind of political nucleus outside the party." [20] With regard to the proposed creation of territorial unions of collective farms and the establishment of a National Council of Collective Farms for the protection of the interests of the collectivized farmers, Kadar has also warned: ". . . let us have no misunderstanding, they will not protect their interests vis-à-vis the . . . state but vis-à-vis the individual state enterprises." [21]

Before the unions or the new associations can even begin to act as spokesmen for the groups they claim to represent, a more democratic process of leadership selection is clearly necessary and to some extent inevitable. As recently explained in the party press:

The broadening of the rights and powers of the unions can only achieve the desired effects if the inner democracy of the unions is considerably strengthened, if union leaders truly express the opinions of their members on every question and regularly inform them about what they have done to protect their interests.[22]

Risks and Dilemmas

The regime faces a serious dilemma in accommodating these conflicting interests. For example, how can the non-party technocrats run enterprises or trade unions protect the interests of labor when, according to the recent amendments to the party statutes, "every local party organization should exercise comprehensive control over operations in their area and make the leaders submit reports to them"? Or how can the leadership avoid impeding professional mobility and crippling individual initiative when the party makes pointed references "to the consequent application of the principle that, with regard to certain functions, the approval or opinion of the appropriate party organs should be asked in cases of appointments or dismissals"? This implied continued supervision of personnel selection by the apparatchiks may well "enhance the guiding and controlling role of the party," but surely this kind of "guidance" will tend to shackle creative energies and restore widespread apathy.

The present trend away from command planning in the economy and the gradual replacement of direct administrative controls by more sophisticated monetary and fiscal instruments represent a clear-cut victory for the advocates of managerial autonomy and for the reformers in general. But in attempting to infuse new economic and political dynamism into society, the Kadar leadership is taking a calculated risk. Is it possible, for example, to dispel popular apathy and indifference by substantive reform without diluting the inner cohesion of the party and weakening its monopoly of power? How can the regime make the people believe in the possibility of change while simultaneously reassuring the political bureaucracy that it will continue to be the supreme arbiter and calling for a new much-needed "sense of mission" on the part of the party membership? Caught in the contradiction between vital economic necessities and political power interests, the leadership has not yet found a way to reconcile these conflicting exigencies.

Resistance to economic reform emanates from two sources—the central administrators accustomed to "easy" command planning, and the apparatchiks at the lower and middle echelons whose security is menaced by the introduction of non-party experts into responsible jobs. In addition, while many economists and a majority of the technical intelligentsia hold that the reforms are being implemented too slowly and that politically-motivated compromises cannot bring about a real "breakthrough," influential party members are worried about the erosion of the party's power and about the crystallization of social and economic interest groups which will eventually demand decision-making power. Popular discontent in the wake of the recent price hikes has added unexpected weight to the arguments of the

[19] Gaspar's interview in *Nepszabadsag*, June 19, and Dec. 2, 1966; See also *Nespszava*, Aug. 7, 1966; and *Munka*, August 1966.

[20] *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, September 1966.

[21] *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 4, 1966. For more details about the projected role of councils as "economic centers" and interest groups, see Lajos Feher's speech at the Party Congress as reported in *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 3, 1966.

[22] *Nepszabadsag*, Dec. 21, 1966. For a discussion of factory democracy, see *Nepszabadsag*, May 15, 1966.

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opponents of reform. Failing to understand the real causes of the country's economic plight, many elements of the population have blamed the belt-tightening on the economic reorganization. An unnatural, if only temporary, alliance between the retrograde forces in the political hierarchy and the disgruntled consumers could conceivably delay the whole reform program.

In the face of these problems, Kadar is playing for time, appealing to the members of the reform commissions to abstain from any "individual interpretation" of the reform resolution and from airing their doubts and reservations, even if justified. "It would disturb the preparations," he claimed "if, in the present phase, complex and difficult questions to which no answer has yet been found would be debated publicly." [23] The essential elements of the reforms do not take effect until January 1, 1968. Despite the adoption of the Central Committee resolution in May 1966, the scope and pace of the projected measures remains the subject of considerable disagreement between those primarily responsible for their implementation.

Rocks and Shoals Ahead

Even prior to the launching of the reform, Kadar, Biszku and other party leaders openly admitted that there were persistent "leftist-sectarian and rightist-revisionist influences" operating within the party. In the four-year period that separated the last two party congresses, some 26,000 members have been subjected to disciplinary measures for a variety of offenses ranging from loose moral conduct and corruption to "anti-party views." [24] The Central Control Commission report hinted that many of those guilty of the latter offense were expelled from the party because they were "leftists." At any rate, the number of party members expelled because of their "anti-party views" was small, officially no more than 200, none of them in policy-making positions. The projected reorganization of the Hungarian economy and the changes in the political system envisaged in the reforms have engendered widespread debate, as well as concern, especially among party functionaries, that their prerogatives might be weakened, despite Kadar's warning that the practice of debating after a resolution has been adopted is "intolerable."

The available evidence suggests that the conflict between the dynamic forces in society and bureaucratic immobilism will continue and probably intensify, particularly once the reform is set in motion. Added to this will be the continuing mutual distrust between the party and the non-Communist population—party membership constitutes only eight percent of the adult population [25]— which cannot be expected to diminish until the reforms have some palpable effect. For the masses, the party's commitment to significant reform seems as yet equivocal, an impression hardly dispelled by such recent statements as "the questions related to economic democracy are extremely complex, and many problems have to be clarified to enable us to resolve them." [26]

There are other factors that should be kept in mind, however, which tend to brighten the picture as far as the intentions of those in power are concerned. Hungary's 11-member Politburo is composed of relatively young—their average age is about 50—and pragmatic men. The stability in the top leadership since 1957 would also indicate a high degree of consensus with regard to basic issues. Further, the promotion of 43-year-old Rezso Nyers, a former Social Democrat and possibly the best political talent postwar Hungary has produced, to full membership on the Politburo and to Chairman of the key Economic Commission of the Central Committee, represents a clear gain for the reformers. These latter must sooner or later realize, as the course of the Yugoslav reform has demonstrated, that economic decentralization and strengthened party domination cannot go hand in hand, and that real group participation is impossible without new institutions to cope realistically with the problem of competition for power within a one-party system.[27]

Even allowing for temporary setbacks and reversals and discounting the likelihood of dramatic shifts in the power structure, Hungary has definitely entered a new phase of her turbulent history. Barring spectacular failures at home and major upheavals abroad, however, the cumulative effects of the economic reform and political experimentation could eventually lead to a more pluralistic system.

[23] *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, July-August 1966.
[24] *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 30, 1966.
[25] *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 29, 1966.
[26] *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, December 1966. For the basic problems involved in the diversity and conflict of group interests and a veiled criticism of the party's timid approach, see essays by Andras Hegedüs, former Premier and leader of the sociological group of the Academy of Sciences in *Valosag*, March 1965, *Kortars*, August 1966, and *Kozgazdasagi Szemle*, July-August 1966. His outspoken statements and the debate about alienation in *Valosag* were the main reasons for his dismissal as editor of *Valosag* in July 1965.
[27] See Rudolf Bićanić, "Economics of Socialism," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1966.

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The Soviet Elite: II

EDITORS' NOTE: In the last issue, Mr. Hough examined the changing status of major Soviet institutions as reflected in the 1966 party elections and speculated on related policy implications in the post-Khrushchev period. The present article explores the changes and continuities in the central and republican party committee memberships and attempts to assess the significance of these developments for the future.

In Whose Hands the Future?

By Jerry Hough

After the deaths of both Lenin and Stalin, collective rule was instituted by the closest lieutenants of the deceased leader; yet, within five years, one of their number succeeded in having almost all of his powerful colleagues removed in disgrace. The elections to the 1966 Central Committee suggest that the top Soviet leaders are acutely aware of this historic trend. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that they have discovered a way to eliminate the possibility of any such recurrence while still promoting a necessary administrative modernization.

As a result of the elections, seasoned members of the Central Committee continue to occupy high political and administrative positions with the result that the most powerful jobs in the Soviet Union remain largely in the hands of men in their fifties with long years of party administrative experience. Yet, the elections to the republican central committees in 1966 show that an increasing number of new, presumably younger men have moved into important positions at the lower levels. In a very meaningful way these new men seem to comprise a different "generation" from their immediate superiors—a generation with a rather different set of experiences and perspectives. Unless the Soviet system becomes quite rigid—and there is still little

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reasons to assume that it will—it is by the perspectives and attitudes of this new generation that the future of Russia is likely to be shaped.

Continuity in Central Personnel

When one compares the composition of the all-Union Central Committee of the CPSU selected in 1966 with that named in 1961, the impression is one of great stability in membership.[1] In 1961 there were 175 full members of the Central Committee, nine of whom had died by early 1966. Of the remaining 166 members, 83 percent were named to the 1966 Central Committee. This percentage would be even higher if we exclude Nikita Khrushchev, Alexei Adzhubei, and a few other men associated very closely with the deposed leader. In contrast, less than 50 percent of the still living full members of the 1956 Central Committee were re-elected to the Central Committee in 1961.

Indeed, the continuity in certain key categories of personnel is quite remarkable, given the cataclysmic organizational and political changes that have occurred since 1961. Over 70 percent of the obkom first secretaries on the 1966 Central Committee and Auditing Commission were already at that level in the hierarchy in the fall of 1961, and another 15 percent of them had become obkom first secretaries by the summer of 1963. Again it is interesting to recall that less than one-third of the obkom secretaries on the 1961 committees had reached that level at the time of the 20th Party Congress in 1956.

Similarly, if we examine the biographies of the 36 USSR ministers in charge of industry, construction, and transportation in 1966, we find that 14 of them had been ministers in 1957 (three of them since 1940) and that an additional 13 had reached the deputy minister level by that time (at least six in the Stalin period). Of the other ministers in 1966, six had been plant directors in the 1940's while a seventh had been named obkom first secretary in 1953. Over half of all these men have more than 20 years' experience as plant directors or higher, and at least another 25 percent have over 15 years' experience at this level.

Of course, no group of officials is impervious to change. The more stable the personnel, the more susceptible the administrative system is to the inevitable process of aging. It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the most notable developments of the last five years has been the aging of the Soviet top administrative elite. The average age of the full members of the Central Committee increased from 49 in 1952 to 51 in 1956, 52 in 1961, and 56 in 1966. As the accompanying chart on page 20 indicates, this increase in average age reflects the aging of nearly all types of key administrative personnel.

Soviet leaders have asserted that stability among the administrative elite is the result of a conscious policy and that it is associated with the general goal of ensuring "objectivity" and "balance" in decision-making. According to the first secretary of the Krasnodar kraikom, "in the last year and a half the Central Committee has made a very important turn (*povorot*) in its work with personnel and has ended [a policy of] mass transfers (*perestanovak*).[2] Leonid Brezhnev himself spoke at the Congress about "the unjustified transferring and replacing of personnel" which had taken place earlier.[3]

Others have explicitly linked this policy with a desire for more experienced administrators. While some officials may still speak of the desirability of training younger personnel, they now emphasize that this requires the presence of older colleagues. In the words of N. A. Shchelokov, formerly second secretary of the Moldavian Central Committee and as of September 1966 USSR Minister of Public Order, (who incidentally had been a raikom secretary in Dnepropetrovsk in 1938 and chairman of the gorispolkom from 1939 to 1941):

The republican party organization cannot but be perturbed by such questions as the combined use of young and old supervisory personnel. As is well known, we have gone to extremes in this matter in recent years.[4]

To a similar statement the first secretary of the Tbilisi gorkom added the warning, "We must not bury in oblivion the Leninist instruction that capable leaders should be promoted to responsible posts only after a ten-year testing period." [5]

[1] Through the addition of 20 full memberships to the Central Committee, the Soviet leadership did fulfill the old statutory requirement of 25 percent "renewal": fully 25.1 percent of the present voting members were newly elected in 1966. However, the percentage of old members removed was much smaller.

[2] *Pravda*, April 7, 1966.

[3] *Pravda*, March 30, 1966.

[4] *Sovetskaia Moldaviia*, March 4, 1966. The biography of this man (N. A. Shchelokov) can be found in *Who's Who in the USSR 1965/66* New York, The Scarecrow Press, 1966, p. 750. In September 1966 Shchelokov was named USSR Minister of Public Order. It should be noted that L. Brezhnev was one of the obkom secretaries in Drepropetrovsk from 1939 to 1941.

[5] *Zaria vostoka*, May 5, 1966.

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Adaptability in Question

While age and experience may be indispensable for knowledgeable decisions, there comes a point when they may deaden a man's ability to respond creatively to new circumstances. An institution whose personnel policy emphasizes these attributes must face up to the problem of ensuring sufficient change in personnel to prevent bureaucratic stagnation. A party dedicated to the transformation of society must be particularly alert to this danger.

As Professor John Armstrong has suggested, personnel stability is already threatening the efficiency of the Soviet administrative system. Contending that the "obkom secretaries have probably passed their primes in terms of the extremely diverse and complex supervisory duties confronting them," Armstrong concludes: "Probably the Soviet system as a whole will have to pay for the situation by reduced industrial efficiency for several years to come." [6]

[6] John A. Armstrong, "Party Bifurcation and Elite Interests," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XVII, No. 4, April 1966, p. 428.

On the surface, at least, this judgment about the obkom first secretaries may be unduly harsh. As a result of the substantial purge of the party apparatus in 1960-61, the provincial party secretaries remain fairly young by Western standards, and the level of their technical competence has risen considerably during the last decade. As we shall see later, the first secretaries in the industrialized regions continue to be men with very considerable industrial experience.

The problem of the adaptability of industrial and military administrators to modern exigencies, however, appears to be quite serious. A 57-year-old industrial administrator may not be considered unduly old in comparison with industrial executives in the US and elsewhere. Yet the Soviet administrators, over three-fourths of whom had become plant directors during the Stalin period, may well be unwilling or psychologically unable to promote the radically different relationship between ministry and plant essential to effective modernization.

The situation in the Ministry of Defense is even more striking. The top military official in the Ministry, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, for example, became a soldier during World War I, and the

Average Age of Officials in the Central Committee and Auditing Commission [a]

	1952	1956	1961	1966
Central Party Secretaries (excluding the First Secretary)	50	54	58[b]	55
Heads of Central Committee Departments	—	49	52	56[c]
Republican Party First Secretaries	47	49	51	54
Republican Party Second Secretaries	—	50	48	50[d]
Obkom First Secretaries	46	48	48	51[d]
Industrial Administrators [e]	48	52	54	57
Department of Defense Officials [f]	—	56	59	64
Foreign Affairs Officials	—	52	54	59

[a] Since these figures include candidate members of the Central Committee and members of the Auditing Commission, they are not strictly comparable to the average ages cited for full members of the Central Committee.
[b] This figure is distorted by the presence of the aged Kuusinen in the secretariat. If he is excluded, the average age would be 55.
[c] It was impossible to find the year of birth for a number of the new department heads. These men may not lower the average significantly or they may be sufficiently young to reduce it by a number of years.
[d] It was possible to identify the year of birth for eight of 13 republican second secretaries and 76 of 94 obkom first secretaries. Without any adjustment the average age of each group would have been midway between 52 and 53. However, the unidentified men are usually newcomers to this level of the hierarchy, and their career patterns often suggest a younger age. Since the age of the other new party officials was usually in the 45-50 range, we have assumed a 1920 year of birth for the unidentified men, and the figures in the table reflect that adjustment. In the case of the obkom secretaries, any average year of birth from 1919 to 1923 for the unidentified men would have produced an average age of 51 for the whole group.
[e] Included in this figure are the ministers and chairmen of state committees in the industrial and construction realm, the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers and the Gosplan officials specializing in industry, and (in 1961) the sovnarkhoz chairmen.
[f] This figure includes only the Minister of Defense and the Deputy Ministers of Defense. If the commanders of the military districts had been included the average age would have dropped; if a number of inspector-generals had been included, it would have increased.

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heads of the Air Force and the strategic rocket forces were both in uniform prior to 1920. In fact, with one exception all of the deputy ministers of defense entered the armed forces by 1920 and presumably fought either in World War I or in the Civil War.

The failure to rejuvenate both the industrial and military officialdom is indeed striking considering the particular demands of innovation in these areas. One cannot easily avoid the suspicion that many of the leaders fear any sizable shake up of the Central Committee on the grounds that it would menace collective leadership and the regime's present, cautious policy based on compromise and negotiation.

Such a fear is not an idle one. Because of the crucial role of the secretariat in personnel selection, members of the Central Committee do not have any really independent power base. Rather they are men whose power rests upon a bureaucratic position to which they have no permanent claim and whose tenure in that position has—in the past at least—depended on their satisfying their superiors, particularly those in the secretariat. For this reason the Soviet political system has always been particularly susceptible to the creation by the First Secretary of a personal political machine within the Central Committee. If there is a fairly substantial turnover among the country's top administrators, the accompanying changes in Central Committee membership may destroy the base for any stable collective leadership.

Yet, the leadership faces a serious dilemma. If this turnover does not occur, administrative dynamism and adaptability will be difficult to maintain. If the leadership tries to resolve the dilemma by parceling out the power of personnel selection to several individuals representing either key factions, institutional hierarchies, or territorial party organizations, then it will be extremely difficult to avoid widespread pressure for change in the basic political system itself. It is a dilemma which must be faced in the next five years—a dilemma which is of basic political importance in the present period.

Harbingers of Change?

If we turn our attention from the level of officials represented in the all-Union Central Committee to the men just below this administrative level, we find much less stability.

In particular, the rates of turnover in the republican central committees stand in marked contrast to those in the center. While the percentage of renewal of all-Union Central Committee members required by the Party Rules (25 percent) was barely met, the turnover required for the republican central committees (33 percent) was substantially exceeded. In the Ukraine over 40 percent of the full members of the 1961 central committee were not re-elected in 1966, in Belorussia over 45 percent, and in Uzbekistan over 50 percent. In the three smaller republics studied—Latvia, Georgia, and Moldavia—(where there were intervening Party Congresses in 1963 or 1964) 55-60 percent of the 1961 members were removed by 1966.

Some of this turnover may be attributed to the rotation of military personnel outside the republic in question and to changes in the worker-peasant members, but the 1961 members who were party officials and republican administrators have also been removed at a rather high rate. In the three large republics over 40 percent of these men were not re-elected, in the three small republics over 50 percent.

In certain key categories of republican party officials the turnover is even greater than a study of central committee membership indicates. While 11 of the 14 republican first secretaries in 1966 held the same posts in 1961 (and two of those removed were promoted to central posts conferring Politburo membership), 38 of the other 56 secretaries have been replaced in the last five years, 17 of them in the post-Khrushchev period. In a number of the republics all of the heads of the departments of the central committees were replaced, while in others (the Ukraine excepted) the turnover approached 100 percent.

Not all of these party officials have been removed from prominent positions. Some (particularly among the second secretaries) have been transferred to responsible posts outside their respective republics, others have been given equally important jobs within the republics. However, a substantial proportion of the 1961 party officials have been demoted, and in any case a large number of new men have been promoted to top party posts.

Only incomplete information is available on the more junior posts at the center or in the RSFSR, but there is an interesting contrast at high levels within the armed forces. Over half of the deputy ministers of defense in 1961 were retained in their posts in 1966, and the "new" deputy ministers have backgrounds almost identical to their predecessors. Among the commanders of the 18 military districts, however, the turnover rate is over 80 percent. Moreover, it is reasonably clear that the new commanders are over five years younger than

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their predecessors and that the average age of the officials at this level has actually declined somewhat since 1961.[7]

Evidence of personnel turnover at lower levels is, of course, not proof that there will soon be turnover at the higher level. However the policy towards junior personnel does demonstrate a keen awareness of the advantages of personnel fluidity in maintaining administrative efficiency, and it does create a reservoir of new men eager to move up in the hierarchy and with the experience necessary to do so. It seems highly probable, therefore, that if the ambitious goals of the leadership are not realized, there will be strong pressure for a "renewal" of more senior central and regional personnel. It would be rash indeed to assume that no one on the Politburo is capable of taking advantage of these pressures.

— Может, откидное место найдется?

Рисунок Ю. ЧЕРЕПАНОВА

Parkinson's Law, Soviet Style

—"Maybe you could find me a folding chair?"

—*Krokodil* (Moscow), Sept. 20, 1965.

The New Generation

A series of questions inevitably arises whenever personnel turnover occurs within a political system, particularly in the case of the Soviet Union. Is there any change in the preparation and career patterns of the new men which would suggest that the leadership is demanding new skills for certain positions or is even transforming the nature of these positions themselves? Is there any change in life pattern which would suggest that the younger men constitute a "new generation" with perspectives and policy views different from their predecessors? In particular, are there any such younger men with new ideals among the officials of the party itself?

Biographical data on the recently promoted officials is not sufficiently complete to permit a precise analysis of changes in the background of all the party secretaries. However, certain facts about their education and experience are ascertainable.

In the first place, despite Soviet statements which might (erroneously) be read to imply a withdrawal of the party apparatus from detailed supervision of industry, the party committees continue to be staffed by men with very considerable technical competence. For example, D. F. Ustinov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Economy from its creation in 1963 until mid-1965 and an industrial minister since 1941, and M. E. Solomentsov, the former chairman of the Cheliabinsk Sovnarkhoz, were named secretaries of the Central Committee. In the Ukraine a former plant manager (P. E. Shelest) remains the first secretary of the republican central committee.

[7] On an average the 1961 commanders were born in 1903. The year of birth of nine of the 1966 commanders averages 1906. However, the other nine commanders have just been promoted to this level of the hierarchy, and it is highly probable that they are at least as young as the three commanders born 1909-1912. If so (and this estimate seems conservative), the generalization about the characteristic of the group is accurate. I have included as military districts the groups in Eastern Europe and the GDR.

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In the oblasts the first secretaries have backgrounds which vary greatly depending upon the nature of the oblast, but the industrialized regions continue to be led by party secretaries with industrial experience. In 1961, 15 of the obkom first secretaries in the 20 most industrialized oblasts had an engineering education, and seven of them were former enterprise directors.[8] In 1966, 13 of these oblasts had a new first secretary. Of the 16 obkom first secretaries in 1966 whose backgrounds are known, 13 were trained as engineers, and eight of them are former enterprise managers. At least three of the other four were once secretaries of the primary party organization in a giant plant, and they, too, are almost surely graduate engineers with managerial experience in the plant.[9] The four men among the 20 who first reached the level of obkom first secretary during the post-Khrushchev period include these three plant secretaries and the former chairman of the Donets Sovnarkhoz.[10]

In the other oblasts in the RSFSR and the Ukraine there has been a much lower rate of turnover among the first secretaries (two-thirds of these oblasts have the same secretary as in 1961). These men have had much less formal preparation for industrial management, having been trained as agronomists or in the Higher Party School and with their only professional experience in either agriculture or rural party and soviet work.

If the republican capitals can serve as criteria, however, the Soviet leadership still strives to ensure that each major urban center has at least one secretary who has held a high managerial post in industry or construction. In Vilnius and Frunze the republican secretary for industry is a former republican minister of construction, while in Tashkent and Baku this official is a former director of a very large industrial enterprise. In Minsk the gorkom first secretary was once a plant chief engineer, while in Yerevan the gorkom second secretary was formerly a plant director. And so forth.

While the new Soviet leadership continues to insist on the Khrushchevian formula that "knowledge of production and the economy is as necessary to a party official as air,"[11] it has made one significant change in the former premier's personnel policy. Plant managers with little or no party experience are not as frequently appointed directly to the post of gorkom first secretary.[12] Such men, it is now claimed, often had insufficient experience to handle the multiplicity of nonindustrial duties thrust upon them as party first secretaries.

Since there now exists a fairly large reservoir of former managerial personnel with considerable experience in party work, the impact of the new policy has been fairly limited, except probably in the gorkoms of the smaller cities. However, assuming that the industrial functions of the party organs are not reduced (and it is likely that they will increase as authority is delegated from the ministries to the plants), there will be a need to infuse new technical expertise into the party apparatus as time passes. It will be interesting to see how the problem is solved.

It may be that the leadership will choose to rely in large part upon managerial personnel drawn into party work at an earlier age—for example, shop heads, chief mechanics, and the like who become party secretaries in large plants and then move into higher party work. Or perhaps they will draw first secretaries from among plant managers who have previous experience in party work. The new first secretary of the Kharkov gorkom, for example, was director of the Kharkov Ballbearing Works immediately prior to being named gorkom secretary, but at an earlier stage of his career he had been a raikom secretary.

Regardless of the career patterns of the newly-

[8] The 20 oblasts are Cheliabinsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Donets, Gorki, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Kharkov, Kiev, Krasnoiarsk, Kuibyshev, Leningrad, Lugansk, Moscow, Novosibirsk, Odessa, Perm, Rostov, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, and Volgograd. These are the twenty oblasts with over 50% urban population having the largest number of people concentrated in the large cities. Given the overconcentration of Soviet industry in the large cities, it is assumed that this index is a fairly reliable indicator of industrial production as well. I chose to focus on 20 oblasts because biographical information is not available on the new secretaries in the oblasts ranked 22, 23, and 24. The sample is as complete as possible.

[9] These men are F. P. Golovchenko (Kiev), who was secretary at the Kharkov Tractor Works; K. F. Katushev (Gorki), who was secretary of the Gorki Auto Works; and G. I. Vashchenko (Kharkov), who was Party secretary at the Kharkov Transportation Machinebuilding Works. During the Khrushchev period, party secretaries at such plants were almost invariably engineers with considerable managerial experience.

After leaving Kharkov, Golovchenko became head of the machine building department of the Ukrainian Central Committee.

[10] The Sovnarkhoz chairman is V. I. Degtiarev, whose biography can be found in the 1962 Soviet directory of Supreme Soviet deputies.

[11] *Pravda*, Sept. 24, 1966.

[12] The policy of appointing such men to the post of gorkom first secretary was not a 1962 innovation. It began in 1950 shortly after Khrushchev was transferred into the all-Union secretariat. During the Khrushchev period the number of gorkom first secretaries with this background increased slowly but steadily. The major importance of the 1962 reorganization from this point of view was to extend this policy to many more of the towns in the more rural areas.

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

— Мне нужны подходящие — под эту мерку...

Рисунок Ю. ЧЕРЕПАНОВА

MEASURING UP

—"I need the right men for the job—these will fit in....

—*Krokodil* (Moscow), April 10, 1965.

promoted party officials, they also usually differ from many of their predecessors in two other crucial aspects: the year they were born and the date of their entry into the party. In 1961 nearly four-fifths of the obkom first secretaries on the Central Committee and the Auditing Commission were born in 1915 or earlier, and three-fourths of them had joined the party before the war. (The "typical" first secretary was born between 1911 and 1915 and became a party member in 1939 or 1940.) Judging from the information we have, the new obkom first secretaries were born circa 1920 and entered the party during World War II.

The new obkom first secretary is, of course, less then a decade younger than the "typical" secretary of 1961, and he may have joined the party only two or three years later. Yet, his experiences and perspectives could be strikingly different from his predecessors, and he clearly belongs to a different generation.

To be specific, the obkom first secretary who joined the party in 1939 or even in 1940 almost invariably also began party or administrative work at that time (or had done so earlier). Since very few persons were admitted to the party from 1933 to 1938, a member's entry in 1939 does not necessarily imply that he played an apolitical role during the purges. On the contrary, it is likely that such a party official or administrator benefited from the purges and perhaps participated in them.

On the other hand, party officials born in 1920 probably had very little association with the events of the late 1930's, although they could have been active in the Komsomol at this time and may even have participated in the denunciation of their teachers. According to their biographies, however, many of them first entered serious political or administrative work in the army (or in some cases in industry) during World War II. This generation—which may be called "the World War II generation"—began to be promoted in significant numbers to the level of obkom first secretary during the purge of 1960-61. Its representation at this level has increased during the last five years, and it would almost surely be the major beneficiary of any increase in turnover among obkom secretaries.

Views and Perspectives

The question of vital concern to students of the Soviet Union centers on the perspective of these younger men. Of course, in any generation there exists a broad spectrum of political views. But are there any distinctive policy orientations which a large number of them share or which a First Secretary or a Politburo desirous of their support might consider?

Many Western observers point to the fact that these officials began their careers in the last decade of Stalin's life, at a time when individual political administrative responsibilities and opportunities were severely limited. It is argued that since these men acquired much of their early experience in the stultifying atmosphere of the postwar period, they are likely to have a "neo-Stalinist" outlook.

Clearly any conclusion about a new generation must remain speculative. But I wonder if another

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hypothesis about the policy orientation of these men doesn't deserve more attention. Perhaps the crucial fact about the World War II generation is not their postwar careers, but precisely their entrance into the party (and often into party work) during World War II. While we tend to think of the post-purge years as an unbroken period of stifling repression and overcentralization, we must not forget that the war years did not fit such a pattern. When the World War II generation entered the CPSU, the party was no longer engaged in warfare against the peasants or against its own members. On the contrary, it was leading the country in the defense of the motherland against a foreign invader. At this time the party de-emphasized Marxist-Leninist ideology and even restored fairly close relations with the Orthodox Church. Many hoped that it would make peace with the Russian people after the war and that the population could begin to enjoy the fruits of the industrialization drive.

A man who assumed party or command responsibilities during the war was called upon to conduct political work quite unlike that of other periods. His relationships with the rank-and-file citizens were different from those of the 1930's or the late 1940's. Indeed, the difficulties in wartime communications often forced him into a more independent relationship vis-à-vis his superiors.

On the surface at least there would seem to be little reason to suppose that the World War II generation has a "neo-Stalinist" orientation. While these men did continue in party or administrative work during the postwar years, and although their relationship to the population did change radically during this period, one should not automatically conclude that these years were decisive in shaping their attitudes. Indeed, it is conceivable that they—or at least those among them who prospered during the Khrushchev decade—were quite repelled by many aspects of the last seven years of Stalin's rule.

If this image of the World War II generation is correct, one might hypothesize that these men have a set of attitudes which includes:

1) an indifference toward formal "ideological" questions;

2) an emphasis upon patriotism as a major basis of legitimacy for the regime;

3) a nostalgic desire to return to a period of considerable freedom of action in day-to-day decision-making;

4) an increased responsiveness to the aspirations of the population for improved material conditions in the short run;

5) perhaps an army-like respect for the need to maintain popular discipline, but a revulsion at the terror and the irrationality of the late Stalin period;

6) an impatience with concern over the Great Purge of the 1930's—a feeling that this is ancient history not worth raking over any more.

Perhaps these hypotheses are unduly influenced by an awareness of the policy developments of the last few years. However, in many respects, the correspondence between these developments and the type of mentality which might be expected of a World War II party official appears to be really quite close.

Surely it would be wrong to suggest that the future course of Soviet history is predetermined. One cannot even preclude the possibility that someday a First Secretary, recalling that Stalin remained in office longer than Khrushchev, may attempt to utilize some of his techniques. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that there is a whole generation of younger officials eagerly awaiting the day when Stalinism can be partially restored. The present cautious nature of policy change in the Soviet Union may be only a hint of things to come in that period when the World War II generation comes into power.

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The Cultural Scene

EDITORS' NOTE: On May 22nd of this year, the thrice-postponed Fourth All-Union Writers' Congress is to take place in Moscow; the last was held in February 1959. The interim change of regime makes this a fitting time to review recent developments in the ever-fascinating interplay between politics and culture in the USSR, and also to examine the present state of Soviet literature stricto sensu. *The broad course of developments on the cultural scene since the overthrow of Khrushchev is traced by Mr. McClure. Mr. Gibian focuses on some interesting features of recent literary output and discusses the present frame of mind of Russia's creative intelligentsia. A narrower but no less important subject is covered by Mr. Monas—the esthetic, philosophical and political values of the few talented literary critics who still uphold (with the help of a powerful sector of the party* apparat) *the beleaguered and largely discredited principles of "Socialist Realism."*

The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1964–1967

By Timothy McClure

It is one of the ironies of the Soviet system that the Communist Party has built anti-intellectualism into its structure and outlook, yet finds itself ever more dependent on scientists, economists, writers and even artists. The party has tried to isolate the intellectuals by giving them a privileged position in society and at the same time controlling their output through an elaborate network of organizations and censors. But with the inevitable development of a more open and complex Soviet society, the party, its creature organizations, and the intellectuals have found themselves in a multisided tug-of-war—a struggle in which strange alliances develop and it often becomes impossible to tell the "good guys" from the "bad guys."

The tension resulting from this struggle has not as yet stimulated great cultural achievement; on the contrary, it has resulted in an enormous dissipation of intellectual energy and waste of talent. Yet out of the articulation of the conflict has come a

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meaningful dialogue, forcing the establishment along a course that has vacillated between grappling with the crucial question of greater freedom and reverting to the search for more effective ways to control and discipline the intellectuals. The trial of the two Soviet writers Siniavski and Daniel in February 1966 marked the latest stormy effort at discipline in the cycle of tempest and relative calm that has characterized the relationship between intellectuals and the regime since Stalin's death.

The "crisis of the intellectuals" in 1965-66 had much in common with the 1963 crackdown on the arts, which began with the bizarre visit of Khrushchev to the Manezh art exhibit on December 1, 1962, but dissipated only six months later with the June 1963 ideological plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.[1] During both periods the heightened debate between "liberal" and "conservative" writers served as a surrogate battlefield for contending forces within the establishment and most likely within the Central Committee apparat and the Politburo itself. In both periods also, the authorities finally backed away from the threatened general repression of the liberals in the official family, while the liberals in turn felt vindicated and emboldened to risk even more daring excursions into artistic experimentation and social criticism. Furthermore, in 1963 as in 1966 the repressive actions that were sanctioned by the party resulted in an outpouring of shocked disapproval and indignation from foreign intellectuals, most particularly from Communists in Eastern and Western Europe.

At the same time, there are significant differences between the two periods of "crackdown," revealing a good deal about current Soviet politics and about the quality and extent of intellectual dissidence in Soviet society. One striking difference concerns the target of attack: in the 1962-63 crisis it was the young poets and the liberal wing of the official intelligentsia that bore the brunt of the leadership's wrath, whereas in 1966 the Soviet authorities directed their major effort against intellectuals who had sought to circumvent the party's controls by operating in the intellectual underground. Partly in consequence, official retaliation was more severe in 1966, resulting in stiff prison sentences for at least two Soviet writers (and reportedly several more) and in the expulsion from the country of a third writer critical of the regime. Yet meanwhile the targets of the 1962-63 crackdown were left relatively unmolested and even flourishing; what fire these by-now-not-so-young writers and poets drew from the literary and bureaucratic conservatives served in large part merely to increase the demand for their publications and to make them even more inviolable institutions in Soviet society.

Another distinction between the two crises concerns the behavior of the top political leadership. The first crisis grew out of an impetuous political *volte-face* by Khrushchev at his most erratic and irascible, and his person continued to dominate the events that ensued. By contrast, during the 1966 crisis the leaders managed to stay out of direct involvement with the intellectuals and to leave the dirty work to lesser agents. Moreover, the decision to put Siniavski and Daniel on trial, risking the further alienation of the Soviet liberal intellectuals and universal disapproval from abroad, was surely not an easy or impetuous move on the part of the cautious coalition of Khrushchev's successors, who were otherwise demonstrating a desire to legitimize their right to rule and displaying a high degree of sensitivity to foreign criticism. The decision that seemed to be so atypical for Khrushchev's heirs must have reflected, as Max Hayward observed, a leadership "torn between powerful conflicting trends and attempting to placate, or at least not to antagonize, violently opposed groups in Soviet society, if not in the party itself." [2]

In the following pages a closer look will be taken at the events surrounding the recent crisis, though neither the trial itself nor the writings of Siniavski and Daniel will be dealt with in detail since these matters have already been covered extensively.[3] For the purpose of analyzing the changing policies of Khrushchev's heirs it has been convenient to divide the time since Khrushchev's fall into roughly three phases: (1) the period of uncertainty from mid-October 1964 to mid-January 1965, during which the party leadership was too bothered with disestablishing Khrushchevism and establishing its own *bona fides* in the Communist world to concern itself with cultural matters; (2) the period of "liberal conservatism" from late January to mid-summer 1965, during which certain elements in the leadership were able to make im-

[1] For a comprehensive review of this period, see Priscilla Johnson, "The Regime and the Intellectuals: A Window on Party Politics," *Problems of Communism*, Special Supplement, July-August 1963.

[2] *On Trial: The Soviet State versus "Abram Tertz" and "Nikolai Arzhak"* (translated, edited, and with an introduction by Max Hayward), New York, Harper & Row, 1966, p. 38.

[3] *E.g.*, see Leopold Labedz and Max Hayward, "The Arrests," and Abraham Brumberg, "Traitors in the Dock," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1966. (The Labedz-Hayward article was reprinted from *Encounter* [London], January 1966.)

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portant, if only moderate, overtures to encourage the intellectuals' participation in developing new programs and in expanding the arts; and (3) the period of reaction and disciplinary measures from September 1965 to the present. In the conclusion the political implications of the crackdown will be examined.

One note: Throughout this essay I refer to the various segments of the intelligentsia as "liberals," "moderates," "conservatives," "liberal-conservatives," *etc.*, to designate their political stance in the struggle between forces that seek and forces that oppose a more open society in the Soviet Union. Such designations are necessary and valid within the context of the essay, but they perforce ignore the rich variety and multitude of crosscurrents that characterize the climate of cultural opinion within the intellectual community. It has seemed best to deal with some of the diverse cultural aspects of current intellectual ferment in a separate commentary (see pp. 30-31) so as not to blur the polarization of forces in the continuing political struggle.

After the Fall

By October 1964 the liberal writers and artists—most of whom had wisely chosen the "conspiracy of silence" during the conservative onslaught of 1963—had reemerged from the provinces and dachas and had actively resumed the game of who can publish what and where. A certain confidence was in the air in Moscow. The broadcasts of VOA and BBC had not been jammed for over a year. The year-old Nuclear Test Ban Treaty plus angry exchanges with the Chinese pointed to even closer relations with the West in the coming year—a development welcomed by the vast majority of the Soviet intelligentsia. The atmosphere in Moscow seemed so hopeful that the visiting Yugoslav Mihajlo Mihajlov, despite his pessimistic view of Soviet society in general, saw light ahead for Soviet artists: in his *Moscow Summer, 1964*, he predicted "a final liberation of literature and arts from all restrictions of dogmatism"—a surprising judgment from such a knowledgeable observer but certainly a reflection of the naive optimism that prevailed at the time among the younger intellectuals.

This air of general well-being was rudely jolted by the announcement of Khrushchev's fall on October 16. The immediate reaction of the intellectual community and probably of most citizens was understandably one of misgiving and uncertainty, but concern over what lay ahead no doubt outweighed concern over the change of regime *per se*. Among the intellectuals, the liberals' reactions were the most confused, for they had long felt ambivalent toward Khrushchev. They all knew that Khrushchev had been the first to open the floodgates of denunciation against Stalin; that he had personally authorized the publication of *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and *The Heirs of Stalin*; that he had seemed impressed by certain independent artists like the sculptor Ernst Neizvestny and the poet Yevtushenko (both of whom had shown the bravado to talk back to the top man himself). On the other hand, Khrushchev's crude, peasant approach to culture had epitomized the party's philistinism and purely utilitarian view of art, and it was he who had placed the control of culture in the hands of the dogmatic and detested Ilichev. Furthermore, though Khrushchev had initiated destalinization, he had resisted yielding to its logical demands; indeed, as First Secretary, he had wielded his authority in the Stalinist style, making himself the final arbiter in all aspects of Soviet life.

Even more than the writers and artists, the scientific intelligentsia had reasons not to feel overly regretful about Khrushchev's downfall. Perhaps no segment of the Soviet establishment had been more contemptuous of his pretensions to expert knowledge and his various crash programs. The scientists were particularly antagonized by his often enthusiastic support for the charlatan geneticist Lysenko—an issue on which the liberals in the "creative intelligentsia" were solidly in agreement.

Thus a few reassuring developments under the new regime were enough to quiet the initial misgivings of the intelligentsia. Nothing could have offered quicker comfort than the post-Khrushchev attack launched in the press against Lysenko, his theories, and his supporters; an article by Vladimir Dudintsev published in *Komsomolskaia pravda* on October 23, only a week after Khrushchev's ouster, sparked an outpouring of abuse against Lysenko over the next few weeks that seemed clearly designed to win the support of the intelligentsia.

Also within a week of the ouster, word was passed that the authorities had dropped Khrushchev's pending project to combine the major literary and cultural newspapers into one organ.[4] This was

[4] This was later confirmed by a speaker at the RSFSR Writers' Congress in March 1965.

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another easy way to win support from all sectors of the intellectual community, each of which had a stake in its own particular publication. The release of Pasternak's close friend Olga Ivinskaia from prison in early November (very possibly because she had already served out her sentence) was another means of picking up good will from the liberals. Word was also floated that the young Leningrad poet Yosif Brodski had been released from his place of exile near Archangel, where he had been sent six months earlier by a Leningrad court for "parasitism"—but this rumor later turned out to be false.[5]

Among other signs encouraging to the liberals, *Pravda*, newly under the editorship of A. M. Rumiantsev, took to criticizing the conservative playwright A. Sofronov and the conservative stronghold *Oktiabr*.[6] On November 30 Yevgeni Yevtushenko, Bella Akhmadulina and Rimma Kazakova—three of the leading young liberals—gave a poetry reading to some 1800 people in the Moscow Conservatory, the first such large reading by the liberal poets since the events of 1962-63. In late December, "Poetry Day" saw most of the liberal poets reading to small audiences.

All of these developments, however, were more or less wisps in the wind—or one might better say in the partial vacuum created by the turnover in the top leadership. Khrushchev's heirs had not as yet enunciated any official line in the sphere of culture—indeed in the first few months they showed little interest in the problems of the "culture lobby." They were concerned with the more pressing problems of tidying up the structural aberrations in the party, reassuring the nation's bureaucrats that they could rule better and more securely without that "subjectivist" Khrushchev, and mending fences with friends in the Communist movement. Cultural life seemed to proceed as usual in Moscow and Leningrad, reflecting—in many respects—trends that had been underway before Khrushchev's fall.

"Liberal Conservatism"—The Rumiantsev Line

The first clear sign that some official sanction was being given to a moderate direction in cultural policies came with significant shake-ups in the literary and scientific bureaucracies. In late January 1965 the Moscow and Leningrad sections of the Writers' Union met in stormy sessions, with dramatic results. The Moscow meeting was highlighted by indirect but unmistakable criticism of Ilichev, the chief of the party's Ideological Commission, and of the hack-writer Nikolai Gribachev, who had thundered as one of the major conservative voices in 1963. The Moscow writers succeeded in removing from their directing board four of the most despised representatives of the old guard: besides Gribachev, they were *Oktiabr's* editor, Vsevolod Kochetov, the playwright Anatoli Sofronov, and the writer Georgi Markov. The four also failed to win election as delegates from Moscow to the upcoming RSFSR Writers' Congress, forcing them—as in 1962—to retire to the provinces where they could be assured of inclusion in other delegations. In Leningrad a similar triumph was scored: the Stalinist poet Aleksandr Prokofiev was not only removed as First Secretary of the Leningrad Writers' Union but was denied a seat on the new board and strongly criticized for his report to the meeting. Prokofiev was the symbol of old guard control over Leningrad's writers and had reportedly been the key advocate of harsh treatment for Brodski less than a year earlier.

The next straw in the wind was the report of M. A. Keldish, President of the USSR Academy of Sciences, to a February 1 meeting of the Academy, in which he officially condemned Lysenkoism and its negative effect on the development of biological and related sciences. The Keldish report (printed in *Pravda*, Feb. 4) was supported, as it turned out, by an earlier unpublished party-government decree on improving biology; the removal of Lysenko and his cronies from positions of power in genetics and in the biological and agricultural sciences became a foregone conclusion.

By mid-February there were other indicators suggesting that the moderately liberal line issued from the top party leadership—or at least an influential element of it: changes in the RSFSR Institute of Pedagogical Sciences and the formation of a new educational commission gave real hope that professionals would have a major voice in the restructuring of education, following the reversal of Khrushchev's ill-fated reforms. Similarly the economists, long isolated from policy-making, found themselves—to their great surprise—being approached for concrete proposals in anticipation of the overdue economic reforms that had been much discussed in Khrushchev's last years.

On February 21 *Pravda* published an editorial,

[5] Brodski was finally allowed to return to Leningrad in November 1965.

[6] See "Where is the Compass?," *Pravda*, Nov. 15, 1964.

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The Cultural Spectrum . . .

Writers and artists in the Soviet Union, in one sense, are more *engagés* in the world in which they live than are their Western contemporaries. Since, as critics, reformers, caricaturists, or defenders of the status quo, they cannot participate directly in a democratic political process, their works take on a particular urgency and become the focus of their political involvement. In describing the activities of the intellectuals, analysts have found it convenient over the years to speak of "liberals" and "conservatives" in depicting the two poles of the intensely political Soviet culture. By "liberals" we mean those intellectuals who are dedicated to increased candor and truth, relaxation of controls, greater personal freedom, and the complete eradication of the Stalinist heritage. In contrast, the "conservatives" are understood to be those who demand the retention of orthodoxy in order to preserve the existing order; for them, criticism of the Stalin era is unpatriotic and detracts from the revolutionary goals of Soviet society.

Yet the terms "liberal" and "conservative" do not adequately describe the multiversity of artistic commitments in the USSR today, and their implications for Western readers may tend to oversimplify the tangled web of the politics of Soviet culture. Many of the political "liberals" are—in matters of culture—conservative, in the sense that they are deeply attached to the Russian past. Conversely, many "conservatives" eschew all ties with pre-Stalin Russia. Thus it is necessary to break down the liberal-to-conservative spectrum into other groupings based largely on attitudes toward art and culture, realizing that no work or art—nor artist—can be considered totally apolitical in the Soviet state. Below I have identified and labeled several such elements. I do not mean to suggest that these arbitrary labels describe formal groupings within the intelligentsia or encompass by any means all the variety in Soviet culture. They have been chosen simply as a framework within which to discuss the growing diversity of the cultural scene and to point up the confusing problems this pluralism presents to the party.

The Dogmatists

The political reactionaries who dominate *Oktiabr*, the Academy of Fine Arts, the RSFSR Writers' organization, and the Unions of Composers and Artists are essentially unreconstructed Stalinists whose superpatriotism and inferior esthetic taste are anathema to the vast majority of Soviet intellectuals, and often an embarrassment to the party, particularly to its younger members. Generally from the older generation, the "dogmatists" are obsessed with maintaining restrictions over form, unwilling to experiment with new artistic genres, fearful of losing their privileges and patronage rights in Soviet society, and most adamant in their opposition to cultural exchange with the West. Despite their apparently hegemonic position in their own organizations, they have on occasion been forced to modify their stand by progressive elements in the Komsomol, the government and even the party.

The Slavophiles

This group is composed generally of the self-consciously Russian intellectuals, who are fascinated by the symbols of pre-Petrine Russia and the Orthodox Church. Mainly from the younger generation, they seek identity with the slavophile writers and artists of the 19th century and tend to denigrate foreign influences and intrusions on "pure" Russian art. Official writers and artists rarely espouse these ideas publicly, but "slavophilism" pervades the ideas and works of many dissident poets and painters who work outside the establishment. Certain elements in the Komsomol, including on occasion the noted cultural heavyweight, Sergei Pavlov, have sought to capitalize on this widespread enthusiasm and curiosity about the Russian past as a means of countering the impact of Western thought and stimulating patriotism. The Komsomol literary journal, *Molodaia gvardiia*, for example, has published extensive "slavophile" journals by the painter Ilia Glazunov and the writer Vladimir Soloukhin, and the Komsomols in 1965 organized *Rodina* (motherland) clubs to study prerevolutionary Russian culture (for quotations from Glazunov, see p. 43).

The Russian Traditionalists

Probably the most talented group in the cultural spectrum, these Soviet writers most closely resemble the traditional Russian *intelligent*. Firmly committed to restoring vitality and spirituality to Russian culture, they have little interest in Western political concepts. They differ from the slavophiles in that they are more mature, less chauvinistic with respect to non-Russian influences, and considerably more committed to the eradication of Stalinist blights. Like the slavophiles, however, they are attracted by the symbols of "eternal Russia," chiefly the Orthodox Church and the Russian village. Aleksandr Tvardovski, the able editor of the "liberal" stronghold, *Novyi mir*, can probably be considered the chief sponsor of this group. He has published the works of such noted writers as Solzhenitsyn, Mozhaev, Tendriakov, Semin, Yashin, Abramov, Kazakov, none of whom could be considered liberals in the Western sense, but who seem to represent the "Russian traditionalist" point of view. Andrei Siniavski, whose strong individuality confounds all labels, might nevertheless be considered a member of this group. He has been characterized a "slavophile" in the philosophical sense of the term; and he has taken a forceful "liberal" position in the struggle against all that is philistine, dogmatic and Stalinist in Soviet society. Yet his critique of the Soviet system and of Socialist Realism in particular is based essentially on Russian conservative values and emotional entrancement with Russian culture and history, so much so that his decision to send his manuscripts to the West might well have confounded many of his admirers among the "slavophiles" or the "traditionalists." Western liberals, on the other hand, have not been able to understand his conservatism on some issues, specifically his refusal to condemn unquali-

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fiedly the Stalin era during his trial. Rationalizing Stalinist brutalities, Siniavski explained that they resulted from action against inertia. His reply to liberal critics was: "And what have all you humane dodderers achieved?"

The Liberal Conservatives

This group is composed of men and women who have emerged from the Khrushchev era fully accepting destalinization but too ensconced in the establishment and/or too involved personally in the Stalin era to take a lead in pressing for further revelations of the past. The group includes representatives from all generations who share the belief that the party and the intellectuals must work hand in hand toward a moderate change in Soviet society. They presumably see Soviet cultural life gradually playing a larger role in Western culture while retaining its ideological and patriotic flavor. In the party this view was expressed by Alexei Rumiantsev, while in the cultural community it seems best represented by such reconstructed Stalinists as Alexei Surkov and Konstantin Simonov, as well as younger writers like Yuri Bondariov and Robert Rozhdestvenski. With supporters in the Moscow and Leningrad writers' organizations, and in government organs such as the Ministry of Culture, the "liberal conservatives" have been influential in enlarging the variety and improving the quality of foreign literature available in Russian and have played an important role in promoting cultural exchanges.

The Modern Liberals

Through artistic style and bold behavior, this group has introduced a new vitality into Soviet cultural life. It is composed primarily of writers and artists in their 30's or early 40's, including Bella Akhmadulina, Yuri Nagibin, Andrei Voznesenski, Vasili Aksionov, Bulat Okudzhava, Aleksandr Volodin, Anatoli Gladilin, Viktor Nekrasov, Vladimir Maximov, Yevgeni Yevtushenko, the sculptor Ernst Neizvestny and the composer Andrei Volkonski. The group enjoys the support of many notable members of the older generation—*e.g.*, Ilia Ehrenburg, Viktor Rozov, Valentin Kataev, Kornei Chukovski, and Mikhail Romm. Centered around the magazine *Yunost* and such theaters as the Sovremennik and "Taganka" in Moscow and the Gorky in Leningrad, this group has been producing literary and artistic works which, for Soviet conditions, are refreshingly new and sophisticated. Broadly speaking, the aim of these writers and artists is to forge a link between a modernized, multinational Soviet culture and the culture of the contemporary West. They have consistently sought contacts with American and European intellectuals. Supported by influential members of the scientific and academic communities, they have also been increasingly open in carrying their cause to the party leadership.

As has been suggested, each of these groups presents its own set of dilemmas for the party leadership, for while they may all be useful at one time or another, none of them can be counted on to follow the inconsistent party line consistently. The "dogmatists" offer needed support for certain ideological and propaganda goals, but they are often a hindrance to the party in its efforts to win the good will of the larger intellectual community at home or abroad. The "slavophiles" are useful to the regime in countering Western cultural influence and in stimulating Russian patriotism, but their arguments have nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism; in fact, their emphasis on purely Russian culture, their disparagement of other national cultures, and their often implicit antisemitism offend the sensibilities of other Soviet nationalities. The "Russian traditionalists" pose the most serious dilemma for the party. Clearly among the most talented and influential of Soviet artists and writers, they have been the most incisive in their attacks on the Stalinist past and the most effective in their portrayal of the seamier sides of Soviet life today. The "liberal conservatives," while most attuned to the policy of the progressives in the party, have been a constant source of irritation to the provincial party, police and military establishments, all of which view with alarm any signs of tolerance toward Western cultural and political values. A similar duality may also be observed in the party's attitude towards the "modern liberals." On one hand, they have proved to be effective "unofficial diplomats" at home and abroad, probably doing more to generate good will and sympathy for the Soviet Union than all the official professions of "peaceful coexistence" combined. Yet the "modern liberals" have also been most persistently in the forefront of the struggle against such ugly manifestations of Stalinist mentality as xenophobia and antisemitism.

In conclusion, one caveat is in order: whatever the challenges of the above-outlined groups to the regime, their basic loyalty is not to be questioned. Each is patriotic in its own way and on its own terms, and few Soviet intellectuals would, if given an opportunity, follow in the footsteps of Tarsis. But the party is not always cognizant of the distinction between "loyal opposition" and political disloyalty. As some of its repressive measures in the recent past have indicated, it is also afraid lest the ferment of the creative intelligentsia vitiate its effort to restore some vigor to a stale ideology. These apprehensions are not unreasonable: the ferment *is* contagious, and the pretensions of the official ideology are viewed with growing skepticism by an increasingly sophisticated public. Contributing to this erosion of dogma, too, are the activities of the "underground" writers and artists and the apparently "fearless" intellectuals of the new generation, whose impatience with the reformist proclivities of the "official intelligentsia" shows no signs of diminishing. Given all these conflicting trends, one conjecture may be safely essayed: The Soviet cultural scene will continue to be rife with tensions and proverbial "internal contradictions" for years to come.

—Timothy McClure

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over the signature of its new editor Rumiantsev, that seemed to herald a more enlightened period of cooperation between the party and the intellectuals. At long last the regime seemed to be recognizing that the economists, scientists, and writers could be of real value to the party if they were allowed experimentation, open disagreement, competition and considerable freedom. While the editorial clearly reasserted the primacy of the party, it appeared to represent an official view that might best be described as "liberal conservative"—a view implicitly acknowledging that the party's periodic confrontations with the increasingly influential cultural and scientific lobbies could only discredit the party itself and cause waste in the society. Among other key passages, Rumiantsev stated that it was necessary "to learn how . . . to open the road to everything talented and socially useful created by Soviet scientists and figures in culture and literature." And he declared: ". . . genuine creation is possible only in an environment of search, experiment, and the free expression and collision of opinions, the presence of various schools and trends, various styles and genres competing among themselves and at the same time joined by the unity of . . . Socialist Realism." This was certainly a novel definition of Socialist Realism!

On the same weekend that the Rumiantsev editorial appeared, *Novyi mir*'s first issue of 1965 hit the newsstands, and it seemed to provide proof that the liberal lobby was to be given wide leeway. In the lead article poet-editor Tvardovski stated more emphatically and openly than perhaps ever before his magazine's liberal position on the arts and belief in the artist's right to express his "small truth."

Only a month later the March plenum of the CPSU Central Committee announced the demotion of L. F. Ilichev from his position as ideological boss of the Secretariat to a lesser role as a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ilichev's place was taken by Piotr Demichev, who had been Party Secretary for the Chemical Industry under Khrushchev but who was promoted in November 1964 to the Politburo. From his earlier days in the Moscow city party organization, Demichev was known to be more moderate on cultural matters than Ilichev, and his first informal meetings with small groups of writers confirmed that he would be far less likely to meddle directly in their affairs than his predecessor.

As the long winter gradually gave way to spring, all these developments combined to nurture a growing sense of optimism among the liberals and moderates in the intelligentsia. At the same time, there were other developments that perhaps should have been recognized as harbingers of another sort of winter. The RSFSR Writers' Congress in March brought cold solace to the liberals, as the conservative bureaucrats from the provinces vented their spleen on young writers in seeming sharp violation of the Rumiantsev line. The most ominous sounds came from Moscow party boss Yegorychev, who declared that the obsession of certain writers with the mistakes of the Stalin era "casts a shadow over the holy of holies—our socialist organization, Marxist-Leninist teaching, and the general line of the party." His call for less criticism of the Soviet past was a line that would be heard with increasing regularity and vigor over the coming months. Indeed, an effort to curb anti-Stalinist influences had already been evidenced by a significant decrease in the number of rehabilitations of the victims of Stalin's purges. The propaganda buildup for the May 9 celebrations of the 20th anniversary of VE Day was accompanied by the first public mention in years of Stalin in a positive vein. On May 8 Brezhnev himself uttered the terrible name, and the steely visage appeared on Moscow TV and in a documentary film on the war which was shown in Moscow.

This hint of a Stalinist revival, coexisting with the fresh sense of freedom among intellectuals—both following on the partial vacuum in cultural controls that was created by Khrushchev's ouster—resulted in a peculiarly restive and exciting atmosphere in the spring of 1965. In the arts, it had been the best season in years—there were two new experimental theaters in Moscow, and the plays of Berthold Brecht had burst on the stages of Moscow and Leningrad with full force. Voznesenski's "Oza" had dazzled both his admirers and his critics with its "formalist" tendencies. In April Yevtushenko's lengthy poem "Bratsk Dam," a restatement of many of his controversial themes, appeared in *Yunost*. *Novyi mir* outreached itself in its first six issues of the new year, particularly with the two tender and penetrating novels on rural life, *The Mayfly's Life is Short* by Vladimir Tendriakov (May issue), and *Seven in One House* by Vitali Siomin (June issue). *Yunost's* anniversary issue in June featured the young poets as well as a new story by prose writer Vasili Aksionov, whose play "Always on Sale," which had premiered in the spring at the Sovremennik Theater, marked the first important step

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by a modern Soviet playwright into the field of fantastic satire. And a new collection of Boris Pasternak's poetry was assigned to the press with an introduction by the devoted Pasternak scholar —Andrei Siniavski.

Even more striking than the quality of Soviet writing was the significant breakthrough in the foreign literature published in this period. For the first time, Kafka's short stories appeared in Russian, Faulkner's trilogy was finally put out in large editions, John Updike's "The Centaur" became the talk of literary Moscow after publication in *Inostrannaia literatura*, and a host of other major foreign writers began to appear in print. All of which suggested that the cultural "opening up" of Soviet society was a fact of life which neither the party bureaucrats nor the conservatives predominating in the publishing world could significantly retard.

The most unusual development was the degree to which young intellectuals and students were expressing themselves openly—aggressively showing, as one Soviet writer said, that they were the first Soviet generation "without the habit of fear." On April 14, 1965, a young organization of dissident poets, the *Smogisti*,[7] marched from Maiakovski Square to the Writers' Union club on Herzen Street, where they stood blocking traffic and reciting their unorthodox verse, to the utter amazement of Union officials who had neither seen nor heard of an unauthorized demonstration of Soviet citizens in Moscow for years. Another remarkable occurrence took place in the spring at a large organized student meeting at Moscow University; a young speaker who was ostensibly on the platform to condemn "Western bourgeois cynicism" for invoking the statute of limitations on Nazi war criminals in West Germany, shocked his audience by proclaiming that the real cynics were the leaders of the Soviet Union, who had revealed the horrible crimes of the Stalin era but had as yet failed to bring any of the perpetrators to trial.

It was also in the spring of 1965 that the eminent Ilia Ehrenburg, speaking to a group of writers at Moscow's Foreign Literature Library, declared that the time had passed when writers should describe how they suffered under Stalin—that they should now begin examining the question of "how Stalinism could have happened."

Looking back, the spring of 1965 seems to have been a period in which the leadership was perforce acting in a collective manner while groping for coherent programs—and for a more stable leadership alliance. In the process of developing such programs the new regime seemed more willing than its predecessor to turn for help to various segments of the intelligentsia. Thus, as it turned out, this period of "liberal conservatism" was not a policy line set down by the party leadership, but the result of several converging phenomena—a reaction to the excesses of Khrushchev's leadership style, the articulation by at least a segment of the party leadership (through Rumiantsev) of a moderate long-range approach to the intelligentsia, and the bolder action of liberal and young intellectuals encouraged by the apparent relaxation and increasingly confident of their cause. As viewed by the party, however, the "new conservatism" called for a strict limitation on writings or discussion that disparaged the Stalin era or the role of the party and the secret police in that era. In return, the liberals were to be allowed more opportunity to experiment with style and to be spared excessive attacks from their conservative critics.

The Reaction Sets In

The partial moratorium on heavy-handed conservative criticism was short-lived. By late July and August the conservative critics had opened up on their favorite targets—Aksionov, Voznesenski, Tendriakov, and Yevtushenko—and had found a new one in Vitali Siomin, whose aforementioned novel, *Seven in One House*, was the literary sensation of the season. *Pravda* printed a strong attack on Siomin, charging that he had dealt only with the "private truths" of a small group of isolated individuals and thereby distorted the big truth—the balanced picture—of Soviet reality. The issue of the "small" or "foxhole truth" versus the universal or big truth had been central in the liberal-conservative debate, particularly since the fall of Khrushchev. The liberals maintained that the private truth (*istina*) of the artist did not necessarily conflict with the big truth (*pravda*)—and that anyway it was the prerogative of a Communist artist to express his personal view of reality. This aspect of the debate also involved the issue of destalinization—*i.e.*, whether the revelation of individual crimes of the Stalin period distorted the

[7] The term *Smog* is derived from the first letters of the Russian words *slovo* (word), *mysl* (thought), *obraz* (form), *glubina* (profundity). Some reports have the "S" standing for *smelost* (courage). The Soviet press has tried to disparage the *Smogisti* by saying the term stands for the "Very Youngest Society of Geniuses."

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entire reality of Soviet life. The cultural conservatives and many in the party obviously thought that it did.

The young prose writer Vasili Aksionov also drew major fire from the orthodox literary critics. The most serious attack came in *Izvestia* (August 13) which followed up a letter from irate taxi drivers in Yalta (the subject of a recent Aksionov story) with an editorial comment castigating all Soviet writers who painted a gloomy—and ergo distorted—picture of Soviet life. The *Izvestia* editors criticized the liberal journals *Novyi mir* and *Yunost* specifically, an unusual move even during the worst of times for Soviet writers.

Having been given the green light by *Izvestia* and seemingly by *Pravda*, the conservatives wasted no time in using their preponderant control over the literary journals and newspapers to focus on what they saw as the recent insidious trends in prose, poetry, drama, and films. Finally—as if to give the official seal of approval of the young party leaders to the conservative resurgence—Komsomol chief S. P. Pavlov, writing in *Pravda* (August 27), blamed certain journals and theaters for the malaise apparent among some Soviet youth and exhorted the party's literary critics to be more harsh in judging such "trash." Most significant, Pavlov called for a revival of the atmosphere of the 1930's among the Komsomols and explained how the police organs, the Army, the border guards, and DOSAAF had all recently instituted new programs to restore respect among Komsomols for past Soviet military glories.

At this juncture Rumiantsev published his second *Pravda* editorial (September 9), which in a highly polemical tone responded to the recent intemperance of conservative critics. In an almost unprecedented act, Rumiantsev reprimanded the government newspaper *Izvestia* (as well as the party agricultural newspaper *Selskaia zhizn*) for assaulting the liberal writers and journals. He strongly restated his case that the party needed to trust intellectuals and allow them more freedom for growth. In support of the liberal cause on the question of "private truths," Rumiantsev pointed out that it is 'unrealistic to expect from an author absolute universality—with such a demand we wouldn't receive any artistic works," suggesting by implication that he also supported the continued examination of the errors of Stalin. Even more striking than his attack on the government newspapers was his charge that any effort "to place in opposition such concepts as intellectuality, party-mindedness, and popular-mindedness represents a dogmatic and stupid argument against a scientific world outlook," leading to the same type of arbitrary and crude direction of society for which the party had removed Khrushchev.

Just four days prior to Rumiantsev's article, *Pravda* (September 5) had carried an editorial on the nationality question which recalled, for the first time since the early postwar years, Lenin's demand for a constant "struggle against anti-semitism." [8]

Little Truth vs. Big Truth

Marxism has always considered truth to be concrete. It has always assumed that absolute truth exists but that historically and practically it is composed of an infinite number of relative, specific, concrete truths that strive toward absolute truth but that never fully exhaust it.

The demand that an artist portray the "big truth of the phenomenon" and not the "little truth of the (individual) instance" has introduced a new element into this concept. The "big truth," the "truth of the century," has begun, in some critics' writings, to look like a mysterious absolute, which must be described in far too general, abstract, evasive words. . . .

The Communist approach induces the honest Soviet writer to depict the entire truth without cautiously dividing it into "big" and "little," convenient and inconvenient, permitted and forbidden, truths.

Yet in critical articles the words "big truth" are most often used as a synonym of the happy life, the desired general well-being, while "little truth" is taken to mean the depiction of any shortcomings, difficulties and deprivations.

—From V. Lakshin, "The Writer, the Reader and the Critic," Novyi mir, No. 8, August 1966.

[8] On July 19 *Pravda* had also printed the text of a speech delivered by Premier Kosygin in Riga, in which he condemned antisemitism. It was interestingly enough Kosygin again who, at a press conference in Paris on Dec. 3, 1966, implied that Soviet Jews could emigrate to unite families, thus making him appear as one of the "liberals" on the Jewish question. No other top leaders have addressed this matter publicly.

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In Soviet society the Jewish question inevitably comes to the forefront during periods of heightened anti-intellectualism, as it most certainly did during 1962-63. What was clearly at issue in the early days of September 1965, then, was the growing atmosphere of anti-intellectualism, the mounting pressures to re-evaluate the Stalin era, and the conservative demands for more attention to the purification of ideology and the increase of discipline in society.

The Trial Célèbre

It was in this setting that Siniavski and Daniel were arrested in the second week of September. Some nine or ten days later Rumiantsev was removed as Editor-in-Chief of *Pravda*.[9] That the two events were connected seemed patently clear.

Although Rumiantsev reportedly had been ailing, no such reason was given for his replacement less than a year after he had assumed the office. Furthermore, he appeared well enough to resume an active role in other fields within a month (more on which later). Whether or not he personally wrote the editorials in defense of greater intellectual freedom, their appearance over his name had publicly identified him with the most moderate semi-official approach to the intelligentsia since the pre-Stalin era. Thus his removal suggested strongly that either the cultural line was changing or that Rumiantsev was involved in a squabble of the highest order—or both.

There are very good reasons to assume that the pressures against the Rumiantsev moderate line were mounting anyway, but the Siniavski-Daniel case most certainly gave added weight to the conservative thrust and may conceivably have been used to precipitate the crisis. The arrest of the two writers—for publishing abroad "slanderous" literature about the Soviet state—was at the least timely from the conservatives' point of view. While it may seem astonishing that the KGB, with its network of informers and controls on foreign visitors, did not have some earlier clue to the writers' contacts, the evidence suggests that their activities went undetected until the spring or summer of 1965.[10] In any event, this was the final "proof" the conservatives needed to support their case that the intellectuals couldn't be trusted. The party felt indignant and betrayed.

The developments directly related to the trial need little review, since so much has been written about the case. Suffice it to say that throughout the fall and into January of 1966, the crucial issue for Soviet intellectuals became the fate of the two arrested writers. Some members of the official intelligentsia felt that the offenders should not be put on trial but should instead be turned over to the writers' organization for appropriate punishment—as was done in the Pasternak case. On the other hand, 200 Moscow students who demonstrated in Pushkin Square on December 5 (Soviet "Constitution Day") demanded a trial—but one that was fair and open as required by Soviet law. Protests and appeals poured into the Soviet authorities from foreign intellectuals on behalf of the two writers.

On January 13, *Izvestia* published a viciously slanderous article against the writers, setting the stage for all ensuing propaganda and for the trial itself. The accusations in official Soviet newspapers seemed almost incredibly prejudicial to Western observers, and must have been totally disheartening to Soviet citizens who had been hoping for legal "guarantees" of their rights.

The macabre trial opened on a grey February morning in a small Moscow court building. It was not an open trial in that only a chosen few were issued tickets to attend. The text of the proceedings that was subsequently smuggled out and published abroad revealed a classic confrontation between two sensitive intellectuals and a frightened, philistine establishment.[11] Daniel pointed out the irony of a powerful modern state trying two of its citizens for slander when he said at the trial, "I cannot think that a couple of books by us, or even a score, could inflict substantial damage upon a country like this." And Siniavski remarked in his final plea, "In the whole history of literature I know of no trial like this one." The fact that the writers refused to plead guilty forced the regime to present its flimsy case against them for the world to behold.

[9] According to letters signed by their wives and later published abroad, Siniavski was arrested on September 8 and Daniel on September 12. See *Grani* (Frankfurt) No. 62, November 1966. On September 21 TASS announced that M. V. Zimianin had replaced Rumiantsev as the Editor-in-Chief of *Pravda*.

[10] The text of the trial implies that the bugging of Siniavski's apartment began in the summer of 1965 (*c.f. On Trial . . ., supra*). It seems highly unlikely that Khrushchev would have passed up the chance to throw Siniavski to the wolves in 1962-63—or that the authorities would have permitted him to play such a key role in defending the liberal cause in 1964-65—had they known of his activities.

[11] Cf. *On Trial. . . .*

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The leadership, having apparently given them up as sacrificial lambs to the conservative camp and the KGB, looked on silently as Siniavski was sentenced to seven years and Daniel to five years in a labor camp.[12]

It would be impossible to overstate the impact of the Siniavski-Daniel case on the Soviet intellectual community. The conservatives, not unsurprisingly, felt emboldened and vindicated, and their periodicals *Oktiabr, Molodaia gvardiia,* and *Neva* carried signed articles duly condemning Siniavski and Daniel. The conservative chief of the Moscow Writers' Union, S. Mikhalkov, also lent his name to a pre-trial castigation of the two men in *Partinaia zhizn.* But the vast majority of Soviet writers and intellectuals, however they may have felt about the indiscretions and writings of the two imprisoned writers, were pained and disturbed by the trial and its implications for Soviet intellectual life. Some maintained an embarrassed silence. But in a show of strength almost unprecedented in the politics of Soviet culture, liberal intellectuals from widely differing professions—scientists, scholars, and cultural figures—addressed letters to the party leadership protesting the treatment of the writers and expressing concern over the possible rehabilitation of Stalin and Stalinist policies. The texts of many of these protest notes were later smuggled to the West for publication.[13] The only really major Soviet writer to support the trial publicly was the recent Nobel Prize winner Mikhail Sholokhov, who earned the contempt of many of his colleagues by suggesting at the 23rd CPSU Congress (two months after the trial) that the sentences were not nearly harsh enough: for this act, one Soviet writer said, "literature has condemned Sholokhov to creative sterility."[14]

Leadership Policy: Two-Fisted or Two-Faced?

The sensational stir created by the Siniavski-Daniel case partially obscured the importance of concurrent developments on the Soviet scene which, it has since become clear, marked the emergence of a new and distinct phase in Soviet cultural policy dating from mid-1965 to the present. In reviewing these developments, it seems simplest to trace two parallel yet, in part at least, contradictory trends that reveal significant ambivalence in the attitude of the leadership (the much clearer reaction of the intellectuals will be taken up later). On the one hand, a period of reaction set in that was marked by a number of repressions as harsh, if not as well-publicized, as the trial of the two writers, and by a general effort of the regime to reassert discipline and respect for authority—most notably party and police authority—in the society at large. On the other hand, the top leaders persisted in striking an official stance that bespoke a middle-of-the-road outlook on culture, and took pains to demonstrate their support of the "trusted" intelligentsia (including liberals who stayed in line).

The conservative resurgence expressed itself with increasing insistence throughout the fall of 1965 and into the winter. Mounting criticism of the liberal writers was accompanied by loud demands for a more "objective" portrayal of the Stalin era. Military leaders entered actively into the intellectual tug-of-war, blaming the low state of discipline in the armed forces on the prevalence of ideologically impure literature and art. Marshal Krylov (in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* of October 8) laid out an elaborate program for the indoctrination of youth, much in the vein of Pavlov's August outline in *Pravda.* In December Pavlov again made headlines by unleashing a violent diatribe against *Yunost* and announcing further plans for Komsomol paramilitary activities. And at the turn of the year a curfew was imposed on young people in Moscow.

Meantime reports began to leak out of a number of repressive actions taken against intellectuals, mainly involving young dissidents. As the poet Yesenin-Volpin is reported to have said, Siniavski and Daniel were lucky in that "their case was taken up by the whole civilized world. There were so many others about whom the . . . world knew nothing—knew as little as people know of a rabbit eaten by the wolves in the forest."[15] To cite some examples that have been reliably reported the authorities tried to dissipate the *Smogisti* group of young poets after they helped to organize the aforementioned demonstration of December 5, and the KGB actually had one of their leaders, Vladimir Bukovski, interned in an insane asylum as an "in-

[12] One macabre note was added to the affair when the pathologically anti-Soviet writer Valery Tarsis was allowed to go abroad on the eve of the trial and was subsequently deprived of his Soviet citizenship by the authorities.

[13] Cf. *Grani,* November 1966.

[14] See the amazing letter of Lidiya Chukovskaia to Sholokhov, printed in *The New York Times,* Nov. 19, 1966.

[15] *The New York Times,* Feb. 20, 1966.

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A "Russian Traditionalist" and a "Modern Liberal"

Andrei Siniavski and Yuli Daniel are close friends, both 42 years old. They knew the Stalin era and felt compelled to write about it; together they have enriched Soviet literature. They both love their country and hope that it will become a better, freer, and happier place to live. Yet, as revealed by their testimonies at their trial for slandering the Soviet state, the two men have quite different styles and views of the world. Siniavski, a Russian, seems to epitomize the "Russian traditionalist" point of view, while Daniel, a Russian Jew, represents to some degree the point of view of the "modern liberals." The following quotations are taken from On Trial, The Soviet State Versus "Abram Tertz" and "Nikolai Arzhak" *(translated, edited, and with an introduction by Max Hayward, New York, Harper and Row Publishers, 1966).*

Love of Country

SINIAVSKI: But nobody can reproach me with partiality toward the West, of not loving the Russian people—I've been called a slavophile. . . . What I value most of all in my fellow Russians is their inner spiritual freedom and what one might call their fantastic nature . . . . (p. 104)

DANIEL: I also wish to say that no articles of any criminal code nor any accusations against us will deter us—Siniavski and me—from feeling that we are persons who love our country and our people. (p. 160)

Respect for the Soviet State

SINIAVSKI: I find it difficult to define my approach; in general terms it is idealistic. I regard communism as the only goal that can be put forward by the modern mind; the West has been unable to put forward anything like it. . . . What I say is that communism is a supreme goal. But the actual ways and means are not always in keeping with the goal. . . . Once achieved, the goal is only a poor likeness of what was envisioned at the beginning. (p. 98)

DANIEL: I did not criticize or make fun of the basic principles of our life. I do not equate individuals with the social system as such, or the government with the state, or a certain period with the Soviet epoch as a whole. The state may exist for centuries but a government is often short-lived and frequently inglorious. (p. 80)

On Stalinism

SINIAVSKI: I was talking about purposes. About difficulties and contradictions, about inhuman methods under Stalin. But even that I don't reject. I even justify such methods. (p. 113)

DANIEL: . . . In 1960-61, when I was writing this story I . . . was convinced that the country was on the eve of a restoration of a cult of personality, . . . seeing all this happening and remembering the horrors of the purges and the violations of legality under Stalin, I concluded—and I am a pessimist by nature—that the terrible days of Stalin's cult could come back. (p. 61-2)

Content of Literature

SINIAVSKI: I am not a political writer. No writer expresses his political views through his writing. My works reflect my feelings about the world, not politics. (p. 101)

DANIEL: I do not wish to deny the political content of my works . . . . (p. 156)
. . . literature is entitled to deal with any period and any question. I feel that there should be no prohibited subjects in the life of society. (p. 81)

Attitude Toward the Court

SINIAVSKI: I am not going to try to explain the literary purposes of our works, or deliver a lecture, or beat my head against the wall, trying to prove something—that would be futile. (p. 140)
That is a thinly disguised sneer, and I shall not answer the question. (p. 134)

DANIEL: In the final plea of my comrade Siniavski there was a note of despair about the impossibility of breaking through th wall of incomprehension and unwillingness to listen. I am not so pessimistic. I wish to go over the arguments of the prosecution and the defense again. (p. 149)

Degree of Guilt

SINIAVSKI: I did not regard my works as anti-Soviet, and therefore, there was nothing to own up to. But it did occur to me that it would be better to lead one existence rather than two, although I do not regard these two existences as incompatible. (p. 138)

DANIEL: We are guilty . . . not for what we have written, but for sending or having sent our works abroad. (p. 160)
. . . if I have overdone things here and there, this should not be put down to my being anti-Soviet, but to my lack of literary skill. (pp. 83-4)
But isn't twelve years of Siniavski's life and nine years of mine a rather excessive payment for our frivolity, thoughtlessness and misjudgment? (p. 160)

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valid of the second category" (a euphemism for a political nonconformist) for six months or more in 1966. At least two other *Smogisti* were arrested but later released.[16] A group of young Leningrad students who had published an illegal journal called *Kolokol* were arrested and their leaders sentenced to jail in the fall of 1965.[17] In Moscow several other young students were arrested, and at least one reportedly sent to prison, when the police discovered their plan to hold an anti-Stalin demonstration in Red Square on March 5, 1966, the 13th anniversary of Stalin's death.

The worst repression took place in the Ukraine. Beginning in the late summer of 1965, as many as 70 Ukrainian intellectuals were reportedly arrested in Kiev, Lvov, Ivano-Franko and several other cities. Some of those seized were subsequently released, but many were put on trial in the first months of 1966. According to reports at least 20 were sentenced to two to five years in labor camps for disseminating and presumably writing anti-Soviet propaganda.[18] Some verification of these actions has come from the Soviets. In December 1965 a spate of articles in the Soviet press reported on the problem of nationalist activities among Ukrainian intellectuals. And in the fall of 1966, a young Ukrainian poet, Ivan Drach, who was visiting the United States, publicly acknowledged the arrest and sentencing of several Ukrainian writers, adding that the matter was painful for him since several of his friends were involved.[19] While some of the defendants were no doubt carrying on anti-regime or nationalist activities, a number of the writers caught in the crackdown appear to have been guilty of nothing more than individualistic literary efforts that were unsavory to the authorities.

The repression against deviant artists and writers was supported by increased coercion in other areas of society. In March 1966 new laws were introduced imposing harsher restrictions on religious practices, and in subsequent months demonstration trials and press campaigns made it clear that violators of the laws were being rooted out and disciplined. In July 1966 the central police ministry (the former MVD, now the MOOP[20]) was reestablished and the militia force enlarged in a stepped-up campaign against "hooliganism" and crime. New legislation strengthened the hands of the militiamen and restricted the courts from being too lenient. Kosygin made it clear that the use of force would continue when he said in June: "It

[16] See dispatch from Moscow in *The Daily Mail* (London), Dec. 17, 1965.

[17] See *Le Figaro* (Paris), Jan. 4, 1966. The circulation of unpublished manuscripts is extensively practiced among all levels of the intelligentsia, and many of the best works of recognized Soviet writers are only known through the "underground." In recent years a few brave souls have ventured to compile literary anthologies and journals and to send them abroad for publication. Examples are *Boomerang* (1959), *Lantern* (1965), *Sphinx*, and some of the recent *Smog* collections. The editors of two such journals, Aleksandr Ginsburg (*Sintaksis*, 1960) and the poet Yuri Galanskov (*Phoenix*, 1961) served prison terms for their activity but afterward continued to flaunt the authorities. Ginsburg has been identified as the compiler of a new collection of documents on the Siniavski-Daniel trial, soon to be published as a "White Paper" in *Grani*, while Galanskov managed to smuggle out a second edition of his journal (*Phoenix*, 1966). According to very recent but as yet unconfirmed reports, both men have been rearrested.

[18] For accounts of the repressions in the Ukraine, see *The New York Times*, April 17, 1966; *Le Monde* (Paris), Nov. 16, 1966; and Gabriel Lorince, "Writers in Revolt," *The New Statesman* (London), Dec. 16, 1966.

[19] Drach made the statement at a poetry gathering on November 11 at the Overseas Press Club in New York City (see news release of Nov. 18, 1966, issued by Prolog Research & Publishing Assn., New York). It is interesting that Drach's first poem to appear in *Novyi mir* ("Ballad of a Bucket," published in April 1965) had been translated from the Ukrainian by Yuli Daniel.

[20] This ministry has jurisdiction over the regular police, as distinct from the secret police (KGB). For the preceding five years organizations at the republic level had directed the work of the regular police.

A Comment on Ukrainian Dissidents

New-born chick: "Everything that was written before me is not worth a hollowed-out egg. Literature begins with me."
Caption below: "From Their Journals."

—From the Ukrainian satirical magazine *Perets*, No. 9, May 1966.

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would be incorrect to think that since communism will finally lead to the disappearance of state organs of coercion, one need no longer bother about strengthening public order and can weaken the measures of coercion." [21]

The campaign to build up the image of the police revealed the degree to which the "organs of coercion" had been undermined by Khrushchev's efforts to tame and even discredit them. In this respect the leadership's actions, particularly from September 1965 on, underscored its serious concern over the breakdown of order and discipline in Soviet society during the years of Khrushchev's rule and over the cumulative tendency of his policies to discredit the party.

To turn to the parallel course being pursued by the party leadership, throughout the entire period of disciplinary crackdown the top leaders struck a public posture of following a middle-of-the-road policy on culture. They refused to get overtly involved in the liberal-conservative tug-of-war, though it continued almost unabated. Moreover, they seemed to disassociate themselves from the Siniavski-Daniel case as much as possible. Cultural overseer Demichev is even reported to have passed the word that he felt the crude coverage of the case in *Izvestia* was overdone. At the 23rd Party Congress in the spring of 1966 First Secretary Brezhnev did refer to the case with a statement that "the Soviet people" would deal with such "renegades" in the manner they deserved. But other speakers seemed to avoid mention of the trial (though some of the conservatives used the Congress as a forum for attack on other liberal writers in the official family and on *Yunost* and *Novyi mir*). In general the Congress seemed to reflect an official effort to avoid opening any more wounds, while at the same time repudiating extremism of any sort. The removal of Tvardovski and Alexei Surkov from the Central Committee and of Kochetov and Prokofiev from the Central Auditing Commission had the effect of rescinding official recognition of the troublesome extremes; coincidentally it lowered the overall representation of the intelligentsia in the top party organs.[22]

Even more interesting was the official treatment of the better-known liberal intellectuals, some of whom were the very men who had borne the heaviest fire in the crisis of 1963. In December 1965, just when the conservative campaign was mounting to full force, Voznesenki, Yevtushenko and Yefim Dorosh were proposed as candidates for the Lenin Prize in Literature for some of their most controversial works. During 1966 the regime permitted a number of the liberals to travel abroad; Yevtushenko, Voznesenki, and Aksionov each made several trips to various countries, and even Ernst Neizvestny and the ballad-singer Bulat Okudzhava were allowed their first foreign junkets. In the same period, the liberal intellectuals were making more frequent appearances before Soviet audiences. No doubt the regime was motivated in part by the desire to counter criticism of the Siniavski-Daniel trial with a demonstration of liberality. For their part, the young liberals—while not fully comfortable in their role as beneficiaries of the repression of the two writers—seemed to recognize the pragmatic need to keep their foot in the door with the party.

Throughout 1966 and into 1967, the pattern of events continued to reflect the two strands of the leadership's stance vis-à-vis the intellectual community. The party seemed to come to the tentative conclusion that by permitting cultural experimentation and foreign imports—within bounds—the intellectuals' energies could be sidetracked from potentially more dangerous anti-regime activity. At the same time, there was no let-up in the authorities' efforts to quell the intellectual underground; indeed, the recent strengthening of laws against anti-Soviet propaganda, as well as continuing reports of arrests among young intellectuals, seemed to reflect the regime's determination to impress upon the intellectual community the lesson that dissidence doesn't pay. Finally, while the top leadership continued to stand aloof from the conservative-liberal struggle, there were persistent indications that official pressure was being brought to bear in certain ideological "problem areas." For example,

[21] *Pravda*, June 19, 1966.

[22] A cultural sidelight on the 23rd CPSU Congress that reveals the party's "two-faced" approach was the closing down of four of the most controversial plays on the Moscow stage for the two weeks that the Congress delegates were in the "big city." The plays were Aksionov's *Always for Sale*, A. Tvardovski's *Tiorkin in the Other World*, Zorin's *Dion*, and E. Radzinski's *Making a Movie*. All of the plays deal in some way with the Stalinist heritage and were apparently considered too daring for the provincial delegates and out of tune with the generally conservative tone of the Congress. After the Congress all the plays reopened. (See *The New York Times*, April 20 1966.) However, *Tiorkin*—the play most critical of Stalinism—did not reappear in the 1966-67 theater season.

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the editors of *Yunost*—the *bête noire* of the conservatives—were eventually induced to "confess" their ideological sins, and in the opinion of many observers the magazine's liberal stance thereafter showed signs of dilution; curiously, however, *Yunost* was allowed to raise its circulation to two million a month in 1966. There were also many signs that the authorities were pressing for changes in the editorial board and policies of *Novyi mir*.

The reaction of the liberal intellectuals to these various official policies and pressures was quite different from what it had been in the 1962-63 period of crackdown, when so many of them chose the "conspiracy of silence" as their best means of protest. We have already noted the remarkable strength and unity demonstrated by various segments of the moderate and liberal intelligentsia in protesting the trial of Siniavski and Daniel. Encouraged, perhaps, by this expression of an overwhelming consensus, the liberals did not retreat into silence, but rather sought other more subtle ways, in their writings and in their actions, to keep alive the crucial issues of the "little truth," the artist's freedom, the dangers of persisting Stalinism. The editors of *Novyi mir* continued to assert their independence—and courage—by publishing prose and criticism that expressed the liberal point-of-view, and *Yunost's* retreat was only marginal.[23] The liberals also kept up their protest against censorship, holding that open criticism of Soviet society not only should be allowed but was essential to its health —as one spokesman put it succinctly, "for Russia, the doctor is publicity [*yasnost*]." [24]

Nor was the intellectual underground much intimidated. No greater act of defiance could have been devised than the smuggling abroad of the Siniavski-Daniel trial record and the protest notes on the case—the very crime for which the two writers had been incarcerated. The extent to which young dissidents and intellectuals remained recalcitrant was most recently revealed by two incidents in Moscow on the same day—January 22 of this year. In Pushkin Square some 25 to 50 young people put official tolerance to the test by a demonstration in protest against Article 70 of the Criminal Code—the article under which Siniavski and Daniel had been condemned and under which other writers have since been arrested.[25] Elsewhere in the city, at a trade union club, 12 of Moscow's leading underground painters opened an exhibit of their paintings. The show was closed by the authorities within two hours, but only after over 500 people had managed to see it. Yevtushenko reportedly decried the closing, defended the artists, blamed the action on the bureaucrats in the Union of Artists, and suggested, according to one report, that the top party officials might have allowed the show to go on had they not been "too high up to be concerned with things like this." [26]

Yevtushenko's remark reflected the degree to which liberals felt helplessly cut off from the top of the power structure, even as they continued to press for changes in cultural policy. Ironically—if what they wanted was some intervention from on high—they were about to get it. But the word that was issued, presumably with top-level sanction, was hardly what they yearned to hear. On January 27, 1967, an editorial in *Pravda* offered the first extensive policy statement on the arts since the removal of Rumiantsev in September 1965. The editorial had sharp criticisms for both extremes in the continuing "conservative-liberal" conflict, and was probably aimed at toning down the debate in preparation for the much-postponed Fourth USSR Writers' Congress, as well as for the general celebration of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution. Yet there was no doubt where the most significant criticism fell. In the most explicit terms to date, the editorial spelled out the regime's objection to *Novyi mir's* editorial policies of publishing literature and critical essays that centered on the negative side of Soviet society, that defended "anti-heroes," and that failed to view the 50 years of Soviet history from the standpoint of

[23] One of the most significant recent pieces in *Yunost* (Nos. 9 and 10, 1966) was Vasili Kuznetsov's *Babi Yar: A Documentary Novel*, an elaboration of the theme of Yevtushenko's famous poem published in 1962. (See George Gibian's article elsewhere in this issue—Ed.)

[24] See *Grani*, November 1966, p. 16.

[25] On these arrests, see *The New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1967.

[26] Quoted in a dispatch from Moscow to *The Washington Post* (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 27, 1967. Throughout the period of repression against the dissident writers of 1965-66, the underground painters had seemingly been allowed a good deal of freedom to sell their paintings to foreigners and to their patrons among Soviet scientists and "establishment" intellectuals. Two of them (Oskar Rabin and Anatoli Zverev) had even managed to sneak out paintings and have shows abroad. Rabin was the target of a scurrilous attack in *Sovetskaia kultura* on June 15, 1966, but it didn't seem to harm his unofficial standing, and in general the underground market continued to flourish. The January 22 exhibit showed 50 abstract and expressionist canvases by Rabin, Zverev, Plavinski, Nemukhin, Masterkova, Kropovnitski—the older and the younger—and five other artists.

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"universality." The statement was a clear repudiation of the former Rumiantsev line defending the artist's privilege to write his "private truths," demonstrating the degree to which reaction had set in over the preceding 18 months. Though more than token criticism was directed at *Oktiabr*—for holding itself up as the only authority on "Socialist Realism," for producing "grey" literature, and for not accepting destalinization—this was little compensation to the elements in Soviet society who looked to *Novyi mir* as the conscience of the Soviet intellectual and the only real defender of the Russian literary tradition.

The editorial in *Pravda* marks the most definitive indication of the current trend of Soviet cultural policy as of this writing. It is time, then, to look backward over the past year and a half, to recognize that what has transpired on the cultural front is only part of the broad spectrum of what has been going on in the Soviet world, and to try to relate the cultural scene to the overall imperatives of leadership policy.

The Politics of Ferment

The developments in Soviet culture since the ouster of Khrushchev demonstrate what we already knew—that the intellectual currents in Soviet society are intertwined with the politics and policies of the party leadership in complex and confusing ways. The sequence of events described above does, however, suggest some observations on the manner in which the present leadership has evolved.

First, it seems clear that the changes on the cultural front in the summer and early fall of 1965 reflected the resolution within the party of broader political issues and most probably stemmed from a realignment within the top leadership. By September, party First Secretary Brezhnev seems to have reconciled to his advantage the disparate forces at work over the preceding ten months. A number of factors point to the conclusion that August-September of 1965 was a watershed in the leadership's programs and policies, and in the career of Brezhnev: (1) Rumiantsev's removal in September as editor of *Pravda* marked the end of that paper's short-lived practice of taking polemical and relatively "liberal" stances on key policy issues, suggesting strongly that he had been replaced in a policy controversy. (2) Within a few months after September, most of the major central newspapers and political journals were assigned new editors-in-chief, and important new assignments were made to the ideological and propaganda branches of the party and government, indicating that a new first team was being installed with new instructions. (3) Nikolai Podgorny, who had been one of Brezhnev's chief rivals under Khrushchev, was kicked upstairs in December 1965 to become titular chief of state; Podgorny had appeared on at least one occasion in the spring of 1965 as a chief spokesman for moderate policies in the economy, and his prior association with Rumiantsev allows speculation that he may have influenced Rumiantsev's appointment

On Regulating Creativity

. . . I do not think that the Fourth Writers' Congress will markedly change the creative direction of literature. At best, it can resolve some organizational questions. For example, some unnecessary parallelism is observed in the administration of the Writers' Union: the RSFSR Writers' Union Board largely duplicates and repeats the work of the USSR Writers' Union Board. A reduction of duplicating organizations can only be beneficial, but it hardly will be greatly reflected in the creativity of the writers themselves. Literature at any rate is created at the writer's desk, and not at the tribunal of meetings. . . .

Life is developing, and everything is becoming more and more complex. In this growing complexity it is not so easy for a person to orient himself. In what connection should one rejoice, in what connection should one be grieved, what should one be enthusiastic about, and at what should one be outraged--these matters prove to be difficult to resolve sometimes. We recall the purely emotional mass resentment in connection with the so-called "enemies of the people," we recall the enthusiasm in connection with the "greatness" of the personality raised to a cult, and now we know that this played a hindering role in the development of our society. . . .

—Vladimir Tendriakov, Voprosi literatura, No. 1, January 1966, p. 74, referring to the Fourth USSR Writers' Congress to be held in May 1967. (Tendriakov is one of the leading novelists of the Novyi mir group.)

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to *Pravda* immediately after Khrushchev's ouster. (4) Party Secretary Shelepin, who reportedly planned or made a move for more power some time in the latter half of 1965, was trimmed back in December 1965 when he was relieved of the party-state control apparatus. (5) After the fall of 1965 virtually every major appointment to the government or party was either a man long associated with Brezhnev or a figure representing Brezhnev's particular bias for older party leaders from the provinces. One seeming inconsistency in this picture is that many of the new appointments in the cultural and propaganda sector seemed to come from the younger party cadres, suggesting that in the September "reconciliation," the younger Politburo members, perhaps represented by Shelepin, Mazurov, and Demichev, were given an important voice in policies and personnel assignments in the field of ideology and culture.

The policy lines that emerged after September 1965 reflected on one hand the party's heightened awareness of the nation's economic ills and its preparedness to make some innovations to meet them, and on the other hand the party's proclivity in the social and political sectors to resort to old formulas.[27] What has emerged over the last year and a half, then, has been a peculiar combination of programs for reform and retrenchment, relaxation and discipline: (1) The economic measures adopted at the crucial September 1965 Central Committee plenum were a moderate but important step toward reform of the economy—although the recentralization of the government and economic administration seemed to vitiate many of the reformist aspects. (2) Party officials were warned not to meddle too deeply in the economy—yet the changes made in the party structure and style were orthodox and fundamentalist. (3) In the face of evident opposition, particularly from the intelligentsia, the party was forced to slow down its campaign to rehabilitate the Stalin era—but increasing stress was put on refurbishing the image of the party, the heroic past, and the police. (4) New stress was placed on sociological and scientific work to determine public needs—yet in the much debated area of legal reforms and "guarantees," in the face of a continued high incidence of crime, there seemed to be a regression to greater use of repressive organs. (5) The scientific establishment was restructured to encourage technological progress, and more latitude seemed to be granted cultural figures for experimentation—yet in the field of thought and expression in general, violators of official controls were severely punished in evident efforts to impose discipline by example, and censorship was tightened on writing critical of the party and police in the Stalin era.

The conclusion seems to be that Brezhnev patched together a conservative leadership bent on restoring the party's prestige but also seriously interested in improving the efficiency of the economy. In the deal, the moderate or "liberal conservative" line of Rumiantsev was moved out of the propaganda sector—but it has not been wholly abandoned. Rumiantsev himself has remained active in setting up the new work on sociology, and the policies he espoused still seem to be the unspoken rationale behind the official encouragement given to some segments of the intelligentsia. While the "hardliners" seem to have the upper hand in the Brezhnev coalition on matters of "legality" and discipline, it is unlikely that the leadership is prepared to introduce extreme enough methods of control and repression to retard significantly the breakdown in the authority and ideology of the party. Therefore, the "liberal conservatives" in the party are relied upon to seek out more subtle methods to tame the youth, channel their intellectual vigor, and—insofar as possible—reinforce their patriotism.

There seems to be little hope that the Brezhnev leadership as it is now constituted will ever allow a major relaxation of controls over the intellectuals. The provincial party and the military and police lobbies have too strong a voice in the Brezhnev collective leadership and in any foreseeable coalitions to allow hope that "liberal conservative" element will gain dominance in the cultural field. At the same time—barring the unlikely return to extreme repression—the gains in the expansion of culture over recent years will not be undone, and the various intellectual forces in the Soviet Union can be expected to continue pressing forward with marginal moves to open up the society.

[27] While I have not been able to deal with foreign policy developments in the context of this paper, I do wish to point out that the intensified conflict in Southeast Asia and the heightened Sino-Soviet dispute most certainly gave added weight to the arguments of those who in the fall of 1965 were pressing for more ideological orthodoxy and vigilance at home and less emphasis on exchanges with the West. In relations with the Chinese, there was also a noticeable sharpening of the debate within the movement from the Soviet side in the fall of 1965, culminating in the December Soviet letter to all Communist parties.

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Brezhnev, however, is still faced with the same dilemma Khrushchev had—how to adapt the party to its leadership role and keep its ideology relevant to Soviet society and the Communist movement. For a short period in 1965, when the leaders were most unsure of their directions, they seemed cautiously to seek the assistance of the intellectuals in taking some moderate steps toward adapting the Soviet establishment to modern needs. However "scientific" their orientation has been since that time, the leaders have demonstrated that the party's bias remains anti-intellectual, resistant to change, and distrustful of the artist. One Soviet intellectual who lived through both the 1953-54 and 1964-65 "thaws," and who understood clearly this persistent inflexibility of the party leadership, has suggested that what the Soviet Union obviously needs is frequent leadership changes, so that during the confusing interregna, the management of the country can be left to those who know what must be done and the intellectuals can benefit from the relative freedom that flows from disorientation at the top.

A "SLAVOPHILE" VIEW

"Slavophilism" takes many forms in intellectual Russia. One extreme form is represented by the Smogisti, *who have stated in their manifesto: "Contemporary art is in a cul-de-sac and cannot turn back. It is steeped in the fumes of foreign literature and art and has become epigonic. National art is dead, we should and must resurrect it." This quotation was published in the context of an attack on the* Smogisti *in* Komsomolskaia pravda *(June 20, 1965); it is rare, however, for such strongly nationalistic cultural views to get into print. Thus the publication of the journals of the young painter Ilia Glazunov in the Komsomol journal,* Molodaia gvardiia, *was greeted with some amazement. Glazunov, by no means a follower of the* Smogisti, *is, nonetheless, deeply nationalistic about Russian art. In the past he found much in common with the "modern liberals," but more recently he has become the favorite "Slavophile" of certain elements in the Komsomol and government. Although he is anathema to the "dogmatists" who control the Academy of Fine Arts and the Union of Artists, his journals have been used by the Komsomol to build up the circulation of* Molodaia gvardiia. *Herewith some of his views:*

As is known, Peter opened just a window, not a door, on the West so that Russians could look at life in Europe and study it, and from students become teachers. But unfortunately, by throwing off their national tunics, many Russians broke connections with their homeland. Cutting off their beards, they lost instead their Russian individuality.

—*Molodaia gvardiia*, No. 10, 1965, p. 121.

The history of Russian culture recalls moments of the highest ascent of national self-consciousness, and each time—whether during the heroic and difficult period of breaking loose from the Mongol yoke, or during the glorious period of "Moscow—the Third Rome," or at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th Century, in the years of tension and the great flowering of national creative thought—each time Russia reinterpreted anew her great significance in world culture . . . as the successor of the great cultural heritage of Byzantium, the guardian of the achievements of the ancient world.

—*Ibid.*, No. 12, 1965, p. 224.

. . . Picasso is not the new word in culture but the destruction of the old. From my point of view, jazz is the deeply national ritual music of primitive Negro tribes. I don't understand why primitive art and the effort to copy it must be considered the international art of the 20th century.

—*Ibid.*, p. 231.

(Speaking of the Russian Orthodox Church, and specifically of the Monastery Troitse Segeievskaiia Lavra:) When looking into the history of Russia and into the very fabric of Russian culture, we shall not find one single thread that does not lead to this original source of the Russian historical consciousness, to the idea of heroic moral strength and military glory. The Russian systems of government, art, architecture, literature and science, all flow from this.

—*Ibid.*, No. 6, June 1966, p. 257.

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In Defense of Socialist Realism

By Sidney Monas

In his brilliant, ill-fated essay, *On Socialist Realism*, Abram Tertz wrote:

The strength of a theological system resides in its constancy, harmony and order. Once we admit that God carelessly sinned with Eve and, becoming jealous of Adam, sent him off to labor at land reclamation, the whole concept of the Creation falls apart, and it is impossible to restore the faith.[1]

Stalin's heirs, however, instead of "surrounding his death with miracles" and having him rise to watch over Russia from a Celestial Kremlin, as Tertz suggested they should have done, complained rather of a "more than natural stench," like that surrounding Father Zosima in *The Brothers Karamazov*. The result was that the Socialist Realist "engineers of human souls" felt shaken to the foundations of their science and began to look timidly and apprehensively at these foundations, not so much with a view to questioning the principles of their construction as with a kind of frightened and ever-widening question mark as to whether they might still be made to hold. To a rather extraordinary degree, these foundations have nevertheless held, if not "firm" at least more or less in place, though everything that rests on them has shifted—and, I would be tempted to say, has shifted radically.

The Human Unconscious and Party Consciousness

As long as Socialist Realism retained the force and authenticity of its religious purpose, Tertz argued, the fact that its basic characteristics combined to form a "loathsome literary salad," an eclectic mish-mash of contradictions, might be swallowed even with a certain relish. The positive hero who "logically tends toward the pattern, the allegory" might be presented in the context of psychological analysis of character; elevated style, declamation, grandly rhetorical speeches mixed with prosaic descriptions of everyday life, idealization mixed with photographic realism. But only the strength of a naive faith could serve as the universal solvent, as it did in the Christian Middle Ages, and help the salad slide down—if not smoothly, at least down.

Once, however, the order of the overall system had been violated—as it was with the exposures

[1] New York, Pantheon Books, 1960, p. 93.

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that followed upon Stalin's death—the eclecticism characteristic of Socialist Realism became too apparent; the center could not hold, and things fell apart. Tertz suggested as best under the circumstances not a return to the hyperbolism, the Socialist Surrealism, of Maiakovski, but rather what he called a "phantasmagoric art, with hypotheses instead of a purpose"—an art characterized by irony, ambiguity, and a seeking after meaning. The assumption that "meaning" and "purpose" are given and fixed must be honestly discarded as compromised. Instead, they must be sought where meanings ever lurk, in the depths of the unconscious; they must be wooed with conventions and hunted with snares so fashioned as to give words and images to meanings that rise from the unconscious.

Tertz's sometimes impressive, sometimes clumsy experimentalism is just such a wooing of the inchoate possibility of meaning that dwells in the human unconscious. All his themes have to do with "possession" or "revelation"—either the seizure of a human being by a powerful but unexpected psychic force, or the tearing away of a veil from the surface of things, an access of symbolic understanding, a "revelation." The body of his work gropes for a meaning not yet discovered but strongly hungered after.

What went on trial with Tertz and Arzhak a year ago, though it was never openly and explicitly arraigned, was the unconscious. The trial, beneath its preordained and apparently inflexible surface, did not proceed with the air of certainty and inexorability that it required. It seemed to breed contradictions: a supposedly open trial held in closed quarters, presided over by a judge (Smirnov) who had written widely on the importance of "socialist legality," yet who resolutely rejected the discussion of literary criteria in what seemed manifestly to be (if that is not a contradiction in terms!) a literary trial; the lack of direct news, where only a short time before Valeri Tarsis had been giving interviews to foreign correspondents in his apartment. All this and much else created a weird impression, as of some sleepwalker's ritual. The charge (under Article 70 of the Criminal Code) of carrying on anti-Soviet propaganda was manifestly absurd; yet the real charge—of violating party controls, of failing even to consult (before publication abroad) with an official and "responsible" representative of the party, whether the editor or some other—was suppressed, though it was constantly hinted at obliquely throughout the trial. Tertz did not even *try*, the prosecutor complained, to have his dangerous works printed in the USSR: he wrote one way as Siniavski, and another way as Tertz.[2]

In fact, the trial was an analogue of the old revolutionary argument between "spontaneity" and "consciousness," as immortalized in Lenin's *What is to be Done?*—that is, as between Lenin and Martov. Under what are, of course, completely different conditions, the argument goes on in all walks of life throughout the Communist camp, but most poignantly and dramatically, most sharply focused and most easily understood with regard to literature. The cause of Socialist Realism is the cause of party consciousness.

During the trial itself, it was Tertz and Arzhak who kept constantly trying to introduce literary discussions and explanations, and the presiding judge who kept insisting that they were irrelevant. This left the prosecution and the witnesses for the prosecution free to refer to conventional artistic representations—the speech of a character in a short story, for example—as literally the opinion of the author. Elsewhere, Socialist Realism has been defended in a more appropriate manner and more ably, and it is with these defenses, which are more interesting and more revealing than is generally acknowledged in the West, that I wish primarily to deal.

The Foundations of a Dogma

First, however, it should be said that these defenses go back to the positions taken at the First Congress of the Writers' Union of the USSR in 1934, and it might therefore be appropriate briefly to review these. There were four major addresses at the Congress, delivered by Zhdanov, Gorky, Radek and Bukharin.[3] In the light of what has happened since then, each has a peculiar interest.

Zhdanov's speech, if one bears in mind his later style, was singularly free of invective. Nevertheless, it contained in embryo the later position of "Zhdanovism," eloquently summed up in one sentence of the speech: "The key to the success of

[2] See Max Hayward, "The Trial of Siniavski and Daniel," *The New York Times Magazine*, April 17, 1966; and A. Brumberg, "Traitors in the Dock," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1966. A full transcript of the proceedings can be found in *On Trial—The Soviet State versus "Abram Tertz" and "Nikolai Arzhak,"* translated, edited, and with an introduction by Max Hayward, New York, Harper and Row, 1966.

[3] For the proceedings of the Congress, see *Problems of Soviet Literature: Reports and Speeches at the First Soviet Writers' Congress*, New York, 1934 (hereafter cited as *Problems of Soviet Literature*).

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Soviet literature is to be sought for in the success of socialist construction." [4] From here on, other "keys" become at best secondary. Even the phrase "socialist construction" needs to be interpreted in Bolshevik terms. Partisanship, *partiinost*, is the test of style, and not the other way around.

About the "technical" (*i.e.*, secondary) achievements of Soviet literature, Zhdanov was quite modest. "The weaknesses of our literature," he explains, "are a reflection of the fact that consciousness lags behind economic life." Here, he feels, Soviet writers have much to learn from the West and from their own Russian past: "The bourgeoisie has squandered its literary heritage; it is our duty to gather it up carefully, to study it and, having critically assimilated it, to advance further." Throughout the Congress, this notion of technical imperfection and learning from the past and from the West is repeated respectfully over and over again.

Ten years earlier, the party line had at least held open the possibility of a classless art, an art that would contribute *not* to the formation of an organizing ideology (the "false consciousness" of Marx) but which might, ultimately at least, transcend ideology, as the purpose of the proletarian revolution was not to make out of the proletariat a new ruling class, but to transcend class society and to create for the first time a complete humanity. In any case, the most important thing about Zhdanov's speech was the fact that he, in his role as Party Supervisor, was the one who made it, signifying that the party had decided to organize the writers, to take control, to "collectivize" them. The "engineers of human souls" were themselves to be engineered, and their science was provided in a handy manual which underwent rapid changes of edition. Their job was to adapt and to apply. Genres, styles, form were (as Zhdanov put it) their "weapons," their tools, their instruments.[5]

Gorky's speech was long and rambling and repetitive. He contrasted the "potent" force of socialism and socialist culture with the "impotence" of European literature in the 20th century, adding, however, that the latter, though impotent, must nevertheless be studied both for its technical excellence and as documentation for "the process of the bourgeoisie's development and decay." Otherwise, this European literature was merely an affair of "introspection and arbitrary thought," restricted, solitary, "detached from life"—obsessed with the notion of personality, with individualism. Gorky spoke of the need to study folk literature as a contrast to the above, to study its inherent power to organize labor and the power of words to give personality to a group.[6] "Myth is beneficial," he said, invoking a strangely flat conception of myth, "in that [by projecting an image of the desired, the possible] it tends to provoke a revolutionary attitude to reality, an attitude that changes the world in a practical way." [7]

The most interesting part of Radek's speech is titled, in its printed version, "James Joyce or Socialist Realism?," and it contains an account of *Ulysses* so ludicrous as to make it apparent that Radek never read the book. For whatever motives, and probably under strong pressure, the same Radek who, ten years previously, had suggested to Trotsky that the Bolsheviks should investigate the possibilities of Freud and the unconscious, now attempted to identify an interest in the unconscious with a bourgeois, "philistine" outlook:

While the literature of dying capitalism invokes the aid of the irrational, of the unconscious and the subconscious, the literature of Socialist Realism demands a consciousness of the fate of humanity. . . . When we are told . . . that we are creating a narrow party literature, we answer . . . that the watchtower of our party is the highest roof of the world, for the party . . . is the vanguard of humanity.[8]

Later, in response to the indignation of the German writer Wieland Herzfelde, Radek disclaimed any objection to artists' familiarizing themselves with Joyce's work. He did not even deny that Joyce was a great writer, but he did not think that the revolutionary artist should be directed "inwardly" at that time. "If it is a question of being able to present the typical in the individual," he added, "we do not need Joyce for that. As teachers, Balzac and Tolstoy are enough for us." It turns out that Radek's real objection to Joyce was not that he concerned himself with "the dung heap" of every-

[4] *Problems of Soviet Literature*, p. 17.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[6] In Gorky's novel, *Mother*, the progress of the hero, Pavel Vlasov, from "spontaneous" revolt to "conscious" revolution is measured by the contrast between his first reacting to a threatened beating from his father by picking up a hammer and his first "speech" delivered to his mother. What he acquires in between is rhetoric, exhortatory language. Gorky wrote this novel in 1907 at Lenin's suggestion. Though by no means his best work, it is one of the perenially cited models of what a Socialist Realist novel should be.
[7] *Problems of Soviet Literature*, p. 44.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 158.

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day life, as he had stated in his speech, but that Joyce tended to create a kind of "Chinese alphabet without commas so that it cannot reach the masses of the people."

The most interesting of the speeches, from our present point of view, was that of Bukharin, for he tried to present Socialist Realism in such a way as not to exclude modernism—*i.e.*, the search for new channels to the unconscious. He spoke of realism as a realism of effect, which might invoke the boldest metaphorical devices, the irrational, disjunction, cacophony as well as harmony. He did not specify "effect on whom," but it seems clear that he did not have "the masses" exclusively in mind, for he found high words of praise for Boris Pasternak as the most original of contemporary Russian poets. He spoke of unity as a unity of aim, not of means; and, almost as though he were already apprehensive, he pointed to the absurdity of ordering literature according to plan and the futility of prohibitive measures. He saw Socialist Realism as a point of view rather than a style, and as such he extolled it. It is striking, however, that even Bukharin, who would seem all along (through the rather heavy pedantry of his own style) to have been *warning* against the future and calling out from under his breath that there were lurking dangers, saw "point of view" in literature as, fundamentally, the translation of a philosophic system into literary terms, so that Zola equals Comtean positivism, symbolism equals V. Soloviev plus Kant, and Socialist Realism equals dialectical materialism. On the other hand, Bukharin insisted very strongly that no area of experience should be excluded: "The new man that is being born and the whole world of his emotions, including even 'new erotics,' if one may so express it, are therefore the province of socialist art." [9] Bukharin's attitude toward the unconscious was that it changes with consciousness; it is not there merely to be repressed, but must be studied and wooed in its shifting aspects.

The First Writers' Congress of 1934 may thus be seen, from the point of view of literary history, as an extremely momentous event. The principles of Socialist Realism received their first public and official expression there, and all subsequent controversies refer back to it, either explicitly or implicitly.

Нашел положительного героя. Рисунок Е. ГУРОВА

CRITIC'S DELIGHT

"He found a Positive Hero." (To right, a department store. To left, a theater.)

—*Krokodil* (Moscow), Dec. 20, 1965

Zhdanov, Gorky and Radek—though with far greater diffidence toward literary values than was customary later, it is true—outlined the essentials of the Stalinist position in literature, including its essential confusion.[10] Bukharin expressed a position closer to the present-day "pro-modernists," but in a heavy and pedantic manner that obscured the differences between him and his colleagues. He spoke as a representative of the party and could hardly have called its authority in literary matters into question. Moreover, since he seemed to take it for granted that style and ideology were intimately related, and since a Bolshevik could hardly be expected to advocate the primacy of style over ideology, there were distinct limits even to Bukharin's latitudinarianism. Nevertheless, he was clearly pleading for greater tolerance toward stylistic experimentation and the depiction of new modes

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 255. (For a recent interpretation of the "new man," see V. Yermilov (ed.), *Literatura i novyi chelovek*, Moscow, 1963.)

[10] The best account of this "Mongol yoke," its tensions and controversies, and the beginnings of its demise, is to be found in Harold Swayze, *Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1962.

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of experience. In general, there seems to be at present an attempt to revive the tone and atmosphere as well as the essential positions of the 1934 Congress. In 1934, however, modernism in the USSR was embattled and on the way out. It would be too much to claim that the opposite is now the case, but the present situation seems at least to be closer to the opposite.

A Surrogate for Humanity

Let us return now to the present-day defenders of Socialist Realism. I have already suggested that what they are defending is party consciousness, the party's authority, its right to control not only literature, but life; the party as a surrogate will, a surrogate personality for the people as a whole—not only for the Russian people (though that is where the claim is most active and vital) nor only the people of the Communist bloc, but humanity at large. In short, the party claims to be surrogate personality for the whole human race. It cannot, of course, be empirically demonstrated, yet I cannot escape the feeling that the party, to a greater degree than anyone knows, depends for its own sense of authenticity, of acting *rightly* as a surrogate for humanity, on literary myths—on Chernyshevski, on Gorky, on Ostrovski, on Kataev.[11] It seems not only that this sense of authenticity has been profoundly shaken by the revelations concerning Stalin, but also that it wanes constantly when it has nothing better to feed on than the mythically feeble creations of Kochetov or Kozhevnikov (see box on p. 50). The party is looking for new Rakhmetovs, Vlasovs, Korchagins; but no one, I think, has much confidence that they will be found, and when the critic Yermilov compares Kozhevnikov's Baluev to Tolstoy's heroes, it seems that he is whistling in the dark.[12]

We commonly assume that literary critics who take it upon themselves primarily to defend Socialist Realism (*i.e.*, party consciousness) are fundamentally uninterested in and insensitive to literature as such, or that they are mere vulgar careerists who would do or say anything to make their way. This may be true of some, but it is manifestly *not* true of others who are sincerely and deeply concerned for the fate of Socialist Realism (which they identify closely with the fate of party control), and who are at the same time well-educated, intelligent, and unusually sensitive and responsive to literary values, though not necessarily in a way that conforms to the standards set by schools of criticism fashionable elsewhere. What needs to be said about the latter is not that they care nothing about literature, but rather that, however much they care, their primary loyalty is to the party and party consciousness, which they feel to be deeply (if obscurely) threatened by the concern with, and flaunting of, the irrational and unconscious that modernism represents.

Ideologues like Novikov, Riurikov, Anismov and Kuznetsov are sensitive and intelligent enough to realize that the attempt to broaden the party line while at the same time retaining a definite line, to discourage heresy while at the same time avoiding direct and overt repression, calls for tact and delicacy of a kind that makes the figure of the late Zhdanov useless as a model. Literary scholars are confronted with the problem of a fresh interpretation of literary classics previously regarded as suspect. To meet the demand for broadened horizons, to combat the threat of literary boredom, these works must now be brought back into the canon of literary classics—yet not so far back in that they are taken as authoritative norms.[13] I doubt that this is merely a task imposed from outside; the frequent traces of scholarly intelligence would seem to indicate that the literary ideologues are moved

[11] N. G. Chernyshevski, a 19th-century Russian writer (1828-1889) greatly admired by Lenin, wrote a novel entitled *What Is To Be Done?* (*circa* 1863), a weird combination of utopian socialism, "nihilism," scientism, and personal libertarianism, which nevertheless expressed many of the aspirations of at least two generations of young Russian intellectuals. One of its heroes, Rakhmetov, later became a model of the tough, single-minded Bolshevik commissar.

N. A. Ostrovski (1904-1936) joined the Komsomol in 1919 and fought in the civil war, receiving a severe wound which caused his premature death. His one completed novel, *How the Steel Was Tempered*, celebrated the "fanatical generation" of Komosols, especially in the person of its autobiographical hero, Pavel Korchagin.

V. P. Kataev (1897-) also fought in the civil war and is the author of numerous novels which generally emphasize the heroic and romantic aspects of revolutionary struggle. Among his works in the genre of Socialist Realism, *Time, Forward!* (1932), dealing with the beginnings of industrialization, is one of the few that merit survival on literary grounds.

[12] V. Yermilov, "Obraz novovo cheloveka v povesti '*Znakomtes, Baluev!*', *loc. cit supra* (see footnote 9). Baluev is the "prototypical" hero of Kozhevnikov's novella, *Znakomtes, Baluev!* (Get Acquainted, Baluev!), of the early 1960's. The party critics would like to think that Baluev, because he is far from a "perfect" figure, carries the kind of conviction that Tolstoy's "seeking" heroes do, but this is nonsense.

[13] One of the most common ways of doing this is by emphasizing the "inner contradictions" of a given work. For two very different examples of this relatively sophisticated technique, see V. Yermilov, *Roman Tolstovo Anna Karenina*, Moscow, 1963 (this is a "popularizing" pamphlet based on Yermilov's larger book on Tolstoy); and M. Gus, *Idei i obrazy F. M. Dostoevskovo*, Moscow, 1962, especially pp. 35-62.

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as well by their own inner necessity—the duty of reconciling what previously seemed to be anti-Communist books with the current party line, while at the same time not dissolving or erasing that line. The most talented of the recent Socialist Realist scholar-critics is probably Aleksandr Dymshits, whose work and line of argument deserve to be better known and will be dealt with presently in some detail.

It goes without saying that not everyone who pretends to be defending Socialist Realism is really doing so. There are Soviet writers, for example, who have deliberately used the conventions and idioms of Socialist Realism for critical, unconventional, sometimes even mocking and ironical purposes—Dudintsev in *Not by Bread Alone;* Solzhenitsyn in all his fiction; Yashin in "Levers" and "Vologda Wedding." So also there are critics who sometimes use the idiom for unidiomatic reasons. In a book on Leninist esthetics, for example, Professor A. Anikst writes: "Insofar as there are no antagonistic classes in the USSR, we cannot have different class tendencies in our art." [14] Surely he speaks with forked tongue, and V. Novikov, the party ideologue, is quick to reprimand him for it.[15] For an outsider, even a well-informed one, it is sometimes a little difficult to tell the wolves from the watchdogs.

The Limits of Opportunism

Here, it might be well to digress for a moment to discuss the extent to which defenders of Socialist Realism are motivated by "opportunism" and "careerism"—terms which one inevitably encounters in discussions of Soviet literary politics. Now I certainly do not mean to deny that such phenomena are a force in human affairs; and in the Soviet Union especially, where the distance between extraordinary fame and power on the one hand, and degraded obloquy on the other, may sometimes be traversed with dizzying speed and unexpected suddenness, the sophisticated observer cannot afford to overlook such motives. There is, however, in these matters, a kind of oversophistication which is only another kind of naiveté, and since it is a fairly frequent manifestation in the study of Soviet affairs by Western scholars, a few simple caveats would seem to be in order, even at the risk of repeating clichés.

First, pure hypocrisy is a rather rare thing: there just are not many people like that Borgia Pope who is said to have admitted, "You know, this story of Jesus has helped us a lot!" Secondly, opportunism is always easier to believe of our opponents. Thirdly, there is the Freudian mechanism of projection, which enables us to think of others what unconsciously we fear of ourselves. It is also possible for a man to compromise one set of values he believes in, and to advance another set he also believes in. Material rewards may or may not affect the decision, but few people are influenced by material rewards alone, and fewer still will allow themselves to be swayed by material considerations without some psychic cost. A literary critic who in a number of published works displays erudition, intelligence, and a detailed and subtle knowledge of a large body of the world's literature is obviously a man who is not "merely" an opportunist; he has devoted time, energy and passion to a study that must therefore to some degree command his loyalty to its own intrinsic value, beyond merely his reliance on it for a living. Loyalty to the party may of course take precedence. He may be loyal to the party and an opportunist in literature, or vice versa. The party has a great historic heap of martyrs' bones with which to impose itself on the conscience of the erudite and the intelligent. Granted that the party's power of command is waning; it is nevertheless still there. On the other hand, one should not underestimate the power of the muses.

There is also such a thing as opportunism under duress—sometimes, in the Soviet Union, extreme duress. A man can be forced to take a public stand he does not really believe in, some men more easily than others, but the psychic cost is rather high, and the result is often personal neurosis and, when a counteropportunity presents itself, an otherwise incomprehensibly vehement public reversal. It is not always obvious who is an opportunist or a cynic, and who isn't. One needs to be a little restrained here.

In her generally excellent essay, "The Politics of Soviet Culture," [16] Priscilla Johnson attributes Boris Riurikov's approval of Kafka in the pages of *Inostrannaia literatura* (of which he is the editor)

[14] A. Anikst, "Narodnost, klassovost i partiinost isskustva," in *Osnovy Marksistsko-Leniskoi estetiki,* Moscow, 1960, p. 326.
[15] V. Novikov, "Partiinost i narodnost," in *Literatura i sovremennost, 1962-63,* Vol. 4, Moscow, 1963, p. 24.

[16] Published in Priscilla Johnson and Leopold Labedz (Eds.), *Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-64,* Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1965. (An earlier and shorter version of this essay appeared in *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1963, Supplement.)

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Some of the Defenders of Socialist Realism

Ivan Ivanovich Anisimov (1899-1966)

Director of the Gorky Institute of World Literature and editor of *Literaturnoe nasledstvo*. Taught history of foreign literature in the late 1920's at the Institute of Red Professors, yet did not join the party until 1939. Earlier critical work on Stefan Zweig, Henri Barbusse, G. B. Shaw, and Theodore Dreiser was followed by discussions of the problematics of Socialist Realism. Edited the 1965 collection, *Contemporary Problems of Realism and Modernism*, discussed throughout the article.

Aleksandr Lvovich Dymshits (1910-)

First published in 1928, joined the party in 1940. Served on the editorial boards of *Zvezda* (1957-1961) and *Literatura i zhizn* (1959-1962) but was dropped from the board of *Oktiabr* in November 1962 after publishing elsewhere a favorable review of Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*. Wrote on Yesenin, Kafka, Freilingrath, Andreev and Vishnevski, but now concentrates on the artistic problems of Soviet writing.

Vsevolod Anisimovich Kochetov (1912-)

Joined the party in 1944 while a war correspondent for *Leningradskaia pravda*. Chief editor of *Literaturnaia gazeta* (1955-59) and since 1961 of *Oktiabr*. Incited the wrath of liberals in 1961 by expressing grief at loss of Stalin as guiding light instead of grief for Stalin's victims (in his novel *Sekretar Obkoma*). Led attacks on Dudintsev in 1957 and on Solzhenitsyn in 1963. Called by the Chinese "the only revolutionary writer today," he backed away from Chinese praise and offered to publish Dudintsev's *The Unknown Soldier* in *Oktiabr*.

Vadim Mikhailovich Kozhevnikov (1909-)

Published short stories six years after graduation from Moscow University in 1933. Also entered the party while a war correspondent. Switched from stories on China to hearty Socialist Realist novels. Attacked at the height of Zhdanov's regime for taking the party line too literally (*River of Fire*, 1950). Now editor of *Znamia*. Also famous for popular patriotic accounts of the adventures of Soviet secret agents.

Boris Sergeievich Riurikov (1909-)

Left editorship of *Literaturnaia gazeta* in 1955 for post of Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's Culture Section, which he held three years. Became editor of *Znamia* in April 1962, then moved on to *Inostrannaia literatura*, where he published in January 1964 the first Kafka works (*In the Penal Colony* and *The Metamorphosis*) to appear in the Soviet Union. Writing in *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (September 1964), he took a position midway between the Chinese ultra-conservative and Soviet liberal viewpoints.

Vladimir Vladimirovich Yermilov (1904-1965)

Secretary of the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers from 1928 to 1934. During the 1930's he polemicized against Maiakovski, informed on scores of writers and intellectuals, and destroyed the reputation of Dostoevski, whom he later helped to rehabilitate in 1956. In a 1949 book, he developed the image of Chekhov as a precursor of the revolution. Received a Stalin Prize in 1950, after several years as editor of *Literaturnaia gazeta*. Began diatribe against Ilia Ehrenburg's biographical recollections of the purge years in March 1963.

Victor Osipovich Pertsov (1898-)

Denounced Pasternak in the 1957 melee for advocating the primacy of art over revolutionary consciousness. But in *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Feb. 27, 1962) declared that the time had come to put an end to the nihilistic approach to new art, and to free the younger generation from the routine of orthodox Soviet art. In a June 1966 speech, requested the inclusion of poets Gumilev, Mandelstam, Bunin, Tsvetaeva and Khlebnikov in the Poets' Library Series then in process.

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to pure cynicism. In her view, Riurikov is an unscrupulous party hack stopping at nothing to attract readers. Yet it seems odd to think of Kafka as a great magnet for multitudes of readers. Undoubtedly Miss Johnson means a special *kind* of reader; but that already calls into question, from a literary point of view, the utter cynicism of Riurikov's motives.

Certainly, as mixed a bag of motives as any psychologist could hope to examine must have been released at the October 1958 meeting of Moscow writers that condemned Pasternak.[17] On that occasion Pasternak was attacked not only by consistently crude and seemingly ignorant critics like V. O. Pertsov and K. L. Zelinski, and by indubitably "party" scholars like M. Gus, but also by Boris Slutski, a fine poet whom Miss Johnson calls "one of the most respected of the Moscow liberals",[18] by Vladimir Soloukhin, a young "rebel", and by Leonid Martynov, an older *intelligent* considered by some to be the best living Russian poet. However suspect their sincerity in this instance, their motives were undoubtedly mixed, and we should not be so quick to put on the judges' robes. Quite apart from fear of violence and greed for gain, the least interesting if not the least common of human motives, it would seem clear that a genuine conflict of values played a role here, albeit a varying one.

For an intelligent and talented literary critic and scholar to follow the party line at a time when the party line is not overwhelmingly gross or rigid, even though he may have sincere doubts on more than a few fine points, is not terribly difficult. He does not proceed from venal motives alone; yet neither do his material interests nor his "good name" suffer. On the other hand, to be an opportunist in the way Yevtushenko is sometimes accused of being—supposing that one accepts a grain of truth in the charge—requires at least a certain admirable bravado.

Persuasion and Consensus

Be all this as it may, the situation confronting the defenders of Socialist Realism is far more complicated today than it was before. Beliefs can no longer be simply administered—on this even the most stalwart Socialist Realist critics agree. Nor is there any desire for—or any thought even of the possibility of—a return to Stalinist methods. To some degree at least, persuasion must replace force. Opposing points of view cannot be completely silenced, though obviously they cannot be given full voice either. The unresolved problem is how much voice they can be allowed. The party must somehow make good its claims to be a surrogate personality for humanity at large: to party members, to the Russian intelligentsia, to Communist parties abroad. It cannot do so any longer by force or fiat alone. The Chinese party has rival claims; so, in a way, do the revisionists. These make it absolutely impossible not to take opposing views on art into account.

The Ideological Commission of the party Central Committee is not exactly packed with literary scholars, conservative or liberal; and since literature, unlike the study of language as such (linguistics), is still officially considered a part of ideology, all "basic" decisions in literary controversies are made there, and made primarily (though not necessarily exclusively) on political grounds. This states the problem, but does not solve it, since it is no longer clear what is "basic" and what is not. There is a tendency for the Commission to avoid problems of style and technique, and even those of subject matter. Also, there seems to be less likelihood now that the party First Secretary himself will interfere directly in literary matters as Khrushchev did, and there has been as yet no major instance in which Brezhnev has done so.

The Commission must take into account the political impact abroad of its decisions. It is anxious to demonstrate the reasonableness of its cultural policy in comparison with that of Peking; yet, on the other hand, it must guard against verifying the Chinese charge that it sacrifices coherence, direction, and revolutionary drive in favor of a more relaxed and more comfortable (*i.e.*, more bourgeois) stance. The Yugoslav writer, Mihajlo Mihajlov, in his book *Moscow Summer*, noted that attack by the Chinese has more than once resulted in the rehabilitation of a Russian "rebel" writer in the pages of *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. The flourishing of modernism in Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia; the changed attitude of the French party (Louis Aragon, former surrealist and now a member of the party Central Committee, spoke out strongly against the Tertz-Siniavski trial); in the Italian party, the tradition of Antonio Gramsci, the party's founder and a humanist intellectual of great distinction—these, too, are factors which, though they do not always prevail, the Soviet authorities have increasingly to take into account.

[17] An account of these proceedings appeared in English for the first time in *Survey* (London), July 1965.
[18] *Loc. cit.*, p. 4.

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These conflicting pressures tend to favor modernist techniques in the arts. And what modernist techniques, for all their variety, have in common is a concern with the unconscious and the irrational. Modernists believe, with Freud, that the unconscious is the true psychic reality, and their concern with technique, with "formalism," is precisely a concern for methods, on the one hand, of reaching the unconscious of the audience that receives them, and on the other hand (and more important) of devising conventions that will allow the unconscious to rise to the surface and thus reinvigorate the arts, enabling them to communicate something new where the conventional forms are felt to be used up, stale, and at the end of their tether—even though this might be at the expense of communicability. What party consciousness fears is that, after years of extreme repression, the gates will open on a *Pugachevshchina* of the emotions that will sweep away whatever is left of party authority.

The Case of Aleksandr Dymshits

Now, for the sake of instruction, let us go out on a safety patrol of the beleaguered Socialist Realist camp with Aleksandr Dymshits, whom—as noted earlier—I consider representative of the more serious and intelligent of its defenders.

At the end of 1960, the long-awaited translation into Russian of Salinger's *Catcher in the Rye* appeared in *Inostrannaia literatura*. It was accompanied by an afterword by Vera Panova [19] who, in spite of a certain amount of grandmotherly scolding, was able to recognize her own kinship with Salinger, and who attempted to introduce him as, in his own way, a realist. Dymshits reviewed the book carefully, with Panova as much as Salinger in mind.[20]

At no point does Dymshits suggest that the book should not have been published, or that it should not be read by good Soviet citizens. Indeed, he has considerable praise for Salinger's purely "writerly" abilities—for his capacity to etch in with exactly the right details a fresh and vivid scene, a conversation that both informs and holds the interest, a characterization that is at once cuttingly fresh and revealing of a whole network of relationships. But Dymshits, who frequently has expressed his admiration for Panova, here takes issue with her interpretation of Salinger as a "realist" and of Holden Caulfield (Salinger's hero) as a kind of Everyman. To be sure, Salinger is offended by the bourgeoisie. He introduces critical motifs, but (Dymshits points out) these do not create "the ideological foundations of the novel," which are built around the notion of "a sustaining poetic illusion" as well as the notion of self-perfection. This Dymshits sees as decadent-utopian rather than realist. Fine feelings in themselves change nothing, and "moral awakenings decide nothing in a man's fate." Salinger's ending also strikes Dymshits as most unconvincing, in that it is quite clear from everything that has gone on in the novel that either Holden will return to the sanatorium, or he will become a bourgeois like everyone else, more sensitive perhaps and nourishing a sense of his own "poetic" superiority, but uncommitted to anything that can conceivably make the world in which he has suffered in any way better. Dymshits regards a similar tendency to dwell on the virtues of "humanity alone"—that is, on sensitivity in personal relations—as the weakness of Panova's own *Sentimental'nyi roman*, which he feels to be "sentimental" beyond the ironic sense of the title.

Reviewing the first volume of Ehrenburg's memoirs, Dymshits seems at least more alert to what the book was trying to say than the great majority of American reviewers.[21] These for the most part were too anxious to prove that Ehrenburg was not "telling all," was not being completely honest, or was not adding anything very new to our knowledge of the period, to notice that the book's real intentions were, as Dymshits points out, to propose, defend and glamorize "the restoration of modernist ideals, techniques and tastes." [22] Ehrenburg had not yet made his famous proposal for the "coexistence" of modernism and Socialist Realism, which was to

[19] Vera Panova, now in her 60's, specializes in the quiet, unpretentious, and meticulous portrayal of everyday life. In the West she is best known for her early novel, *Sputniki* (1946; translated as *The Train*), and the more recent *Seriozha* (translated as *Time Walked*), which was also made into a charming and popular film. Though she twice won a Stalin Prize (1947 and 1950), her *Sentimentalnyi roman* (1958) was criticized, among other things, for the indulgence it showed toward retrograde characters, such as a religious-superstitious grandmother.

[20] A. Dymshits, *V velikom pokhode*, Moscow, 1962, p. 364.

[21] There were, of course, some more perceptive American reviews. See, *e.g.*, Victor Erlich's "The Metamorphoses of Ilia Ehrenburg," in the No. 4, 1963, issue of this journal; also, his later commentary on the final portion of the memoirs ("Ilia Ehrenburg Takes a Bow") in the No. 5, 1965, issue of the same publication.

[22] Dymshits, *op. cit.* p. 371.

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draw upon himself the wrath of Khrushchev and party ideological arbiter Leonid Ilichev; but Dymshits senses that this is where the trick is hidden.

Dymshits takes Ehrenburg to task for his interpretation of key Russian poets. Maiakovski was not, Dymshits insists, the divided and tormented figure that Ehrenburg depicts. There was no disharmony in him; he did not waver inwardly between his "futurism" (never a very deep commitment) and "realism." He was indeed the granite-jawed party activist that the well-known statue in Maiakovski Square portrays and whose image Ehrenburg attempts to undermine. Maiakovski, according to Dymshits, opted for the strong side of his uncertainties, and so was strong because he willed himself to be strong. In the case of Tsvetaeva,[23] on the other hand, Dymshits holds that her inner conflict was her weakness and not her strength.

Let me say, at this point, that I do not in either case agree with Dymshits. Ehrenburg's comments on Maiakovski are the very least that needs to be said. Yet it is interesting that Dymshits takes Ehrenburg to task without denying either the existence of Maiakovski's doubts and uncertainties or Tsvetaeva's talent, and that he chastises Ehrenburg not for lying, but for interpreting wrongly.

But it is Ehrenburg's admiration of the withdrawal and "self-concentration" of Pasternak that draws the critic's strongest blasts. Pasternak, says Dymshits, wrote his best works—"1905" and "Lieutenant Schmidt"—in connection with the revolution, in solidarity with the party and the masses. And while it is true that Ehrenburg condemns *Doctor Zhivago*, Dymshits points out that he fails to show "the reasons for its appearance"—*i.e.*, the moral-psychological implications of Pasternak's world-outlook.[24]

As an old-fashioned moral critic, Dymshits tries to get at the mood, the temper, of a writer. He insists that the answer to the question "who creates?" already implies an answer to the question "how does he create?," and that the question "who?" can only be answered in moral-political terms. He sees his own role, when dealing with living Soviet writers, as an instructive one—critical in a party sense, but not repressive. It is in this manner that he handles some of the poems of Voznesenski,[25] whose talent he affirms, but whose playfulness he deplores.

"In our poetry," Voznesenski wrote in 1962, "the future is with the play of associations. The use of metaphor reflects the connecting link among phenomena, their interwoven interplay. . . . Poetry is improvisation. You can't plan it."[26] Commenting on this statement, Dymshits writes: "I think that Voznesenski has pretty clearly expressed a tendency to separate *ratio* and *intuitio* and to place a higher value on the intuitive than on the rational and the ideational." This is the crux of the matter and precisely what Socialist Realism refuses to accept. As Dymshits put it,

> **Voznesenski's poetic practice shows that quite often and to a considerable extent he operates on principle by means of elemental associations which are chaotic and arbitrary and which arise not by the exercise of rigorous logical choice, but rather on the basis of chance proximities, often purely phonetic. This leads to a yoking together of far-fetched phenomena and concepts and gets in the way of a clear and precise ideational and logical structuring of the verse. External comparison, or contrast for effect, pushes Voznesenski in the direction of images that do not stand up to ideational verification.**[27]

Dymshits goes on to show why this worries him, and what it might lead to, by citing a poem called "Genius," in which Voznesenski allows himself to play with the notion that Lenin, when weary or discouraged, invoked another self called Ulianov, and vice versa, and that this double identity, the essence of genius, sustained him. What Dymshits objects to here is not so much the vague association of genius with schizophrenia (which is in any case most delicately touched on) but precisely the uninhibited nature of Voznesenski's playfulness. "His improvisation," Dymshits writes, "was not ideologically prepared, not civically reflected on"—that is, not serious.

The Threat of Modernism

In 1963, two major literary events engage our critic's attention: the Prague Kafka Conference of the spring of that year, and the publication also that spring of a remarkable book by the French

[23] Before her suicide in 1941, Marina Tsvetaeva wrote strikingly original poetry which was denounced in the Soviet Union as "formalist." Her career and work, along with Pasternak's, have inspired the new individualism of the more daring of the younger Russian poets.

[24] Dymshits, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

[25] Andrei Voznesenski, at 33, is considered one of the most exciting and literate of the new generation of Russian poets. His filial devotion to Pasternak and his concern with the shape of sound in poetry are well known.

[26] From Voznesenski's reply to a questionnaire by the editors of *Voprosy literatury* (Moscow), No. 9 1962, p. 123.

[27] A. Dymshits, "Lichnost khudozhnika," in *Literatura i sovremennost*, Vol. 4, pp. 103-04.

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Communist, Roger Garaudy.[28] Indeed so important were these two events considered that they were made the central subject matter of discussion at a literary-scholarly conference organized by the Gorky Institute of World Literature, in which Dymshits was only one of a number of talented participants.[29]

In his book, Garaudy advanced a theory of total realism. Any authentic work of art, he insisted, is "realistic" and "expresses the form of man's presence in the world."[30] On the other hand, all art is based on convention and stylization, and so is in some measure independent of the world it depicts. Dymshits makes some motions towards accepting the first statement, but not the second. There is one kind of stylization he finds unacceptable—the formalistic! For those who might think this a contradiction in terms, he specifies: "The literature of Socialist Realism is guided by the main line defined by the party."[31] Far from being schematic, he contends, this provides a basis for stylization that is the richest and most flexible approach to the real world; nor does it rule out any particular technique or area of human experience, provided the technique is understood as secondary and the experience is understood in the context of worldwide development.

The subconscious is not ruled out as an area of human experience. "But," Dymshits argues, "we do not approach the subconscious with Freudian measure; we insist on seeking for an explanation of subconscious impulses in society." Literature may use myth—either in the form of folklore motifs in the manner of Yevgeni Schwartz,[32] or in the form of Gorkian "revolutionary romanticism." He objects, however, to myth as the object of creation, as an analogue in story and images of what is felt but cannot be rationally explained, to myth as the creation or invocation of archetypes. He quotes Marx to the effect that as man gains control over the forces of nature the need for myth recedes.

What is dangerous about Kafka, in Dymshits' judgment, is his portrait of man as devoid of effective will, imbedded in a "human condition" from which he cannot shake loose.[33] Details and particular techniques may be of great interest, especially to Austrian writers,[34] but the attempt made by a number of Czech and Polish comrades to derive from Kafka a pseudo-Marxist notion of "alienation" that applies to socialist as well as capitalist countries is clearly heresy. Dymshits attempts to show that Russia had its Kafka in the person of Leonid Andreev,[35] a talented writer who, however, used his talents well only during the period when he strove towards realism. Nor should it be considered accidental that this Russian "modernist" stood closest to the revolutionary movement during his realist phase; nor is the fact that he ultimately became a renegade unrelated to his modernism, according to Dymshits.

In response to the charges made against Socialist Realism—that it is impoverished, worn out, and schematic—Dymshits retorts that it is the modernist approach that is schematic. By removing man from his engagement with and involvement in society and politics, it abstracts and schematizes him. Techniques of all sorts, including those of myth and folklore, are not closed to the Soviet writer.

[28] *D'un réalisme sans rivages,*" Paris, 1963.

[29] For the papers presented at the conference, see I. I. Anisimov *et al.* (eds.), *Sovremennye problemy realizma i modernizma,* Moscow, 1965 (hereafter cited as *Sovr.*).

[30] Garaudy, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

[31] Dymshits, "Khudozhestvennoe mnogoobrazie sovetskoi literatury i sovremennyi modernizm," *Sovr.*, p. 101. This, however, would seem to contradict his earlier assertion, in criticizing an article by Max Rieser ("Russian Esthetics Today and Their Historical Background," *The Journal of Esthetics and Art Criticism*, No. 1, 1963, p. 47), that "our esthetic . . . has not at all become a pseudonym for politics, has not lost its specifically artistic significance." *Sovr.*, p. 82.

[32] Yevgeni Schwartz (died 1954) was one of the best Soviet playwrights. His plays are witty, highly stylized politico-philosophical allegories based on fairy-tale motifs. His best play, *The Shadow* (based on the story of Peter Schlemiel, the man who lost his shadow), was removed from the boards in 1940, and Schwartz himself fell into disfavor, from which he reemerged only in the last year of his life.

[33] This is very close to the criticism of Kafka by the Hungarian writer György Lukacs (*The Meaning of Contemporary Realism*, London, 1962, pp. 47-92), who in general resembles the more sophisticated defenders of Socialist Realism much more closely than he does the "revisionists" with whom he has frequently been classified by Soviet critics. See, *e.g.*, Ia. E. Elsberg, "O nekotorykh subektivistskikh i obektivistskikh kontsepsiakh v estetike i literaturovedenii," in A. G. Dementev *et al.* (eds.), *Protiv burzhoaznykh kontseptsii i revisionizma v zarubezhom literaturovedenii*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 48-77. While it is true, as Elsberg charges, that Lukacs tends to blur the distinction between critical and socialist realism, it is also true to some extent of Dymshits and Elsberg himself. Other Soviet charges against Lukacs are purely political, having to do only with his role in Hungary in 1956. Indirectly, however, Lukacs *has* been influential, through his influence in matters of Marxist epistemology on such figures as Lucien Goldmann and Roger Garaudy: see the article "After Lukacs," in *The Times Literary Supplement* (London), July 14, 1966.

[34] Dymshits emphasizes that Kafka is obviously of greater interest to Austrian comrades, Proust to French, and Joyce to British, than any of these writers are to Russians; that is to say, their critical social interest is of a purely local nature.

[35] Leonid Andreev (1871-1919), a contemporary and friend of Gorky, was a very uneven writer, overrated in his day and probably underrated in ours. His work ranged from the Gorkian realism of *The Seven Who Were Hanged* (1908) to the symbolist-allegorical play, *He Who Gets Slapped* (1914). His political allegiances wavered somewhat, like his style; in the end he left Russia (and the revolution) a sick and disillusioned man. To compare Andreev with Kafka strikes me as going too far.

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On the contrary, familiar as he is (and as foreign writers generally are not) with the newly-developing literatures of the Soviet national minorities, he has available to him a richness and variety of forms and genres that are still virtually untapped by European writers. Against the names of Kafka, Joyce and Proust, thrown at him by Garaudy and others, Dymshits falls back on Sholokhov, Leonov, Gorky, Furmanov and Ostrovski. There is indeed a beleaguered tone to his presentation at the 1963 conference that is not present in most of his work elsewhere. If one looks at some of the other articles in the volume covering the conference, one can perhaps understand why.

There are articles on Kafka and on the conception of "alienation" as it is understood in Western Europe. Though these are more or less in Dymshits' spirit, they are more detailed and concede more than he does. There is a good deal else. An astonishing article by E. F. Trushchenko returns very subtly to Ehrenburg's notion of coexistence with modernism. While proposing to retain a guarded boundary between modernism and Socialist Realism, he also proposes a strip of joint territory, a kind of UN mandate, limited in extent but free in its possibilities, where the two should be allowed to interact. Indeed, he implies that such interaction constantly goes on in any case. E. M. Potapov gives a detached and objective account of an argument at the Gramsci Institute between Garaudy and Italian Communist scholar Cesare Luporini over the possibility of reintroducing Kantian ethics into Marxism. P. V. Palievski, in a detailed analysis of *The Sound and the Fury*, performs the astonishing trick of converting Faulkner from a "decadent" into a newly-discovered realist.

Most interesting of all, there is a long article on James Joyce and *Ulysses* by D. M. Urnov.[36] Ultimately, Urnov rejects Ulysses as "the sick book of a sick age," but in the course of his essay he demonstrates a thorough and sympathetic understanding of what Joyce was up to and reviews his early impact on Russia (including the critical articles by D. S. Mirski and Startsev, the fragmentary Russian translations of *Ulysses*, and the rather witty parody of Joyce by A. Arkhangelski). Urnov also engages in a subtle examination of what innovation in literature means and how experimental exercises that previous writers relegated to their notebooks or the margins of their manuscripts, devices that they used sparingly and secondarily in their works, suddenly assume a central importance, and thus how past literary history is also rediscovered and rejuvenated through new application in the present. Although the surface meaning is rather different, Urnov's article reminded me of the brilliant finale to Mandelstam's *Egyptian Stamp:* "Destroy your manuscript, but save whatever you have inscribed in the margin out of boredom, out of helplessness, and, as it were, in a dream. These secondary and involuntary creations of your fantasy will not be lost in the world . . ." [37] On the surface, Urnov seems to be rejecting Joyce, but underneath, his entire tone and meaning are not only understanding and sympathetic, but even full of fascination. He goes to some pains to bring out Vsevolod Vishnevski's great admiration for Joyce and quotes Vishnevski's defense of himself against charges of "Joyceism".[38] It would seem, too, that the admiration was mutual, and that Joyce once promised Vishnevski to go see the movie "We are from Kronstadt" (for which Vishnevski had written the scenario), though Joyce was all but blind at the time. In general, Urnov dwells on Joyce's heroism, his titanic struggle for his art—a struggle to which the Russians, with their love for the elemental (Jack London and all), cannot help but respond with some sympathy. Joyce, he points out, influenced more realistic writers like F. Scott Fitzgerald, whose *Gatsby* is now widely admired in the Soviet Union. And incidentally, in the course of the article, he manages to include, if not James Joyce, at least Henry James in the realist camp!

Of course, either Anisimov or Dymshits might easily have organized a conference at which his own would have been the most rather than the least radical voice. Dymshits is by no means the only conservative critic of talent, though possibly the

[36] D. M. Urnov, "Dzh. Dzhois i sovremennyi modernizm," *Sovr.*, pp. 309-45.

[37] *The Prose of Osip Mandelstam*, transl. with a critical essay by Clarence Brown, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 187.

[38] Vsevolod Vishnevski (1900-1951) was another of the hero-writers of the Russian Revolution, joining in the Petrograd insurrection in 1917 and serving in the Red cavalry, 1918-20. He is best known as a playwright and stirred up a controversy in the 1930's by his disregard for the traditional conventions of the drama. Influenced by Meyerhold and Eisenstein as well as by Joyce, he tried to create a Brechtian "epic drama" with the mass as hero, although the results were more ordinary than Brecht's. Accused of "Joyceism," Vishnevski nevertheless disdained to conceal his admiration for the English writer. Since 1954, a five-volume edition of his collected works has appeared. Dymshits wrote an article on him ("Proza V. V. Vishnevskovo") in *Znamia*, No. 5, 1955.

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most able and articulate. He represents a small but important handful of "party people" in literature who see themselves as a bridge between the authority of the party and the youthful modernism of more radical writers and critics. They advocate expression rather than repression and would choose to argue with and convince their talented juniors rather than attempt to destroy them. Nevertheless, in this atmosphere, one cannot help wondering what possible harm could have come from the works of Abram Tertz? Why translate Kafka, usher Faulkner into the realm of critical (if not socialist) realism, and then send Tertz and Arzhak off to hard labor for seven and five years respectively? It seems doubly inexplicable in view of the fact that the "crackdown" many feared after the trial did not take place. Yevtushenko went off to Australia, Voznesenski to America. *Novyi mir* went on in more or less its accustomed manner. What seems to have been at issue in the Tertz trial was the direct, basic political issue of the party's capacity to control Soviet writers, for it is quite obvious that if Soviet writers can publish works abroad under pseudonyms, the party's capacity to judge, mold, reject, or even claim them is completely undermined.

Pyrrhic Victory?

In actual fact, the results of the trial seem to have strengthened the hands of the pro-modernists. Artists of undoubted party loyalty who are nevertheless also artists, and critics who are party critics but have all along been advocating—and sincerely advocating—a critical tolerance, are bound to have been badly shaken, whatever facade they may present for the sake of appearances. At a meeting of Italian and Soviet film directors late last spring, Grigory Chukhrai (director of "Ballad of a Soldier" and "The Forty-First") said in reply to a question about the Tertz-Arzhak trial that he did not approve of it, that he found the methods of Tertz and Arzhak in themselves unacceptable but felt that they had now been dignified with the status of martyrdom.[39] Tvardovski wrote in the April 1966 issue of *Novyi mir* that political interference with literature defeated its own aims and that writers were right to stand up against such interference.[40]

The authority of the party line, however, is still such that it has a surprising hold even on some of its most stalwart opponents in the Soviet Union and is capable of engendering moods of self-doubt, guilt, and a sense of frustrating limitation in all those who consider their primary allegiance to be to the liberation of the arts. Throughout their trial, Tertz and Arzhak spoke up boldly to the prosecutor and the witnesses for the prosecution. Their appeal, however, was to literary criticism, to a sense of literary occasion and convention, and the judge kept reminding them that this was a legal trial. They did not question the legality of the trial as such, or the right of the party to judge. They merely wished to explain the distinction between "propaganda" and "a work of art," no easy task under the best and freest of circumstances—more difficult even than establishing the difference between art and pornography. Their appeal was to the party, that it should be more sophisticated and more civilized, more tolerant and more receptive to literature. They did not at any point—and their defense was as bold as any that has been made by accused writers in the Soviet Union in the last twenty-five years—challenge the right of the party as such, or the court, or any official agency, to judge them. In this sense, the party still holds them in thrall, and Socialist Realism is not yet dead.

Recently, Daniel (Arzhak) wrote from prison an extraordinary and courageous letter to *Izvestia* which that newspaper did not print, but which somehow found its way abroad. In this letter, Daniel emphasizes that he and Tertz (Siniavski) were duped into a partial complicity in the trial by being misinformed and having information withheld from them concerning the true nature of the reaction abroad to their writings. The minimal confessions wrung from them had been based on their belief that they had unwittingly contributed to the defamation of their native land. "I have come to the conclusion," the letter states, "that our writings should not under any circumstances have been the subject of a criminal prosecution. The verdict is unjust and illegal." Perhaps Socialist Realism is deader than we think.

[39] "Soviet and Italian Film Directors Debate Writers' Trial Meaning," *The New York Times*, Feb. 28, 1966.

[40] "Soviet Editor Appeals to Writers to Withstand Political Critics," *ibid.*, April 14, 1966.

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The New and the Old: From an Observer's Notebook

By George Gibian

The Soviet Union has now passed through ten years of accelerated change. In culture as in other aspects of Soviet life, it is interesting to observe how new trends emerge even while old elements of the Stalin past persist. To convey a partial picture of the shifting cultural scene, the present article draws on the evidence of recently published prose, as well as on conversations held by the author (mainly in the role of listener) during a visit to the USSR in the last three months of 1965. Originally set down as a series of personal notes, the observations offered here have been regrouped to deal first with trends in literature and then with the author's general impression of prevailing currents in Soviet cultural life.

Prose: The Old and the New

One can find almost anything one looks for in Soviet Russian literature today. There are the routine, hectoring, content-analysis-oriented book reviews which are no better than what appeared in the 1930's or before the death of Stalin; on the other hand, if one wishes to be encouraged about the direction in which Soviet literature is moving, there is some worthwhile new fiction and poetry and even a little high-grade book reviewing.

Within the variety of the present-day literary scene, however, it is possible to discern some significant patterns. The most interesting shift consists in the various ways in which the old literary manners as well as topics and themes are clung to, while at the same time new forms, ideas, and subjects have come into existence, often alongside, or in a sense on top of, the old ones.

A prime example is the latest crop of books dealing with World War II. The theme of the war, which has long obsessed and is still obsessing Soviet consciousness, has far from run its course. Yet works now being published show marked differences from those written earlier. There seems to be a steady advancement in the depth, breadth, and quality of such literature. Part of the reason is the subject matter. Over a period of time, the chronology of war literature has proven to be directly antithetical to the chronology of when works were written. By this I mean that the first books on war themes, produced while Stalin was still alive, dealt primarily with the last period of the war. Glossing over the tragedies as well as mistakes that marked

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the war, they celebrated Stalin, various Soviet generals and Soviet feats, victories in Berlin, the conquest of cities like Budapest, and so forth. A little later Soviet novelists moved to a consideration of what was happening during the middle period of the war. Later still, they moved toward the beginning of the war. And now, they have gone back to the first days of the German invasion and the weeks and months that preceded it, relating this period to still earlier events—including the purges of 1937-38.

One recent work about the war is Grigori Baklanov's *July 1941* (Moscow, Sovetski pisatel, 1965). Baklanov describes an army corps at the Russian border, which is forced to retreat, is surrounded and decimated by the Germans, and finally fights its way back through to Russian lines. One of the heroes is a corps commander, General Shcherbatov, who suspects the German attack, has information of its impending threat, but is not allowed by higher headquarters (obedient to Stalin) to take appropriate defensive measures. A batallion commissar and, as Baklanov more than hints, security police agent, Shalaev, is among the villains of the novel. He thinks in clichés and readily suspects military men of disloyalty and defeatism.

The horrors of the fighting—of German victories and atrocities—are intermingled with flashbacks to the 1937 period and the few years preceding the war. There are many moving pages about the purges and arrests. We feel Baklanov's shame and indignation at the non-aggression pact with Germany, at the kowtowing to the Nazis, at the arrest of officers and their relatives, and at the rewriting of history. It is a book about 1937 as much as about 1941—in which the events of 1941 are found inexplicable without their connection to the past.

There is even an allusion to something almost never mentioned in the Soviet Union—the fact that England fought the war alone while the USSR was at peace with Germany and sending the Nazis trainloads of wheat and oil: "London, which now was being bombed every night," warned of German plans to attack. Nevertheless, Soviet planes were kept concentrated near the border, while tanks were being reequipped and were therefore out of commission. The final word about Stalinism and its consequences is spoken by one character: "It is terrible that we ourselves helped to strengthen blind faith in him, and now we are helpless before that same blind faith." The worst human quality, the one which caused the most harm, is shown to be the combination of suspiciousness (of traitors and subversives) and blind faith.

I happened to hear Baklanov speak at a Union of Writers conference in Leningrad in December 1965. He was preceded and followed by half a dozen well-known critics and fellow novelists. The theme of their speeches and his own was the same: the warping of the Russian moral character through years of Stalinism, the suspicion among the people, the trickling down of terror and fear, the general distrust. They also expressed the idea that the "straightening out" of the national spine began not just with the 20th Party Congress in 1956 but as early as the first stages of the war, which brought to light Stalin's errors, Soviet unpreparedness, and other basic failures.

Baklanov's book is a war thriller. There are pages of impressive dramatic narration, packed with horror scenes. But primarily it is an analysis which goes deeper than previous war novels into the roots (psychological, sociological, chronological) of what happened in the first months of the war.

Another recent work, one which makes close links between the war and the present day, is Vasili Bykov's *The Dead Hurt No More* (*Novyi mir*, Nos. 1 and 2, 1966). The hero of the book, which begins in the present, is waiting in a hotel lobby. He cannot get a room in a hotel, in a town which sounds very much like Minsk. There in the crowd he sees a man he thinks is someone he knew during the war. He follows the man, becomes involved in a fight with him, is arrested and taken to a militia station. The man turns out to be not Sakhno, the wartime villain of the hero's recollection, but someone very much like him.

We are then given two stories: that of Sakhno during the war, in an elaborate flashback; and a character sketch of the Sakhno "double." Sakhno was a political commissar and perhaps also a secret-police representative with the army in 1944. He was harsh—in fact, cruel. He was suspicious of defeatism and saw signs of panic everywhere. Caution and common sense were taken by him to be evil defeatism. He would not listen to advice, insisted on his high rank, disregarded warnings, made unreasonable demands, and ordered numerous executions. His motto was: "Don't trust the local population too much. Half of them are nationalists waiting for the Germans." Bykov says about him: "All his life he perfected himself in just one craft:

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compulsion (*prinuzhdenie*). He just isn't capable of another." Captured by the Germans after several mistakes on his part, the cruel Sakhno turned to sycophantic attempts to please his captors.

The man who reminded the narrator of Sakhno, Gorbatiuk, is a Stalinist who has survived into the present day. He reveals that during the war he was the head of a military tribunal and sentenced many people to death. He has no regrets, and worse still, shows no change in his outlook. Hearing the story of Sakhno, he approves of his cruelty. "When the troops were more afraid of the commanding officer than of the Germans, there was good order," he says. The narrator asks him: "What about the people who are in their graves now?" He answers: "*You can't think about that when a war is going on.*" He feels no shame for what happened in 1936-1938 either. Putting people in jail was the "line" then. If it was incorrect, the party has corrected it since, but it was right in its time. The hero says to him: "You are too late; the times have changed." Gorbatiuk answers: "That is where you may be lucky. I am too late. . . . I would have broken your back for you [in the old days]."

Bykov, then, projects the war theme both backward and forward in time. His main innovation is to bring into the open the survival of Stalinists, of villains of World War II, into present-day Russia. He shows that there are people who are unreconstructed, who believe the old ways were better, who have carried the cruelty and other mental traits of Stalinist days into the present, and who regret that times have changed. He treats this as a very dangerous fact, and implicitly pleads the need for tolerance, gentleness, mercy, and above all an appreciation of freedom.

A war story of a different sort—but no less interesting in its implications—is Anatoli Kuznetsov's "Babi Yar: A Documentary Novel," published in *Yunost* (Nos. 8 and 10, 1966). Kuznetsov delves further into the subject of Yevtushenko's famous poem deploring the lack of a monument to the tens of thousands of Jews murdered by the Nazis in a ravine near Kiev during the war. The poem—one not likely to be forgotten for decades in the Soviet Union or elsewhere—led to subsequent official attacks against Yevtushenko for having failed to indicate that others besides Jews were murdered by the Germans and for having brought the general issue of Soviet antisemitism into the open.

Kuznetsov's "documentary novel" narrates the story of wartime Kiev as seen from the vantage point of himself as a child. In poignant and painful detail, he gives a sense of what it was like to be a little boy living with his family under the German occupation. He begins with the entry of the Germans, recalling their proclamations and posters and describing the reactions of Soviet citizens. With impressive restraint and matter-of-factness, he portrays adults who welcomed the German occupation, complained about Soviet inefficiency, and said things like: "Now everything will be fine; the Germans are efficient people. You will see; we will have heaven on earth." He then goes on to describe the rounding up of the Jews and their slaughter in Babi Yar. Kuznetsov is thus continuing what Yevtushenko began—recalling and documenting one of the most frightful chapters of the German occupation of the Soviet Union—and doing it without regard to official sensitivities on the subject.

World War II was a trauma whose memory still obsesses the Russian writer. The profound suffering, the slaughter of millions of people, the destruction of millions of houses, caused wounds whose scars have still not healed. But there are other reasons, too, for the obsessive return of Soviet writers to wartime themes. One seems to be a wish to exorcise the subject, to pull its teeth, so to speak, to remove its painfulness by reimmersion in it. Another is the importance of the war in the eventual accounting of Stalin's mistakes; and its link, too, with the purge of thousands of officers who were sorely missed when the Germans attacked. Still another reason is the recollection of high hopes that after the war things must be, could not help but be, better than before—hopes which were dissipated in the harsh years of the reimposition of terror from 1946 to 1953. So the writers return to the war, showing more and more of its ties and relevancies to the general Stalinist condition—going backwards in time, from 1941 to 1937 and 1936; and on the other side, into the future, from 1945 to 1953 and on to the contemporary period.

A second category of subject matter in recent prose embraces revelations of Stalinist conditions in peacetime, of evils and mistakes more directly attributable to the whole Stalinist system. In some of the literature of current vintage a notable difference can be detected in the way social criticism is projected. In the years immediately following the Thaw, such topics as industrial inefficiency, bureaucratic mismanagement, arrests, unjust persecutions, prison camps, deplorable farm conditions, anti-

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semitism, and so forth, were discussed as befitted themes that had been hitherto taboo—with evident trepidation. They were handled with caution, self-consciously, and were usually regarded as so compelling that they were, or became, the focal points of a work. Now references to such themes are often much more matter-of-fact—sometimes almost nonchalant.

The August 1966 issue of *Novyi mir* (a jubilee edition marking the 500th number of the journal) contains a typical example of this new approach—a story by Fazil Iskander called "Sozvezdie Kozlotura," roughly translatable as "The Constellation Capricorn." Iskander is one of the favorite authors of the younger literary audience in the Soviet Union. This particular story, set in the 1930's, is a very light, whimsical view of a bureaucratic enthusiast in the Black Sea Republic of Abkhazia, who starts a campaign to popularize the crossing of a kind of wild buffalo with goats, the new animal to be called a *kozlotur* (capricorn). After much farcical build-up, his crazy scheme goes bankrupt, and even his superiors turn against him—yet he manages to emerge unscathed. By this time he has a new object of enthusiasm: he has found a romantic cave in the mountains which he is sure can become the center of a thriving tourist industry.

While most of this story is devoted to absurd and amusing incidents laid in an exotic setting, Iskander does inject some remarks that previously would have been considered daring and risky. How is it possible, he asks, for example, that such a foolishness goes undetected and that the man responsible is never called to account for his mistakes? And he answers his own question: the inept bureaucrat has all the resources of the government behind him; the government always backs him up. Iskander then goes on to make a few brief but scathing comments on the evils of bureaucratism. The reference to official support of questionable individuals and causes is not in itself new: after the Stalinists' championship of Lysenko and Marr was finally exposed as nonsensical, Solzhenitsyn and other writers used the theme in their works. Iskander's innovation lies in his casualness; his tone implies: "This is nothing remarkable . . . we refer to this kind of thing as a matter of course."

Another work which seems singularly unself-conscious in its treatment of social evils is Yuri Dombrovski's *The Keeper of Ancient Things* (*Novyi mir*, Nos. 7 and 8, 1964), a tale about a museum director in Alma Ata. The story is especially interesting in that it focuses on someone who did not buckle under to the system—who ignored the demands of the secret police, told militiamen to go away, and thereby saved an innocent but addle-brained girl from arrest. This must be a rather uncomfortable subject for many Russians. The survivors feel better if they believe that there was no way of resisting; that they did not survive through any cowardice, through any accommodation on their own part; that, as Ilia Ehrenburg has said, life under Stalin was a lottery, and they happen to be among the lucky ones who escaped unhurt. Dombrovski by implication suggests that resistance, unspectacular simple disagreement, speaking back, were possible—although very risky.

There have been other fresh and sometimes surprising developments in recent prose. One novelty—in a double sense—is Yuri Kazakov's *Nestor and Kir*. The work is unusual, first because its talented author has previously avoided social themes, devoting himself to personal subjects—lyrical, small episodes in the private lives of everyday characters; yet here Kazakov turns the spotlight on a complex public issue. The topic is also surprising: Kazakov attacks the vast subject of collectivized agriculture at its root.

Interestingly enough, the story came out not in a major literary magazine in Moscow or Leningrad, but in the journal *Prostor* (No. 4, 1965), published in Alma Ata, the remote capital of Kazakhstan. *Nestor and Kir* is in part completely in keeping with Kazakov's previous works and in part completely at variance with them. Typically, the story opens with a description of a man's solitary walk along the shore of the White Sea. He spends the night in a shack and watches the beach, the rocks and the sea.

But then when he reaches a small village and stays with a local inhabitant, the story changes entirely, and we are face to face with a brand new Kazakov. The narrator's host, Nestor, tells of his life today and in the past—and his story is a sweeping indictment of the collective-farm system. The narrator introduces the theme by remarking: "People have a fine life now." Nestor replies "with a heavy laugh" and tells him that in the old days life was really worth living. He gives a glowing account of prerevolutionary times and of the early 1920's, when life meant enterprise, hard work, and deserved rewards. Later his father was "de-kulakized" and sent to a labor camp. Nowadays, Nestor complains, those who work and those who don't work fare equally; there is no incentive. The narrator reinforces Nestor's tale of the passing of good

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times and the coming of evil ones—Soviet, collectivized ones—by recalling someone he knew during World War II who also was a giant of labor, worked for himself, became extremely rich, and was admired rather than condemned by all who knew him. His host admits that recently things have become a little better: "Now there is better order, I won't deny it, there is even a club and electric light—but it is not the same life, not the same riches."

The story of Nestor's life is given in some detail, and in a language rich in colloquialisms. Nestor is an individual who sums up the past of the Russian people; he is the folk hero of old who stood out by reason of industry, largeness, boldness, initiative—whether in cutting down lumber, quarrying stone, trading, or sailing ships to England and Norway. He embodies the "true poetry of labor" in contrast to the ersatz images of "poetic labor" presented in Soviet socialist realism. He is an incarnation of ancient Russia—the energy of pre-Petrine Russia reinforced rather than hampered by Peter's innovations—and finally cut down and hamstrung by Soviet collectivization. Here is a Russian Gulliver tied down by innumerable Soviet Russian pygmies.

The narrator, in Kazakov's conclusion, thinks of newspapermen who have praised the Soviet countryside—its TV, sanatoria, electricity, high pay, and bountiful harvests. The only conflict they discern is that of "the excellent" driving out the "good." "Now I sit here, sixteen years after the war," he writes, and thinks:

Where are those books, where are those writers? . . . How I'd like to move that writer, or critic, over here, to the seashore, to Nestor, how I'd want to take a look at them. . . . I've been in the Smolensk region, around Yaroslavl, Gorki, Kaluga, the North, in Siberia . . . how many Nestors I've seen, with their houses and their gardens and orchards and cows and pigs. . . . The earth in relation to man is faceless. She bears and gives fruit to anyone who takes care of her. But a man like Nestor was never faceless in relation to the earth. He always had the concept of land which was his own and that which was somebody else's. And he can never cross the gulf separating his land from the common land.

The greatest hope for literary masterpieces lies on one hand with Solzhenitsyn, Kazakov, and the few other authors who have already written fine works and may succeed in surpassing themselves in the future, and on the other hand, with almost unknown authors who as yet have had little or nothing published. Among the latter are Andrei Bitov and Boris Vakhtin. In the collection *Young Leningrad 1965* (Moscow-Leningrad, Sovetski pisatel, 1965), Bitov published a strikingly personal and imaginative account of a small incident on the street and in a cinema in Leningrad, entitled "Penelope"; to the same collection Vakhtin contributed two minuscule sketches, "Her Personal Affair" and "Scissors in the Sea," both of them lyrical, intense, and highly original.

To sum up, no violent change has taken place in the thematic or the formal aspects of Soviet Russian literature. We can speak of no revolution. Rather, there has been a slow development along the lines set in 1954 and 1956. More subjects are touched upon; there is greater frankness in discussing topics previously treated with circumspection. The stories by Kazakov and the novel by Baklanov illustrate this process: collectivization in the North, arrests in 1937, and mistakes in 1941 are dealt with more fully in these works than before.

This, then, is progress, as is the high artistic and literary value of some works of the last few years—the prose of Solzhenitsyn in the first place. In comparison with Western literature of the last few years, however, Soviet writing still lags behind. In the United States, for instance, there are currently half a dozen prose writers who are of greater interest than anyone in the Soviet Union.[1] Russian contemporary drama is wretched. Poetry is sometimes interesting, more for the themes and attitudes expressed than for esthetic reasons; but there are some extraordinary exceptions—a handful of poems by Brodski, some of the published verse of Voznesenski and others, and certain works circulated but not as yet published in the Soviet Union.

Attitudes of the Intelligentsia

In turning to on-the-scene impressions of the current cultural climate in Russia, the writer moves onto the difficult ground of generalizing from personal and particular experience. Yet three months offer enough time, I believe, to sense, to analyze, and to confirm certain facts about Soviet cultural life that fundamentally influence the attitudes and outlook of the people—and, of particular interest here, the intelligentsia. The following observations attempt to identify and explain some of these phenomena.

One result of social conditions in Soviet Russia, about which it is difficult to speak without being

[1] This is, of course, a personal opinion. The writer would gladly supply the names on his private honor list of the best Western writers, and to argue their merits, but that would take another long article. So the statement is left in the form of an unabashed *obiter dictum*.

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misunderstood, is something that might be called psychological intensification due to restriction. So much has been unavailable to the general or even to the fairly well-educated public—foreign books, Russian books of the 1920's, reports about contemporary political and cultural events abroad—that all attention is concentrated on what *is* available. This has a polarizing effect. Everybody talks about the same few books; everybody goes to the same few foreign films. When I was in Leningrad in the winter of 1965-66, these films happened to be two old American movies—*Mad, Mad, Mad World* and *Judgment at Nuremberg*—and Italy's marvelous *Marriage, Italian Style*. Everybody went to see them, everybody discussed them. This produced a community of reference, a common topic of conversation, and a concentration of attention.

In the same way attention was focussed on a limited number of foreign literary works and authors. The impact of this "selective" concentration came home to me on the few occasions during my stay that I had access to copies of *The New York Review of Books, The New York Times Book Review*, and some American newspapers from Paris: I found that just a few months of living within the highly-restricted environment of the Soviet Union, with so much excluded, had severely limited and narrowed my field of vision. My reaction was twofold. On one hand, I felt the natural delight at the variety and quantity of information in American publications: the lengthy analyses of current events, the great number of reviews, the wit and erudition of the critics, the tremendous manifoldness of a world in which so much went on, and was reported and discussed. But on the other hand, I also felt a certain fear, perhaps similar to that of a prisoner allowed to leave the confinement of his cell—a fear of the *distraction* of so many objects of interest competing for time and thought, and thereby diluting and dispersing attention. Happily, one's horizons quickly readjust away from the Soviet environment.

It is no secret, of course, that some Soviet artists and intellectuals have come to feel strongly alienated from the general community. A phenomenon of great interest in this respect is the propensity to regard extreme intellectual or social disaffection as a form of insanity—a feeling that is shared, in a sense, by the disaffected intellectuals themselves. The theme of madness is important in their thinking and in their artistic production. The works and life of Valeri Tarsis, who is now living outside of Russia, epitomize this peculiar facet of Soviet culture. The theme also permeates some of the short stories of Tertz-Siniavski. In the writer's personal experience, the insanity syndrome—if one will—was brought home most clearly at a murder trial I witnessed: both the accused, who out of jealousy had killed his wife, and the character witnesses for the accused, who were what we would consider "beatniks" or alienated Bohemian artists, made it clear that they regarded either society or themselves as crazy. The testimony as well as the judges' attitudes at the trial underscored the impression that there is little room in Soviet society for people who find themselves in basic disagreement with the officially-sanctioned social norms. To be rational is to conform; to deviate is to be irrational—indeed, insane. I found myself pushed toward the view which the accused expressed to the investigating judge: in reply to the question whether he would be glad or sorry if he were determined by the court to be mentally ill, he remarked: "If all of you here are sane, then I am insane; and if I am sane, then all of you here are insane."

Soviet attitudes toward insanity have their roots in Russian history. In ancient Russia, the *yurodivy*, the "fool-in-Christ," was traditionally viewed as a person deprived of his reason yet at the same time possessed of a prophetic gift. Renouncing worldly pleasures, he either begged or roamed the land as a pilgrim wearing chains; but he was allowed the privilege of speaking with impunity, even though his words might be insulting, offensive, or scandalous. In much more recent times, it became the official practice to declare certain disaffected people and political dissidents to be insane, subjecting them to no physical harm but at the same time depriving them of any chance to air their views. Examples of this practice abound in Russian life and literature, dating from the case of Chaadaev and the publication of Griboedov's *Woe from Wit*.[2]

In recent times, it has been not only the authorities but the dissidents themselves who have exploited insanity to their own advantage. Valeri Tarsis has dramatized this fact both in his writing and in his course of conduct. It is clear that other disaffected people have sometimes pretended to be

[2] Because of criticisms of Russia in his major work, *Philosophical Letters* (1829), Peter Chaadaev was officially declared insane, placed under house arrest, and kept under the surveillance of a doctor. Shortly before, Aleksandr Griboedov's play, *Woe from Wit* (written 1822-24) had portrayed a hero named Chatski who bitterly criticized Tsarist Russia, causing the forces of society to declare him insane and hence not to be taken seriously.

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insane or somehow wangled a certificate of mental disability. This not only enables them to talk more freely without being criminally liable but—just as important—relieves them of the obligation to work; for under Soviet law only persons with a history of psychiatric trouble are exempted from holding jobs or seeking work through job placement agencies.

Thus self-serving considerations no doubt contribute to the dissidents' acceptance of the dogma which views extreme social non-conformity as a species of insanity. Yet the basic factor explaining this attitude can be traced to the rigid, self-justifying myth which the Soviet Communist Party has imposed on the nation and on itself. Its attempts to control social development, to dictate thought, seem like a carrying out of what William Blake warned against in the modern age—mankind's covering itself with a shell and leaving only a narrow chink through which to view the world outside. In a society where the flow of significant communication between various individuals and groups, between the governed and the governing, is highly restricted, it is very easy for those who feel rebellious to conclude, or to pretend, that they—or if not they, then the system—must be crazy.

Another significant feature in the thinking of dissident Soviet intellectuals is the clear identity of the oppressor, the "enemy."

The importance of this factor can be grasped more clearly if the attitude of Soviet intellectuals is compared with that of their counterparts in the United States. For who, after all, are the extreme dissidents in American society? I suppose they are to be found among the so-called beats, among the most zealous of the nonconformists, among the LSD-marijuana experimenters, and so forth. Except for some brushes with legality on the part of the drug-takers, most of these dissidents are left alone by the law. It is not the law they are infringing, but social norms. In the society at large they run into derision and contempt on all sides, yet they have no clearly definable opponent. The whole system—or many people, with numerous comments, gestures and boycotts—is the enemy.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the disaffected artists do not find themselves confronted with social disapproval and social penalties. Their neighbors, the people in the next room or the next apartment, usually do not care very much how they live and what they think. They find themselves crossing swords with a very definite and powerful opponent: the state, the party, the police. While the struggle is obviously unequal, there seems to be something rather comforting in the crisp clarity of knowing whom one is fighting. The American beatnik who has seceded from his society is in some ways worse off because his persecutor, in his opinion, is only that very vague semi-entity, the Rat Race, the Squares, or the Establishment.

Turning from the dissidents to the more typical members of the intelligentsia, one is struck by the intensity of their nationalistic and patriotic feelings. Their conversations with one another or even with Poles and other Eastern Europeans differ notably from their conversations with Westerners. The thought that something written by one of them might be construed by foreigners as a reflection of Russian conditions in general is ever present in their minds. They also worry about the presence of foreigners at their discussions.

The Soviet cultural climate is still very different not only from that in Western Europe and the United States, but also from that of other Eastern European countries. Socialist Realism is still the prevailing official genre in the Soviet Union; it is discussed in serious tones, and no one attacks it openly. By contrast, in Poland and Czechoslovakia, it is hardly mentioned any more, even by stalwart Communists; in these countries no one *bothers* to attack it since few would come to its defense. To read a Czech literary magazine is to find oneself in almost an entirely different world, far removed from Soviet Russia. Czech, Polish, and Yugoslav journals publish translations of contemporary Western authors, reproductions of contemporary art, sophisticated literary discussions. Close contact with current cultural developments in the West gives the writers and painters a sense of belonging to a world community of artists and literati that cuts across political boundaries. In Russia this is still not so; the isolation that marks the intellectual community, though far less strict than in the past, remains one of the most discouraging aspects of the cultural scene. One of the most poignant experiences I had was a talk with a painter who kept asking me about "op" and "pop" art in the United States, what the abstract expressionists were doing, what the newest trends were. He remarked: "I wish I were living in a world where I could know immediately what somebody was painting in New York. I don't want to know it three years or even a week later, I want to know it right away."

Soviet restrictiveness is thus pitted against a strong force in the modern world: perhaps never in the history of mankind has there been such uni-

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versal psychological pressure to let thinking people know what people in other countries are thinking—and doing. There is a great desire for contemporaneity, for being in touch. The Soviet regime, in spite of the great relaxation of the last decade, still impedes the intellectuals from free contact with the rest of the world—from being part of what is unconsciously or consciously felt to be a world "avant garde" situated at the razor's edge of advancing human creativeness.

Soviet society, just as ours, belongs to an age that believes in progress, despite the various disillusionments of our century. Technological advance keeps this faith going in the teeth of political and social failures—world conflicts, genocides, concentration camps, "wars against the people" (Yevtushenko's phrase in his poem "To Yesenin.") In the social and political spheres, Russians generally still believe that they are at the very head of the vanguard; the Soviet Union is the most progressive nation in the world, and they therefore belong to the "leading team." But while a great many people still feel capitalism and imperialism to be decadent forms belonging to the past, and socialism to be the wave of the future, it is no longer easy for them to believe that Soviet culture is in the vanguard. The suspicion that more exciting—more progressive, newer, leading—things are being done in the West is strong and widespread.

While this underlying concern is clearly discernible, the immediate concerns of Soviet artists, especially writers, are still very different from ours. The Soviet writers have enlarged the area which they investigate; innovations in literary techniques have taken place. But their preoccupations are with World War II, with the consequences of Stalinism, with infringements of legality, with a more exact and detailed analysis of human psychology. They are also interested in various painful Soviet problems such as antisemitism, the rewriting of history, the survivals into the present of evils acknowledged to have existed in the past.

What, on the other hand, do our newest name writers concern themselves with? If one can assert that the latest and most exciting American novelists are people like James Baldwin, Philip Roth, Susan Sontag, Norman Mailer, and Saul Bellow, most of them are preoccupied with entirely different subjects and literary genres. They veer towards the fantastic, the exaggerated; they are expanding the area of the human mind in the direction of exploring the unusual. Continental writers like the French New Novelists, Genet and Beckett, or like Günter Grass, Heinrich Böll, Berth, and the American Heller of *Catch 22* fame, are leaving behind traditional methods of narration and producing a new amalgam of hardness and fantasy—a new genre of the novel of the machine age which is sometimes unpalatable, but all the more original. Soviet authors have not in any way approximated this. When they do try what ours have been doing in the limited area of whimsical fantasy (as Dudintsev did in his "New Year's Tale"), they fail pathetically.

In the United States there has been a great deal of talk lately about changing attitudes of the public towards writers and about the "new" public. In a recent speech Saul Bellow remarked that in comparison with the 1930's the public has become greatly enlarged and that writers no longer feel quite so alienated.

One is tempted to look for parallels, or if not parallels then contrasts, in the USSR. In this connection, one must note the new image of Lenin—human rather than godly, humane, earthy and even humble—which the liberals have used effectively as a counterpoise to Stalin. Now there is a body of doctrine, so to speak, a part of the Soviet Holy Script, and a group of the Church Fathers (Lenin's disciples), to which the liberals can point; or to put it more politically and less ecclesiastically the liberal wing has its own constitutional authority to which to appeal. Moreover, there are a number of people outside the cultural sphere, notably scientists with their great power in the Soviet system, who support the liberal writers—*e.g.*, Kapitsa and others have offered crucial backing to various artists at different times. Thus the liberals have established a broader and deeper base from which to operate, and this should be some guarantee against too wide a swing of the pendulum back in the direction of restrictiveness.

The strong influences of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia are also important. Exposure to the publications of these countries and contact with their artists and intellectuals provide a constant subtle pressure on Soviet Russia to move in a similar direction—a pressure from within the so-called "socialist camp" rather than from the West.

These elements, the liberals' ever more-confident invocation of Lenin as a liberal ancestor and sanction, and the soft but sure impact of East European examples—together with the persistent influence emanating from Western thought—are three factors which give grounds for optimism when one plays the role of prophet of developments to come.

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Communist Fronts in the Philippines

By Justus M. van der Kroef

"The members of the Philippine Communist Party today are on their own; they are limited to scattered islands of activity," Dr. Jesus Lava, Secretary-General of the party, told me last June as we sat in the interrogation room of the Philippine Constabulary headquarters in Quezon City, near which Lava has been held in confinement since his capture in May 1964.[1] Indeed, since 1957, when the so-called "Anti-Subversion Act" (Republic Act No. 1700) outlawed the Philippine Communist Party and made knowing membership in it a felony, the Communist movement in the Philippines has tended to present a fragmented and somewhat spasmodic appearance. Nevertheless, it was already showing noticeable signs of renewed vitality well before Lava's arrest, and the present-day pattern of Communist-manipulated front activity, openly proclaimed to be part of a "national democratic" revolution moving toward an eventual "socialist" state, deserves closer analysis.

Certainly Filipino leaders are under no illusions about the extent of the present domestic Communist threat, however carefully their utterances on this point must be evaluated in the light of the sharp partisan crossfire of Philippine politics. Thus, at the meeting of the council of ministers of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in Canberra, Australia, in June 1966, Philippine Foreign Secretary Narciso Ramos appealed for aid against the increasing Huk insurgency in Central Luzon, and a "SEATO spokesman" called attention, in

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[1] Interview with Dr. Jesus Lava, June 22, 1966. For facilitating this interview, and also one with former Huk commander Luis Taruc, the author is grateful to General Alfonso Arellano, Undersecretary of National Defense, Republic of the Philippines.

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this connection, to stepped-up Chinese Communist burrowing in the Philippines.[2]

The Background

Since its founding in November 1930, the Philippine Communist Party has engaged in both revolutionary and parliamentary forms of struggle, sometimes stirring peasants and workers to militant resistance, at other times joining with other political groups in "aboveground" united-front action.[3] During World War II, Communist cadres effectively infiltrated the *Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon* ("People's Army to Fight the Japanese"), which after the failure of the party's parliamentary tactics in the immediate postwar period became the *Hukbong Mapagpagpalayang Bayan* ("People's Liberation Army")—popularly known as the "Huks." At its peak in 1952, this Communist-directed peasant guerrilla movement numbered some 15,000 adherents and achieved some success in exploiting the age-old discontent of tenant farmers in the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija, in Central Luzon. The imaginative land-reform and resettlement schemes initiated in the early 1950's by the later President of the Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay, the progressive isolation of the insurgents as a result of the government's relatively more effective anti-Huk military tactics, and the gradual rise of dissension in the rebel leadership eventually caused the fortunes of the Huk movement, and with them those of the Philippine Communist Party, to plummet. After 1957 the badly harried and once again underground party strove with little initial success to set up new trade union fronts and to retain its small hard core of Huk followers, while one after another of its top leaders —such as Alfredo Saulo (arrested in 1958) and Casto Alejandrino (captured in 1960)—fell into government hands.

It was not until the early 1960's that the Philippine Communist movement surged forward again. Its revival was due in part to the energetic leadership provided by Jesus Lava, in part to persistent peasant unrest aggravated by a lapse in the implementation of the land-reform program after President Magsaysay's death, and in part to a steadily widening civic discontent fueled by the corruption and inefficiency of successive government administrations. Another and by no means unimportant factor was the rising influence of the Communist Party of neighboring Indonesia (PKI), which was actively engaged in assisting radical movements in various parts of Southeast Asia, including the Philippines.[4] Reports of Indonesian Communist agents infiltrating into the Philippines and effecting liaison with the Huks, of the mounting influence exerted by these agents in certain Philippine student groups and in some sectors of the press, and of their apparent role in instigating anti-American demonstrations in Manila all suggested that Communist front activity in the Philippines was receiving a powerful new impetus from outside.[5] Party documents which fell into the government's hands at the time of Lava's capture not only gave evidence of contacts with the PKI but also indicated adoption of a new strategy involving a broadening of front groups for use in waging "legal forms of struggle," greater emphasis on the "political education" of

[2] *The Manila Chronicle*, June 30, 1966.

[3] No comprehensive, up-to-date account of the history and operations of the Philippine Communist Party, or for that matter of the Huk insurgency, exists. Useful background data are offered in Renze L. Hoeksema, *Communism in the Philippines: A Historical and Analytical Study of Communism and the Communist Party in the Philippines and its Relations to Communist Movements Abroad* (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1956); Conrado S. Sabelino, *A Study of the Legal (or Parliamentary) Struggle of the Communist Movement in the Philippines* (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Graduate School, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, March, 1958); Ruben Hernandez Alvina, *Philippine Strategy to Maintain National Security* (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Graduate School, University of the Philippines, November 1960); and Antonio S. Araneta, Jr., *The Communist Party of the Philippines and the Comintern, 1919 to 1930* (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Oxford University, 1966). On the social and political context of the postwar Huk insurgency, see Dante Simbulan, *A Study of the Socio-Economic Elite in Philippine Politics and Government* (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 1965). By Lava's own admission to the author, the Philippine Communist Party has never published its history; neophytes are provided with a 42-page mimeographed pamphlet by José Lava (Jesus' brother), entitled *Milestones in the History of the Communist Party of the Philippines* (Manila, 1951 and 1954, in English and Tagalog), for introductory purposes. On Communist involvement in the Huk insurrection, see the reports of the Special Committee on Un-Filipino (later changed to Anti-Filipino) Activities of the Philippine House of Representatives, particularly *Communism in the Philippines* (Manila, 1952), and *Report on Red Threat* (Manila, 1957). For the Huk point of view, see Luis Taruc, *Born of the People* (New York, International Publishers, 1953), much of which, Taruc told me, was "ghostwritten under my supervision" by the American leftist, William J. Pomeroy, who fought with the Huks. See also Pomeroy's own account, *The Forest. A Personal Record of the Huk Guerrilla Struggle in the Philippines* (New York, International Publishers, 1963).

[4] *Cf.* J. M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Expansionist Role in Southeast Asia," *International Journal*, Vol. 20 (1965), pp. 189-205, and "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership," *Orbis*, Vol. 8 (1964), pp. 332-356.

[5] See, *e.g.*, *Manila Bulletin*, May 26, 1964, and May 31, 1965; *The Sunday Times* (Manila), Oct. 4, 1964; *The Philippines Herald*, (Manila) May 24, 1964; and *The Manila Times* Feb. 13, 1965.

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students, and participation by Huks in local and national elections.[6] (Lava told me that at the time of his arrest he had been almost exclusively preoccupied with developing the party's new "theoretical approach".) The subsequent destruction of the PKI following the abortive Communist coup in Djakarta on October 1, 1965, undoubtedly deprived the Philippine Communists of a valuable outside prop, but by that time they had already laid the groundwork for a viable pattern of front activity, based on the operations of the Huks on the one hand, and on a number of urban student, trade-union, and special interest groups on the other. These two dimensions of Communist front operations in the Philippines merit examination in greater detail.

The Huks

Even seasoned Filipino political observers find it difficult to characterize the Huks today. As one Manila columnist observed last July, "there are now so-called ideological Huks and 'convenience' Huks. There are parliamentary Huks and unparliamentary Huks. There are even supposed to be millionaire Huks."[7] To which one might add that there are also what some observers have sarcastically dubbed "budgetary" Huks, an appellation inspired by the charge frequently voiced in certain quarters that Philippine constabulary and military officials tend to issue alarming announcements about resurgent Huk activity precisely when the national defense budget is under consideration in the Philippine Congress. The implication of the designation is dangerously misleading, however, because Huk activity demonstrably flares up at times other than when Congress is deliberating on the budget (as for example during June 1966), and also because it often tends to go hand in hand with the equally erroneous view that the Huks today are mere bandits without any sustaining ideological commitment.

The strength of the Huk movement is currently estimated at from 1,000 to 1,200 hard-core members operating in small bands of 50 to 150 in assigned "zones," with at least an additional 20,000 supporters in the smaller towns and villages of Central Luzon. A recent Constabulary estimate speaks of a core of about a hundred "diehard, 24-hour" regulars, with additional hundreds of "12-hour Huks" in "combat support" and "service" organizations, and up to 25,000 in the "mass support" category. Luis Taruc, founder and leader of the movement in the 1940's and early 1950's, told me last June that there are three kinds of Huks today: (1) hard-core Communists, or "Stalinists" as Taruc preferred to call them; (2) non-Communist "radical reformers" committed to a kind of nationalist and populist ideology, among whom Taruc classified two current top Huk leaders: "Commander Sumulong" (Faustino del Mundo) and Pedro Taruc (Luis' cousin); and (3) "opportunists," *i.e.*, marauders and hoodlums who participate in Huk depredations for reasons of personal aggrandizement.[8]

The presence of this last category probably explains why Huk operations frequently seem, at least superficially, to resemble the Mafia's, with extortion, graft, intimidation, and exploitation of vice as stock-in-trade. In the city of Angeles, in Pampanga Province, near the big American-manned Clark Air Base, Huks exact "protection" money from night clubs and a fleet of "jeepneys" (converted jeeps used to provide cheap bus transportation), as well as from hundreds of local bar girls and market vendors. Monthly Huk income from the "protection" racket in this area alone is estimated at no less than 30,000 pesos (about $8,000.).[9] In the surrounding countryside, peasants pay Huk "taxes" in money, palay (rice), sugar or fowl. Public officials of small towns and villages are sometimes forced to hire Huk "bodyguards," and various other methods are employed to compel their subservience.

One such stratagem consists of first inducing a town official to dismiss certain local employees, who are then approached by the Huks and persuaded to join their ranks, after which the new recruits, again through Huk pressure, are reinstated in their jobs. By thus placing just a few of their own recruits in key local positions in a barrio (village), and counting on the intricate pattern of family and communal

[6] *The Philippines Herald,* May 28, 1964; and *Manila Bulletin,* May 26, 1964.

[7] Mario P. Chanco, in *The New Evening News* (Manila), July 4, 1966.

[8] Interview with Luis Taruc, June 22, 1966, at Philippine Constabulary Headquarters, Camp Crame, Quezon City.

[9] *The Philippines Herald,* June 11, 1966. A quarrel over the disposition of these and other Huk funds between two top Huk commanders, Sumulong and Alibasbas (alias Cesareo Manapang) led to the latter's liquidation in February 1966. This was reportedly not just a simple quarrel over spoils, but rather over how much of the Huks' funds was to be allocated to "ideological" objectives and indoctrination by party cadres.

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ties that characterizes Filipino life generally, but especially in the rural sections, the Huks can often gain decisive influence, if not control, over an entire community. Those who resist are swiftly dealt with. Constabulary Chief Segundo Velasco announced last June that in the first five and a half months of 1966 alone some 60 persons in Central Luzon had been kidnaped and presumed killed by Huks.[10] Instances of Huk terror mutilations have also become more common.

Terror and intimidation, however, are but one Huk tactic. Where appropriate, Huks may also act more like Robin Hood's band. For example, cattle thieves in the barrios are meted out rough Huk "justice"; a few Huk rural "banks" lend money to small farmers without interest; to an impecunious farmer who wishes to give a baptismal feast for his new grandson, the Huks may send food and drink; and so on. All such gestures are greatly embroidered in local folklore and provide the Huks with a never quite exhausted source of peasant sympathy. In rural Luzon, with its chronic un- and underemployment, the Huks even provide "career" opportunities. In early June of 1966, the mayor of Candaba, in Pampanga province, noted that most Huks in his particular area were unemployed youths who had "joined Huk cadre divisions at 250 pesos a month."[11] The taxes and tribute in kind exacted from the peasants are stored in barrio or small-town warehouses owned by Huks, to be distributed to the deserving or sold. A kind of Huk "bureaucracy" of guards, drivers, and "sales representatives" has thus developed, operating, as will be indicated, with the connivance of local authorities, and providing additional jobs.

Communist Influence

But the Huks' businesslike banditry should not obscure the "ideological"—more specifically, Communist—coloring of the movement. All Philippine Communist Party members, Lava told me, are required to perform a period of "field work" devoted to providing Marxist political education and indoctrination to the Huks, for, as he put it, the peasantry remains "the main force of our revolution."

Other evidence has come from Constabulary Chief Velasco, who disclosed last June that the Huks, especially in Nueva Ecija province, have been organizing rallies and meetings under the guidance of a militant peasant group called "Samaka" which conducts open forums on Communist doctrine.[12] Moreover, Constabulary officers in Pampanga showed me poorly stenciled or handwritten Huk instructional brochures and leaflets which consisted of little more than a series of quotations from Mao Tse-tung and urged "united front" action against "feudal landlords" and "imperialists" under the leadership of peasants and workers. Nor is this indication of Chinese Communist influence surprising in view of the disclosure by Philippine armed forces intelligence as long ago as September 1965 that military training centers run by Chinese Communist infiltrators had been discovered in Bicol and the Visayas, and that Chinese agents had been working closely with the Huks.[13] In March 1966, the same source revealed renewed Chinese Communist efforts at subversion.[14]

To what extent these disclosures by army intelligence sources may have been influenced by domestic political considerations is difficult to assess in view of the complexities of partisan and service rivalries in the Philippines. In any event, however, it would seem unwise to ignore the Communist ideological coloration of the Huk movement, which is especially apparent at the leadership level. It is also apparent that whatever the distinction between those Huks who are Philippine Communist Party members and those who, in the words of Taruc, are just "radical reformers" (if in fact there is such a distinction), in practice an operational *modus vivendi* appears to exist between them, at least for the time being. For the non-Communist "populists" appear to share the Communists' view of the need to wage an unrelenting "national" struggle against landlords and "compradors" in league with the "imperialists" who allegedly hold the Philippines politically and economically in bondage. Both also agree, in view of the decade-long failure to implement the program of land reform (to be discussed presently), that only a widening popular uprising spurred by continuing agrarian unrest and violence can break through the prevailing feudal pattern of rural social and economic relationships. This conviction in turn makes an alliance with the "opportunist" hoodlum elements possible. On the one hand, the alliance enables these elements to mask their depradations behind a "legitimizing" ideological cloak, while on

[10] *The Sunday Times*, June 12, 1966.
[11] *The Philippines Herald*, June 9, 1966.
[12] *The Manila Times*, June 4, 1966.
[13] *Ibid.*, Sept. 28, 1965.
[14] *The Philippines Herald*, March 27 and 29, 1966.

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the other hand Huk "taxes" serve to finance Communist ideological work.[15]

Huk Political Tactics

Huk tactics are clearly designed to create the impression of a functioning "invisible government" allied with or even based on leading civic, business, government, and law enforcement figures in the local communities, and seemingly immune from effective counterattack. This has resulted in a growing disrespect for the established governmental authority, a disrespect that is further augmented by unpunished Huk criminality and government ineptness in conducting the anti-Huk campaign. Colonel Rafael Ileto, Constabulary commander for Central Luzon, estimated last summer that beside the thousand or so "diehard" Huk fighters, "combat supporters," and "cadres" operating in his area, there were some 26,500 additional Huk supporters, most of them businessmen, politicians, and landowners.[16] Wealthy rice merchants have been supplying the Huks with food, and other merchants have acted as fronts or "dummies" for Huk business ventures, the profits from which provide the wherewithal for the purchase of modern weapons, particularly Armalite rifles and submachine guns, which have become standard equipment in some Huk gangs.

Ileto accused 18 of the 22 municipal mayors in Pampanga province of being either avowed Huk supporters or at least indifferent to the government's anti-Huk campaign, and he charged other provincial and town officials with providing the Huks with weapons and food. These charges are not surprising, however, since the Huks have for some time been openly active in local politics in Central Luzon, particularly in Pampanga's second congressional district, where they have virtually controlled elections not only to local offices but even to the national House of Representatives. In the words of one reporter, many officials in this area have become political "tightrope walkers" who "realize that they owe their election to the Huks."[17] Even Constabulary and Army officers have appeared on the same political campaign platforms with Huks, and former Huks have been integrated into local Constabulary units.

All this has heightened concern over what has come to be called "peaceful coexistence" between the Huks and government and police agencies—a situation which Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos himself felt compelled to condemn in June of last year.[18] The picture is further obscured by partisan political infighting among officials. When President Marcos, acting in response to what Undersecretary of National Defense Alfonso Arellano had called the "uncontrolled resurgence" of Huk activity, placed a number of small Pampanga towns under Constabulary control (tantamount, in effect, to martial law) in June 1966, the ensuing crossfire of protests and countercharges between municipal, provincial and national government officials soon enveloped and virtually nullified the whole local anti-Huk campaign.

Agrarian Ferment

It is to this climate of confusion and dissension, in which political antagonisms are sharpened amidst a widening breakdown of public confidence in the government's security forces, that Communist manipulation of the Huk movement seems particularly well attuned. Yet, it is not just the Huks' hold on local government, nor the efficiency of their business operations and terror tactics, that buttresses Huk strength. Some unsolved national political and social problems have also played a part in enhancing the appeal of Communist political ideology. This is not the place to analyze the Philippine government's land reform policies; suffice it to note, however, that none of the measures thus far taken—*i.e.*, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954, the Land Reform Act of 1955, or the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963—has, in the virtually unanimous opinion of qualified observers, yet had a significant impact on tenant misery and feudal agrarian relations in Central Luzon.[19] In Pampanga,

[15] Such alliances are no novelty in Communist tactics in Southeast Asia. *E.g.*, on the recruitment of criminals for tactical purposes by the Indonesian Communist Party in the 1920's, see H. J. Benda and R. T. McVey, eds., *The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents*, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y., 1960.

[16] *Manila Bulletin*, June 29, 1966.

[17] Filemon V. Tutay, "Marked for Liquidation," *Philippines Free Press* (Manila), Jan. 23, 1965, p. 3. See also the same author's "By Huk or Crook," *Philippines Free Press*, Nov. 6, 1965, p. 10.

[18] *The Manila Times*, June 27, 1966.

[19] See, *e.g.*, Domingo C. Salita, *Land Use in the Province of Pampanga* (Unpublished M.S. Thesis, Graduate School, University of the Philippines, 1958); Francisco Nemenzo, Jr., *The Land for the Landless Program of the Philippine Government* (Unpublished Master of Public Administration Thesis, Graduate School, University of the Philippines, 1959), esp. p. 206; Erich H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in Southeast Asia* (London, Asia Publishing House, 1961), pp. 191-233.

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for instance, tenancy rates have shown hardly any change over the years.[20] That this situation bears a close relation to Huk strength in the area is quite evident. As Commissioner Blas F. Ople, chief adviser to the government's "Social Action Committee" involved in the land reform program, noted, "while the land area of Pampanga's second district may comprise 5 percent of the land area in Central Luzon, you might say that it accounts for 95 percent of the armed dissidents." [21]

Already in Spanish colonial times rural Central Luzon had its tenant rebellions. The Huks today capitalize on this old tradition, on the government's chronic lack of funds to implement the land reform and rural improvement programs, and on the seeming futility of efforts to dislodge the entrenched political power of the landlords. It is significant, however, that unlike in the late 1940's when Huk-affiliated farmers' unions drew up concrete demands for the end of tenancy and the establishment of rural cooperatives, the Huks today have virtually no land reform proposals of their own to offer beyond vague generalities with a recognizable Maoist flavor.

Huk tactics thus seem to be geared not so much to land reform *per se* as to the land reform *issue* as a political stratagem. (Indeed, the Huks in recent years have shown themselves not averse to striking practical bargains with some of the more notorious landlords when it suits their purpose.) Despite this, the Huks still manage to cling successfully to their old aura of "reform"; they continue to provide a channel of expression for generalized peasant grievances and aspirations and, more important, have even come to be recognized in leading urban intellectual circles as *bona fide* champions of agrarian reform. "What's right with the Huks?" was the title of an editorial article published last year in a new quarterly of "current affairs, ideas and the arts" which has been attracting a significant following among the Manila intelligentsia. The author's answer: "If there is anything right . . . about the Huks when they defy this government, it is their espousal of land reform." [22] Under these conditions, the Philippine Communist Party's central doctrinal tenet which calls for making the peasantry the main force of revolution assumes new and wider significance.

Warning in July 1966 that the "symptoms of revolution" are apparent in the Philippines, Cornelio T. Villareal, Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives and chairman of the Liberal Party, pointed in particular to the "massive poverty" of "more than half of our people, the tenant farmers," who "live under semi-feudal agrarian conditions." [23] Governmental corruption and inefficiency have aggravated popular misery and contributed to a growing crime problem which the Huks have also known how to turn to their advantage. Patterns of gangsterism and criminality and a subculture of violence, some features of which are deeply rooted in Philippine-Malay traditions of piracy and brigandage, are being fully exploited and further accentuated by the Huks, who have reportedly recruited members of notorious criminal gangs into their ranks.[24] The ineptness which has frequently marred the govenment's anti-Huk campaign—exemplified by such incidents as the killing by Constabulary forces in Tarlac province of five alleged Huks who later turned out to have been innocent peasants, and by the issuance of fire-breathing Constabulary orders (subsequently repealed in embarrassment) "to shoot anyone seen in the company of Huks"—has only played into the Huks' hands. Meanwhile, few expect any immediate or significant results from the "civic action" program announced by President Marcos in July 1966, calling for combatting the Huks through improved local social and economic welfare and development services (funds for which have been chronically and notoriously short in the Philippines), or from such new organizations as the anti-Huk mayors' and barrio captains' (village chiefs) "leagues."

Assessing the causes of the failure of the Huk movement in the 1940's and 1950's, William Pomeroy, an American leftist who fought with the Huks during that period, has argued that the Huks' struggle was not geared to the requirements of "a protracted war," with "the elements of attrition involved," and that they consequently made their attempt to seize power prematurely. He also points out that "phases of legal struggle that were still possible and the creation of a broad united front

[20] In 1948 the incidence of farm tenancy in Pampanga province was 87.99 percent; in May 1960, it was 85.17 percent. In March 1966, it was estimated at 85.2 percent. (Data supplied by the Philippine Chamber of Agriculture, Manila.)

[21] Cited in Rodolfo G. Tupas, "A Land Crying for Change," *The Sunday Times Magazine* (Manila), July 10, 1966, p. 21.

[22] F. Sionil José, "What's Right with the Huks?" *Solidarity*, Vol. I, No. 2 (April-June 1966), p. 1.

[23] *Manila Bulletin*, July 11, 1966.

[24] *Cf. The New Evening News*, July 7, 1966.

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of a nationalist character were neglected" in favor of a rapid Huk military buildup. Pomeroy attributes these errors to the "isolation" of "the Philippine national liberation movement" and to its cadres' lack of proper theoretical training.[25]

The Second "Leg"

Today the situation is altered. Philippine communism now appears to be "walking on two legs": on the one hand, there is the "protracted" demoralizing strategy of Huk operations; on the other, there is a new, major emphasis on "legal struggle" through the development of a "united front" with strong nationalist overtones. In Manila and some of the larger provincial towns like Cebu and Iloilo, there exists a volatile community of political radicals of various hues—intellectuals, students, unemployed or underemployed college graduates, newspaper columnists, trade-union leaders, and even a few "nationally"-oriented businessmen—among whom Communist "united front" tactics are beginning to have significant effect.

The chief organizational foci of these tactics are the National Youth Movement (Kabataan Makabayan, or KM) and the Labor Party (Lapiang Manggagawa, or LM). KM has been described in Communist media outside the Philippines as the "most outspoken and most active of the new organizations in the Philippine struggle for freedom."[26] Around the axis formed by these two organizations, and overlapping them in membership, are more ephemeral groups like the "Philippine Committee for Freedom in South Vietnam" and the "Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation of the Philippines." Jose Lapuz, KM's "Chief of Propaganda," told me that the youth organization had about 6,000 members, mostly students and "young working adults"—the bulk of these belonging to KM's chapters in Manila and the larger towns, but "we also have peasant members." Lapuz' membership figure was almost certainly too high by at least a thousand, but beside its formal members KM claims, and undoubtedly has, several additional hundreds of sympathizers who readily participate in the organization's anti-American demonstrations, political discussions, and conferences.

Perhaps KM's ideological orientation is best reflected in the organization's official program.[27] According to this document, the Philippines is in a "semi-colonial and semi-feudal condition," and KM has a "national-democratic mission" to complete the "Philippine Revolution, which has been frustrated by a new type of colonialism, American imperialism."[28] KM "perceives as the principal contradiction the conflict . . . between imperialist interests and national interests"—that is, between "the compradors and the big landlords" on the one hand, and the "national bourgeoisie," the "petty bourgeoisie," and "the working class and the peasantry, to which the vast majority of Filipino youth belong," on the other. With KM as the "vanguard organization," there can be created "an invincible unity" of "all national classes" to "push further the struggle for national liberation."

The combatting of "American monopoly capital," and of "the political monopoly being enjoyed by the fair-haired boys of American imperialism" in the Philippines, is posited as a first step toward the implementation of a "genuine land reform which benefits all segments of the peasantry," a "nationalist industrialization" that will "widen the opportunities of Filipino youth," and a more diversified economic development assisted by loans "from all possible sources in the world . . . even from non-American sources." Culturally, KM is "committed to the preservation of our national identity from the powerful onslaughts of American cultural imperialism" (*viz.*, "the Peace Corps, USIS, AID, Voice of America, Hollywood films, the Ford, Asia and Rockfeller Foundations"), while politically it "seeks more freedom" and the fuller exercise of "democratic rights." As an example of the latter, the KM program declares:

Political groups and individuals who question the undue amount of American power and influence in our

[25] William J. Pomeroy, *Guerilla and Counter-Guerilla Warfare, Liberation and Suppression in the Present Period*, New York, International Publishers, Little New World paperback edition, 1964, p. 67.

[26] Jorge Maravilla, "Upsurge of the Anti-Imperialist Movement in the Philippines," *World Marxist Review*, Vol. VIII (1965), No. 11, p. 44.

[27] "Programme of Kabataang Makabayan," *Progressive Review* (Quezon City), 1965, No. 6, pp. 68-73.

[28] This same "national democratic" line was emphasized by Jesus Lava in his interview with me. Earlier, at the time of his capture, Lava, when asked about his aims, said, "We want to be independent and nationalistic, and then socialistic, these steps taking form under democratic process." (*The Manila Chronicle*, June 6, 1964). On the significance of the national democratic tactic generally, see the author's "The Communist Concept of 'National Democracy,'" *Studies on the Soviet Union*, Vol. IV (1964), No. 2, pp. 39-63.

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political and economic life should be allowed by all branches of the government to express their views in the open. In this regard the Anti-Subversion Law [*i.e.*, Republic Act No. 1700, of 1957, which bans the Communist Party] should be annulled because it is detrimental to democracy.

Finally, the KM program demands an end to American military rights and military assistance programs in the Philippines and calls for the creation of an independent "Filipino citizens' army."

KM was founded in November 1964 by two veterans of the Philippine radical Left: José Sison, a teacher, and José Lansang, Dean of Journalism at the Lyceum of the Philippines in Manila, one of the country's most respected collegiate institutions. Addressing the Philippine House of Representatives in May last year, Congressman Fermin Z. Caram described in detail Sison's antecedents and alleged connections with Indonesian communism, as well as Lansang's own presumed involvement in the Philippine Communist Party.[29] Whatever the validity of Caram's carefully-worded charges, an insight into Sison's political views is perhaps most easily obtained from his writings, particularly his editorials in the bimonthly *Progressive Review* (chief publication medium of the KM-LM coterie), of which he is the acknowledged guiding light. Sison's editorials abound in inflammatory demands for the formation of a "united front" of the "national" and "petty" bourgeosie, the "working class and the peasantry," to wage the "anti-imperialist" and "anti-feudal" struggle in the Philippines, and for the "full development of the Philippine Revolution and its national democratic phase" as it seeks to triumph over "American neo-colonialism." [30] As for Lansang, he has formally acknowledged his onetime adhesion to the Communist cause, declaring that only the Communists appeared to him to be sincere "about land reform, about fighting for true sovereignty for the Filipinos, about doing something positive for the millions of our people who live in misery in the rural areas." [31]

Beating the Drums of Nationalism

The KM's current tactics are aimed at bringing about a steady radicalization of student and young adult opinion through a ceaseless beating of the drums of nationalism. Thus, the organization, like the Philippine Communist Party before it, has adopted as a kind of symbol the Katipunan, the secret Philippine nationalist plebeian organization founded in 1892, which was dedicated not only to independence from Spain but also to the "defense of the poor and the oppressed." Also, through KM's "Institute of National Affairs," a number of Filipino historians and economists have been projecting the image of a nation whose early national ideals were betrayed at the time of the Spanish-American War by "U.S. imperialism," and which today remains hobbled by preferential US economic rights. In January 1966, KM formulated a twelve-point "action" program of demands, ranging from the abolition of so-called US "parity rights" and removal of US military bases to more effective implementation of land reform legislation, "proper observance" of civil liberties, relaxation of the "tight credit squeeze" on Filipino businessmen, "Filipinization" of the educational system, and the establishment of diplomatic relations "with all countries in the spirit of internationalism." [32] In its anti-American and nationalist emphasis, however, KM can sometimes be curiously selective. When I went to see KM propaganda chief José Lapuz, he appeared late for the interview, explaining the delay by referring to the special problems of producing Clifford Odets' play "Waiting for Lefty," which KM's "Cultural Bureau" was putting on in downtown Manila that night.

The escalation of the war in Vietnam, and more particularly the Philippine government's proposal last year to dispatch a 2,000-man Philippine engineer unit to bolster the forces supporting South Vietnam, provided the KM with one of its most effective agitational weapons to date. Denouncing

[29] Republic of the Philippines, *Congressional Record, Sixth Congress, House of Representatives*, May 13, 1966. See also *The Philippines Herald*, May 15, 1966.

[30] See *e.g.*, "Towards a Broad National Front," *Progressive Review*, No. 5, January-February 1965, pp. 1-3; also José M. Sison, *Ang Nasyonalismo at Ang Kilusang Manggagawa*, Manila, Union de Impresores Filipinas, 1966. In December 1966, a special Philippine Congressional mission headed by Congressman Carmelo Barbero visited Indonesia to inquire into reported close ties between the Indonesian Communist Party and "certain labor and youth organizations" in the Philippines. Press reports published in connection with the mission described Sison as having been a repeated visitor to Djakarta where he "made contacts with the PKI," and also stated that the PKI had made funds available to "certain" Philippine youth and labor organizations for the purpose of mounting anti-American demonstrations and propaganda. (LKBN Antara Daily News Bulletin, Dec. 20, 1966.)

[31] *Weekly Graphic* (Manila), June 22, 1966, p. 7.

[32] Ninotchka Peña, "The Kabataang Makabayan," *Weekly Graphic*, June 29, 1966, p. 15. "Parity rights" were provided for by the Laurel-Langley treaty at the time the Philippines formally acquired independence in 1946 and require that US and Filipino citizens be accorded equal economic rights in both countries. The "parity" provision has also been incorporated in the Philippine Constitution.

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American intervention in Vietnam as violative of the 1954 Geneva accords and of the Vietnamese right of self-determination, as well as "offensive to humanity," KM declared that "US imperialism" was generating a "war hysteria" in order to revive "McCarthyism" in the Philippines.[33] Early in 1966, particularly in February and March, KM organized a series of protest demonstrations in front of the US Embassy in Manila, the demonstrators numbering up to a thousand placard-bearing university students and youths and LM trade union cadres, as well as several scores of "farmers from Pampanga" (as KM releases described them). Alleged Communist direction of the demonstrations led to demands for an inquiry by the Philippine Congressional Committee on Anti-Filipino Activities into Communist influence on university campuses, particularly at the University of the Philippines. KM immediately responded by launching a campaign to protect "academic freedom." Under KM's auspices, "fifty student leaders" at the University signed a manifesto which declared:

We hold the view that American imperialists and their lackeys are responsible for the inspiration behind the projected congressional inquiry in order to silence opposition against the Vietnam Aid Bill, to create an atmosphere of crisis, with the end in view of suspending the writ of habeas corpus, so that the power of the state can be fully utilized by the American imperialists and their tools in maintaining their cultural, military, political and economic stranglehold on our country.[34]

Congressman Felix Amante charged that KM's March 25, 1966, anti-war demonstration (which coincided with similar demonstrations in the United States and elsewhere on that day) had been coordinated by a visiting "American Communist organizer," and Congressman Caram subsequently cited Philippine military intelligence reports showing contacts between the Philippine and American Communist Parties, and noting in particular that the CPUSA had offered to provide financial assistance to the Lapiang Manggagawa, whose members had participated shoulder to shoulder with the KM in the anti-US demonstrations.[35] Amante's charge drew a denial from the head of the Philippine "Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation" that an "American Communist organizer" had planned any demonstration. However, in mid-May 1966, Philippine armed forces intelligence publicly called attention to an intensifying Communist "cultural offensive" in the country and reported extensive infiltration of youth, student and labor organizations.[36] In the following weeks, KM-LM spokesmen concertedly stressed the dangers of US "escalation" of the Vietnam conflict, lashed out at the use of US military bases in the Philippines, and warned that the Philippines was inexorably being drawn into a nuclear holocaust.

The Labor Front

KM's closest ally, the Lapiang Manggagawa, was founded in 1962 by radical trade union figures, some of whom, according to Caram's exposé, had served at one time on the Politburo of the Philippine Communist Party and still maintained close connections with the party.[37] LM's original program (1962) in some respects anticipated that of KM ("our economy is colonial in structure and orientation"), also stressing the "alienation" of Filipino workers from "the center of power" and offering LM as "an effective instrument of reform political action."[38] Opposing "the interests of the few who are rich, native and alien alike," the program dedicates itself to the goals of "social justice," "land for the landless" and "homes for the homeless," the transfer of wealth and economic power to "Filipino hands," and the "full and unhindered exercise of civil liberties." It also calls for a "truly independent foreign policy" opposed to colonialism and dedicated to "universal peace." Subsequent pronouncements by LM leaders have taken on an ever more uncompromising anti-American tone, adopting KM's vocabulary wholesale, so that today there is no practical difference in the objectives of the two organizations. Their memberships as well as their officers overlap (*e.g.*, José Sison is a vice-president of the LM).

LM, however, addresses its appeal primarily to organized labor, from whose ranks come at least a majority of its 7,000 members—particularly from the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU),

[33] Educational Department, Kabataang Makabayan, *Why We Oppose the Vietnam Bill* (Place of publication not given, 1966), pp. 3, 4, 7.
[34] *The Philippine Collegian* (University of the Philippines, Quezon City), April 13, 1966.
[35] *The Manila Times*, March 26, 1966; and Republic of the Philippines, *Congressional Record, Sixth Congress, House of Representatives*, May 13, 1966.
[36] *Manila Bulletin*, May 15, 1966.
[37] See references in footnote 29.
[38] "The Lapiang Manggagawa Platform," *Progressive Review*, No. 1, May-June 1963, pp. 58-63; and Ignacio P. Lacsina, "Lapiang Manggagawa and the Liberal Administration," *Progressive Review*, No. 6, 1965, pp. 26-31.

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whose president, Ignacio Lacsina, is also LM's principal leader. NATU and LM, for reasons that can at this point only be speculated upon, have made special attempts to organize banking employees and transport and communications workers in the greater Manila area. LM's leaflets and throwaway literature expertly play on the whole gamut of workers' grievances—from low wages to inadequate welfare services—under the "semi-colonial" economy of the Philippines. Although third parties have thus far never done well in Philippine politics, LM appears to have set its sights on becoming a "swing" political force between the two dominant Nacionalista and Liberal parties.

Basic Problems

Fundamentally, the strength of the KM-LM axis and its ephemeral satellite committees for "peace" and against the Vietnam war no doubt derives from the ferment of widening popular dissatisfaction with the Philippine system of government as it is, and from the frustrations of a burgeoning population (now 33 million, with an annual growth rate of 3.6 percent) in an inadequately expanding economy. One may dismiss such hyperboles as Jose Lapuz' assertion to me that "both the Nacionalista and the Liberal parties are in the pockets of the CIA," but there is a hard core of truth in the observation made by a political commentator in 1965 that "the most influential intellectual persuasion in the national culture now, let us admit it, is not liberal but leftist" [39]—and the primary targets of the Left, including the non-Communist Left, are at present the United States and its "parity" and military rights, as well as the corruption and inefficiencies of the Philippine two-party system.

In this context, a coalescing of many readily exploitable frustrations becomes possible: those of businessmen facing foreign (including American) competitive pressures, of college graduates who annually swell the ranks of the educated unemployed,[40] of civil servants unpaid for weeks because of confusion or chicanery in budgetary allocations, of newspaper columnists and academicians with ideological axes to grind, of workers increasingly being made aware by their leaders that they, too, are entitled to some of the comforts of the Roxas boulevardiers, of the long-suffering, exploited peasantry, and of many others. The uneven distribution of wealth in the country is severe: according to a report of the Philippine Economic Development Foundation, only 4.7 percent of all Filipino households have an annual income of 5,000 pesos (about $1300) or over, while 78.2 percent have incomes below 2,000 pesos (about $520).[41]

Above all, there is a growing sentiment that the Philippines has too long been a tail to the political and cultural kites of the West, Spanish and American, and that it needs to be more "Asian" and to discover its own national identity. It is this, in large part, which explains the curious dalliance with political radicalism of some Filipino business magnates and their foreign-trained sons, who finance the publications of the KM-LM coterie; it also sheds light on why praises of People's China are now being sung by a number of left-wing Filipino journalists.

The degree of integration—financial, tactical or otherwise—which exists at present between the two arms of the Philippine Communist front pattern, the Huks and the urban radicals, the author has heard endlessly speculated upon in various knowledgeable quarters. Little hard evidence of such integration has thus far been made public, but by its very nature such evidence is no doubt kept carefully guarded within the top echelons of the party and front leaderships. It does not seem unwarranted to suggest, however, that the protracted campaign of terrorism and demoralization being waged by the Huks readily supplements the political radicalization process carried forward by the KM-LM axis and its satellites, and that the present coalescing of political discontent makes the mutual interaction of the two dimensions of the front pattern increasingly likely and more dangerous. This point was well made last summer by José Crisol, Magsaysay's top anti-Huk psychological warfare expert. Crisol observed that the tactical situation of the Huk movement had improved not just because it was "better financed and better armed," but because

. . . the dissidents have found friends and supporters among politicians and even in the armed forces. The

[39] Petronilo B. Daroy, "The Failure of Liberalism," *Politika* (Quezon City), No. 1, 1965.

[40] According to a report on the unemployment problem published in mid-1966, "of an estimated 300,000 students graduating yearly from Philippine colleges or universities, only around 17 percent are able to secure employment commensurate with the degrees they have obtained." (José Rodriguez, "Our Idle Millions, a Potential Powderkeg," *Weekly Graphic*, July 13, 1966, p. 22.) Out of a total labor force of about 15 million, some two million are wholly unemployed, and an additional three million underemployed.

[41] *The Manila Times*, June 6, 1966.

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"glowing" reports of recent Filipino visitors to Red China about the success of the Communist regime of Mao Tse-tung are grist for the Huk propaganda machine. Huks are riding on the wings of extreme nationalism. According to army intelligence, there is increasing infiltration of the Huk movement in intellectual, student, labor and media sectors of the country. Taken together, these factors, complicated by the upsurge of crimes and criminality, give the new Huk movement a tactical advantage over the government forces.[42]

Countermeasures and Prospects

In the face of the stepped-up Communist front offensive, bipartisan legislation was introduced in the Philippine Congress in June 1966 to amend and stiffen the provisions of the 1957 "Anti-Subversion Act." The amendments sought to redefine the scope of the term "Communist Party of the Philippines" so as to include the party's current front operations under the existing ban. Other provisions granted greater authority to investigating and law enforcement agencies for the detention of suspects and provided heavier penalties for violations. Constabulary and Army units have since been equipped with improved weapons and have launched new operational campaigns against the Huks. But reliance has not been placed solely on repressive police measures. The Marcos administration has also announced its commitment to an accelerating program of welfare services and social and economic development, including effective implementation of land reform, particularly in the Huk-infested areas of Central Luzon. Similar pledges have, however, been made in the past by other Philippine administrations, and it remains to be seen whether the present incumbent of Malacañang Palace will be any more successful than his predecessors in fulfilling them.

As 1966 neared a close, there was little evidence that the new rural development campaign and the much-heralded acceleration of land reform were effectively curbing revolutionary ferment. "An ideological storm is fast approaching the Philippines," Manila's leading news weekly warned last October, noting that the entrenched power of the landlords and the restiveness of Central Luzon tenant farmers were continuing to feed the Huks with new recruits.[43] The Huks, moreover, appear to have gained new self-confidence. When government forces raided a Huk stronghold near San Fernando last August, they captured documents indicative of plans to train a "regular" Huk army of over twenty thousand men, with a fully organized command structure.

Meanwhile, Communist China's part in promoting the Huk resurgence has been admitted in the highest circles of the Philippine government. When President Marcos was interviewed on an American television program during his visit to the United States last September, he declared that "agents" from outside the Philippines were actively aiding the Huks, and upon further questioning he identified these agents as "coming from Peking".[44] At almost the same time, Undersecretary of Defense Arellano likewise charged that Peking was helping the Huks. The military services, he said, had "definitely established" that counterfeit pesos currently circulating in the Philippines had been printed in mainland China, suggesting a Communist plan to "flood" the country with false currency in order to undermine the economy.

The war in Vietnam also continues to provide the urban KM-LM axis with a useful agitational weapon, as again became apparent with the anti-war and anti-US demonstrations staged on the occasion of President Johnson's recent visit to Manila. *Progressive Review*, the mouthpiece of the KM-LM coterie, promptly voiced its support of such demonstrations as "the best means available" to protest Philippine involvement in the Vietnam war.[45]

Thus, the tactical opportunities for Communist front operations in the Philippines, as well as the prospects of a greater Communist effort to consolidate and intensify these operations in 1967, appear larger than ever.

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[42] José M. Crisol, "A Huk Resurgence?" *The Examiner*, July 17, 1966, p. 14.

[43] Edward R. Kiunisala, "The Approaching Storm," *Philippines Free Press*, Oct. 22, 1966, p. 72.

[44] National Broadcasting Company (NBC) program, "Meet The Press," Sept. 18, 1966.

[45] Editorial, "Democracy and Demonstrations," *Progressive Review*, No. 9, 1966, p. 3.

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Whither Russia?

EDITORS' NOTE: Our series of commentaries on the nature of the Soviet political system continues with two essays that focus attention on the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Mr. Hook adds some further cogent views on where the Soviet Union is headed after a half century of evolution, while Mr. Souvarine looks back into history to remind us that the political system that emerged from the Revolution was a betrayal, not a realization, of the Communist ideal.

Fifty Years After

By Sidney Hook

In one way or another all my conscious life since adolescence seems to have been dominated by the Russian Revolution of 1917. I still recall as a high school student the impact of the February Revolution on the labor and Socialist circles in New York. Firm opposition among these circles to American involvement in World War I was unaffected by the event. But already the hopes of political and social liberation, anticipated as consequences of the overthrow of the Tsarist regime, began to influence the attitude of a few Socialists who had until then shied away from taking sides between the rival imperialisms of the Allied and the Central powers. In April 1917 it was easier to believe President Wilson's declaration that the war would help to make the world safe for democracy now that the cause of the parliamentary powers had been freed from the incubus of Tsarist support. For in those days Tsarism in the eyes of even the mildly liberal was synonymous with the darkest reaction.

Nonetheless the ravages of the bloodiest war in history seemed too high a price to pay for any side's victory. By and large, American Socialists refused to support the military struggle, calling instead for a negotiated peace—and this despite the severest oppression and reign of terror any political minority has suffered in American history before or since.

It was this opposition to the war which was primarily responsible for whatever initial sympathy the Bolsheviks received in Socialist circles. Actually, although the names of Lenin and Trotsky were familiar to lead-

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ing members of the Russian Federation of the American Socialist Party, they were unknown to the indigenous elements of the party. Eugene Debs had never heard of them. Neither had the editors of the New York *Call*, the official organ of the party, whose editorials refused to give credence to the news that some extremists, headed by Lenin and Trotsky, were trying to overthrow the socialist government of Kerensky. Even Morris Hillquit, one of the chief theoreticians of the Socialist Party, and a firm opponent of the American Communists, sought to find acceptable links between the mainstream of Marxism and Lenin within the context of a common opposition to war.

This explains why so little attention was given to the Bolshevik program, why the Bolshevik repudiation of democratic theory and outrages against democratic practice were overlooked or glossed over in some Socialist circles as temporary measures of defense against counterrevolution and military intervention.

As one looks back to those days, one is struck by the failure on the part of both the defenders and the opponents of Bolshevism to predict the evolution of events in the Soviet Union. This has been true for every sharp turn or reversal in its development, and should make for modesty in predicting the future. Up until the very eve of the events, no one anticipated the NEP (New Economic Policy), or the emergence of Stalin, or the annihilation of Trotsky and Bukharin, or the appropriation and absurd exaggeration of Trotsky's domestic proposals, the enforced industrialization and collectivization of agriculture, or Stalin's totalitarianization of culture. Only a handful anticipated the Hitler-Stalin Pact or the resumption of the purges after the Second World War. No one predicted the emergence of Khrushchev after Stalin's death, the thaw, Khrushchev's epoch-making speech at the 20th Party Congress, nor his precipitous debacle. Even those who, in the immediate post-Stalin period, predicted that the new leadership would by no means be inclined to abandon some of the essential elements of Stalin's foreign policy, whatever the significant domestic changes, were clearly jolted by the emergence of the Sino-Soviet rift.

Indeed, the tremendous importance of the conflict between the two Communist powers was not appreciated even after it burst upon the world. As knowledgeable an observer as Richard Lowenthal opposed the American involvement in the defense of Vietnam against Communist aggression on the ground, among others, that it would throw the Kremlin and Peking into one another's arms. At the present time it seems as if it is more likely, now that Communist China has complained that the Soviet Union is rearming its Chinese borders, to provoke hostilities between them.

There are too many variables to predict with confidence the evolution of the Soviet Union. There are many who will hail the 50th Anniversary of October as testifying to "a basic virtue" of persistence or staying power in an unstable world although they would not be caught dead referring to the "basic virtue" of Franco's regime in Spain which has endured more than half as long and by this criterion should be considered at least half as virtuous. In social life as in personal life, however, it is not existence or duration itself which is the source of value but the quality of that existence or duration. Normally, the fact that a tyranny has long endured is hardly a recommendation for it but rather a stronger ground for criticism.

We need not gainsay the remarkable achievements of the Soviet Union during the fifty years of its existence—most notably, its emergence as an industrial power second only to the United States. The only relevant questions are whether the agonizing costs, the millions of lives crippled and destroyed, the misery and suffering, were worth it, whether the same results could not have been achieved by other means, and if not, whether the lesser achievements would not have been preferable. There is good reason to believe that without Bolshevism and the internationl revolutionary strategy of the Communist International, the world would have escaped Fascism.

As far as the future is concerned, the only reliable probabilities are that the industrialization of the Soviet Union will continue apace. This makes it extremely foolish to continue the kitchen debate initiated by former Vice-President Richard Nixon and Khrushchev, and which identifies superior productivity as the great virtue of free society over Communist totalitarian society. To be sure, Soviet agriculture has proved a dismal failure even compared with the per capita productivity of Tsarist Russia. And as far as the amenities of material culture go, it lags far behind even the less industrialized countries of Western Europe. But the impact of technology on Soviet development, even admitting that it has adopted the industrial methods, processes and inventions of the free societies it would destroy, does not foreclose the possibility of its equaling and surpassing Western productivity in one, several or even most sectors of the economy. After all, Soviet society is still basically a command or war economy—goods and resources as well as labor (which, despite Communist ideology, is primarily a material resource) can be mobilized at any time. An economy that can beat the West in the race for the control of stellar space can win industrial races on earth as well.

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Much more questionable is the assumption that with the increasing industrialization of the Soviet Union there will necessarily take place an increasing *political* liberalization and a relaxation of cultural controls in philosophy, art, literature and the social sciences. Here a kind of crypto-orthodox Marxism is observable in the thinking of those who base their expectations for liberalization on the reasonable anticipation that modern technology will transform the current Soviet economy of scarcity into one of abundance. These expectations *may* be realized, but whether they are or not is hardly a function of technology and increasing productivity alone. The very progress of electronic technology shows that it is quite feasible to introduce, even where poverty and hunger have been eliminated, a control of the human mind every whit as thoroughgoing as, and in some ways even more subtle than, the system described in Orwell's *1984*. After all, the German industrial economy resembled the British economy in the 1930's, yet vastly different political and cultural superstructures prevailed in the two countries. A given economy or technology may exclude some political and cultural institutions, but it is compatible with several widely different ones.

If we examine the degree of political and cultural freedom which exists in the Soviet Union today, we will discover that although it is greater than that which existed under Stalin, it is still less than what existed *before* Stalin consolidated his power. There is nothing in the economic system of communism which requires the condemnation of abstract art or music, or party and police control of scientific theory and experiment. Indeed, one could make a good case in the interest of a Communist economic system for the complete emancipation of at least the physical sciences from the leading strings of dialectical materialism, however that mythology is currently construed. It is the political structure of Soviet society which permits the strangulation of the arts depending upon the tastes and prejudices of the top echelons. It was Stalin's ear, not Soviet economics or philosophy, which was the secret of the decrees against formalism in music. Had the Soviet Union been ruled by a sophisticated intelligence like Trotsky's, its cultural life would undoubtedly have been freer without the internal political terror necessarily being less.

In the interests of greater efficiency, it is highly probable that Professor Liberman's proposals to use the profit motive, decentralization, and the limited influence of a free market will be adopted in the future planning of Soviet industry. But this no more entails a radical change to "an economy of capitalism without capitalists" than the widespread and inefficient use of Stakhanovism in an earlier period. So long as the workers are not free to bargain through organizations independent of the state over what proportion of the "surplus value" produced is to go to them in the form of wages or bonuses, so long as the industries are not given sufficient autonomy to make the basic decisions depend upon the consumer's wishes but receive their directives from a central planning source, the economy of the Soviet Union remains essentially unaltered. The masses of the workers and peasants cannot make their will felt unless their trade unions and the Communist Party itself become independent of the state. *This* would be a highly significant change. There is no evidence, however, that this is happening or likely to happen in the near future. This evolution is not excluded if the world remains at peace, but the probability of its realization is not a function merely of technology: the force of example of the free cultures of the West may be just as great.

Even the reintroduction of "party democracy" as it existed under Lenin, imperfect as it was, and a remarkable step forward as compared to the present, would hardly be tantamount to the liberalization envisaged by the prophets of the convergence theory, who see in recent tendencies in the economies of capitalism and of communism a mutual approximation to a bureaucratized industrial system. For until the state abandons its monopoly over all the means and media of communication, and until we see the emergence of an independent judiciary, the apparatus of terror will be capable of functioning with the same freedom from humane controls and judicial restraint as it has in the past—and indeed, in many respects, still does to this day.

There are those skeptics who argue that what the state can give the state can take away, that when Khrushchev or his successors *order* intellectuals to be more critical about this and that, it is not much different from commanding them to be silent. I believe that such skepticism goes too far. What the state gives it *cannot* always take away—if the giving has resulted in the emergence of centers of political or industrial power independent of itself. Thus far the concessions to the population at large and to the Soviet intelligentsia in particular have resulted in a less unhealthy psychological climate, in a greater measure of tolerated diversity and cautious criticism in cultural fields. This is by no means to be depreciated, but as the fate of Brodski, Daniel and Siniavski and others has shown, it is far from enough.

Only if the Soviet armed forces were to be genuinely depoliticalized would there take place what has often been predicted, especially during the Second

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World War—the emergence of an independent political force in the Soviet Union. The same would be true if the trade unions were cut free from the state and became the partisans of the workers' interests rather than the watchdogs of planned productivity.

The view that the "concessions" made by the ruling dictatorship cannot be cumulative is sometimes a corollary of the notion that a totalitarian regime is all of a piece, and that if it is transformed it can only be destroyed from without by defeat in war, not by gradual evolution from within. Those who conceive of totalitarianism as an ideal type, in the fashion of Hannah Arendt, are chary of indicating the empirical characteristics whose variation may gradually lead to a change of political type. Nonetheless there is a converse error which assumes all features of a totalitarian society to be of equal weight, which regards a change towards population control or in policies towards minorities just as significant as, say, the abolition of the secret police. Not all of the changing factors in a totalitarian society are of equal weight, and some may presage a greater intensification of its control rather than a lessening of it. It is perfectly true that the Soviet Union today is far less totalitarian than it was under Stalin. But the institutional conditions which made the emergence of Stalin and Stalinism possible still exist and do not foreclose the possibility of its reemergence—although the present likelihood is low. The more Communist China shows a Stalinist face to the world and to the Kremlin, the less likely is a renaissance of Stalinism in the Soviet Union.

In order better to appraise the direction of social change in a totalitarian society one must ask: what conditions would have to be fulfilled in order for the society to lose its predominantly totalitarian character?

There are several conditions, but the most significant of them all is the recognition of a legal opposition not only *within* the Communist Party but *to* the Communist Party, with access to the mass organs of public communication—press and radio—and protected in its exercise of the rights of criticism by an independent judiciary. This is the touchstone. It is one thing, however, to be aware of what would constitute a move in this direction, quite another to determine whether or not the move has been undertaken, and still another to estimate the probabilities that a move undertaken in this direction will be followed either by similar steps or by a frightened reaction.

It is easier to predict some specific political or military action or inaction on the part of the Soviet Union in a particular historical situation than an institutional change towards or away from the ideal of ultimate totalitarian evanescence. Thus, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, one could—and some of us did—predict that the Soviet Union would back down, and that even in the event the US Navy intercepted the Soviet ships transporting missiles to Cuba, such an act would not be regarded as a *casus belli.* If the Soviet Union was not prepared to risk war and destruction to establish its hegemony in Europe, why should it do so for Cuba—or even for the Viet Cong? At the present time, two factors mitigate against any Soviet initiatives that might lead to an all-out conflict: first, the military power of the West, which means essentially the United States; and second, the growing prosperity of the USSR. Clearly, the more the Soviet Union has to lose, the greater will be its concern to avoid losing everything.

There is one thing about which we can be reasonably confident. The ideology of the Soviet Union, in the precise sense that Marx gave to the term "ideology," will remain Marxist in somewhat the same way as the ideology of Western nations will remain "democratic" or "Christian." Marxism—like democracy and Christianity—embraces a whole spectrum or family of doctrines. Changes in the content and emphasis of Soviet Marxism should be studied carefully as presaging —*not* causing—changes in the spirit and structure of Soviet society. The economy of the Soviet Union will remain essentially collectivist notwithstanding any modifications in the detail of its operation. On the basis of its centrally controlled and planned economy, a number of political variations are possible, ranging from the present dictatorship of the Communist Party to rule by several Communist parties, a politically democratic system, or, in the event of war with China or the West, a reversion to Stalinism. The longer the peace lasts, and the brighter the prospects of multilateral disarmament and effective international controls, the more likely it is that the democratic variation will develop within the Soviet Union.

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The "Durability" of October

By Boris Souvarine

The *coup d'état* that has gone down in history as the "October Revolution" is approaching its 50th anniversary, and it requires no great foresight to predict that all of the resources of Communist propaganda will soon be put to work lionizing the occasion. Among other familiar themes, the claim that the "durability" of the Soviet regime is the best proof of its excellence will surely be emphasized. It is astonishing that this sophism has generally escaped challenge from Western intellectuals opposed to communism. The Soviet regime has indeed endured, but only by renouncing its initial program, its founding principles, and its very *raison d'être*. What has endured is not the regime put together in October 1917 in the name of the proletariat, but rather the party that seized power by force and succeeded in keeping it by changing into an omnipotent oligarchy alien to the proletariat.

Prior to the Bolshevik takeover, Lenin promised to establish a new kind of State based on the example of the Paris Commune of 1871; he talked of a federalist system of autonomous communes, to be administered by representatives freely elected by universal secret ballot, without class distinction. He promised that such elected officials could be removed from office at any time and would be held to salaries equal to the "average wage of a good worker." He pointed to the soviets as the nucleus of his envisioned system: "To the extent that the soviets exist, . . . a State of the type of the Commune of Paris exists in Russia." He advocated "the replacement of the permanent army by arming the public," and "the replacement of the police by the people's militia [in which] all citizens, both men and women, between the ages of 15 and 65 will enlist." He wrote *The State and Revolution* to systematize these propositions in support of his principal theory, which maintained that "the proletarian State begins to wither immediately after its triumph, for in a classless society the State is unnecessary and impossible."

In the months preceding the October *coup*, the Bolsheviks demanded that the provisional Socialist-Liberal government hold an immediate election for the proposed Constituent Assembly, appealing for popular support with the promise that "the Congress of Soviets will ensure the convening of the Constituent Assembly." They also proclaimed that Soviet power "will guarantee all nations in Russia the genuine right of self-determination," which Lenin explicitly defined as "the immediate, full restitution of freedom to Finland, the Ukraine, White Russia, the Moslems, etc., . . . including even the freedom to secede." In agrarian matters, Lenin called for nationalization of the land, "the local conditions of possession and enjoyment" to be fixed by the local soviets pending a permanent solution by the Constituent Assembly. He promised to respect "the decision of the masses, even if it does not agree with our opinions. . . even if the peasants still follow the Revolutionary Socialists, even if they give that party the majority of the Constituent Assembly. . ."

Among other explicit promises and predictions, Lenin wrote: "The peaceful development of the revolution would be possible and probable if all the power were turned over to the soviets. Within the

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soviets, the struggle of the parties for power can develop peacefully, provided the soviets are fully democratic." He announced practical measures for achieving "genuine freedom of the press for all. . ." He demanded abolition of the death penalty. One could go on and on quoting from Lenin—or from other Bolsheviks such as Trotsky, who said "the country can be saved only by a Constituent Assembly"—or from party texts and resolutions that, before October, opened up glorious prospects of a truly free, democratic, and equalitarian society.

On all points, without exception, the Soviet regime has gone back on its promises, has carried out the absolute antithesis of its original program. Indeed, between the *coup d'état* and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly less than three months later, the Bolshevik Party had already put into practice the reverse of its declared principles. Thus one cannot argue the duration, much less the "durability," of the "political system" that was forecast to justify the party and the system that emerged, or to infer that the latter exemplify and indicate the "direction of history."

What has endured is not the Republic of the Soviets proclaimed in October, but a Soviet State without real soviets; the term, emptied of its original content, is just another word, and the soviets are only dummies that mask the actual power of the parvenus of the Revolution. What has endured is the use of force, at times to the extreme of terrible violence, to keep in power a minority determined to perpetuate its domination. The only thing original in this is the oppression of the working people by a new privileged class and the exploitation of man by man in the name of socialism and communism.

The outcome of the Revolution has, in return, fully justified the views of those critics who refused to acknowledge that the Bolsheviks had any chance of establishing an authentic socialist system under the Russian conditions of the time—that is to say, any chance of enduring while remaining true to their proclaimed principles. Credit must be given here to the few close associates of Lenin who had the farsightedness to reject the "preservation of a purely Bolshevik government by methods of political terror," who foresaw that this would lead "to the establishment of an irresponsible regime and the loss of the Revolution," and who accused the party leaders of endeavoring to impose their rule "without counting the workers and soldiers who are victims." A coalition of various Socialist parties—as desired at the time by Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Riazanov, Shliapnikov, and others—would have pacified the Revolution, prevented the new power from plunging into mad utopias, and spared Russia many of the misfortunes that were to ensue. Those who did not believe in the endurance of a strictly Bolshevik regime were not at all mistaken; they simply did not attribute to their political adversaries the intention to retain power by resorting to endless and limitless terror in defiance of Bolshevik ideals.

Lenin himself long doubted the durability of his "experiment." Obsessed with the memory of the Paris Commune—about which he had formed a singularly false idea—he began his report to the Third Congress of Soviets in January 1918 by noting, with as much astonishment as satisfaction, that the Bolsheviks had been in power two months and 15 days—"five days more than the power . . . of the Paris workers had lasted." Later he often expressed himself in the same tenor. Hélène Stassova, former Secretary of the Party who had become its historian, reported that in 1919 "it was quite possible the party might be forced to go underground again," and that in preparation for this eventuality forged passports had to be made for Lenin & Co., counterfeit money had to be printed bearing the likeness of Catherine II, and so on. Bruce Lockhart, former Consul of Great Britain at Moscow, has attested that at the time of the Allies' ridiculous landing of 1200 men at Archangel, the Bolsheviks "lost their heads and, in their desperation, began to pack up their records;" he quoted an official (Karakhan) who believed the Bolsheviks' cause was lost even though they would never surrender. Several other times during the Civil War, the Communists thought that they were on the verge of ruin, an indication of how precariously the regime hung on by a thread.

In sum, Communist claims of the durability of the Soviet regime can properly be evaluated only in the light of the particular circumstances, the causes and effects, that enabled the Communists to stay in power contrary to all "reasonable" reason, and contrary in particular to "Marxist" reason. All that was proven was that political economy and social ethics give way to conquering force.

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HISTORY IN PERSPECTIVE

What Happened to Stalin?

By Thomas B. Larson

When Josef Vissarionovich Stalin died 14 years ago, few observers outside the Soviet Union thought that his successors would ever try to squeeze his memory into a small footnote to Soviet history. His stature was too big, his deeds too well known, his place in history seemingly assured by the scope and durability of his personal power. Yet, after more than two decades of the most frenzied kind of Stalin worship, the Soviet people were confronted after 1953 with the results of an official reexamination of the past calculated to deflate their revered leader's image. As the picture gradually took shape through the process which has come to be known as "destalinization," [1] Stalin emerged as something of a distant figure, responsible for some good, but for the most part guilty of serious errors and crimes against humanity.

The destalinization process, however, has followed no consistent pattern, and at times no one could be sure what the end result would be. It has been a tumultuous 14 years for both Stalin's cadaver and his ghost. Today there is a vacancy in the mausoleum, and although his ghost still walks the land, it does so with unsteady steps.

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If Stalin could rule as he pleased, calling down a helpless Lenin's blessing, why could not Stalin's heirs do what they liked and call it "Stalinism"? We have only partial answers to this crucial question. In many ways, of course, Stalin's style of rule was not transferable, and no doubt his successors felt the need to establish an identity of their own. None of them, however, sought to repudiate the greater part of the policies Stalin had followed, particularly those which had survived a severe testing in war and had produced a nation of imposing industrial and military strength. Stalin's Russia had developed from a European to a world power, flanked by Communist-led states from Central Europe to the Pacific.

Under these circumstances, the party conceivably could have preserved the Stalin myth and a sense of continuity with the Stalin era, while introducing more or less radical policy and institutional changes. Ideol-

[1] In this discussion, the term "destalinization" is used freely, even in contexts referring to statements of those Soviet authorities who would never employ the word. The pejorative phrase "cult of personality" dates back to Marx and appeared in early Soviet discussions. *Pravda*, on April 28, 1918, published an article by Bela Kun defending the erection of a statue to Karl Marx in Penza. Kun argued that even if such memorials were erected everywhere to Marx, this would not be "a cult of personality" but only a display of honor by the Russian proletariat for its own revolution.

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ogists are adept at the art of justifying change while honoring tradition: hadn't Stalin himself called repeatedly for "creative Marxism" rather than a "Talmudic" search for old formulas and quotations? This alternative, however, was probably never seriously considered, for destalinization quickly became the order of the day. The country was ready for a change, both of a restorative and of an innovative nature, for Stalin's repressions had left a pervasive sense of malaise within the party, the military, and the intelligentsia. Although dissent "lay trampled out of sight," uneasiness and resentment lingered on below the surface of popular expression. More important, contrasts had developed between an increasingly educated population and the Stalinist political system with its primitive tactics of indoctrination and its whimsical and arbitrary modes of decision-making and personnel management. Destalinization responded in some degree to both these needs for change.

The Early Stage

It is sometimes forgotten how early the destalinization process began. In fact, no sooner was the funeral over than the Soviet press began to be denuded of the usual references and panegyrics to the leader. Within a few months even the Soviet Constitution ceased to be called the Stalin Constitution, and the late dictator began to lose his position as Lenin's equal in the ideological catechism. In the lengthy July 1953 document setting forth the party guidelines for celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Second (founding) Congress of the Bolshevik Party, Stalin was given a mere six mentions, which were almost lost among the many citations of Lenin.[2] Significantly, the document retraced party history in a spirit quite different from that of the *History of the CPSU—Short Course,* authorship of which had been attributed to Stalin after its publication in 1938.

A very discreet disparagement of Stalin also began shortly after his death. For example, there were hints in April and May 1953 that Stalin's last publication, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,* had to be used with caution.[3] The work had appeared in October 1952 on the eve of the 19th Party Congress, which resolved to use the pamphlet as the basis for the new party program. Soon after Stalin's death, however, this idea was dropped, as Soviet propaganda began to stress the need for collective leadership and to attack the evils of the "cult of personality."[4] Although some of this propaganda, especially that concerning collective leadership, was probably aimed at the new leaders, much of it suggested that something had been wrong with the Stalin regime. The themes became a bit more pointed after the Central Committee met for a lengthy session in late June to discuss not only the Beria case but the broader question of violations of legality that had accompanied the personality cult.

However, none of these sly hints and broad innuendoes hit Stalin directly. Whenever Stalin was mentioned in the 1953-55 period, it was always in a favorable context. Tributes were usually paid him on his birthday and the anniversary of his death, though certainly with declining enthusiasm. His works continued to be cited in indoctrination manuals, and his doctrines frequently quoted, but his name was gradually disappearing from the daily propaganda carried in newspapers, journals and radio broadcasts. The country was told that the next volume of Stalin's *Collected Works*—13 volumes of which had appeared before his death—would soon be published. It never appeared.[5] Originally scheduled to cover the purge years of the 1930's, the book loomed as too embarrassing a document at a time when many purge victims were returning from the forced-labor camps and when many of these camps were actually being closed.

The progressive dwarfing of Stalin entered a new phase at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, even in the "open" sessions. Stalin was no longer cited as guide and authority, and all of the subsequent party congresses, including the 23rd in 1966, have followed the pattern of the 20th in this respect. Although First Secretary N. S. Khrushchev paid modest tribute to the departed leader, he did so only in the context of praise for other Communist leaders who had also died since the 19th Congress. In the Central Committee report, Khrushchev sharply criticized the cult of personality and cited a number of arbitrary and illegal acts connected with it. He also managed to disparage the party's basic manual of indoctrination, the *Short Course,* without explicitly attacking book or author. "Cult of personality" was on everyone's lips

[2] *Pravda* and *Izvestia,* July 26, 1953.

[3] The work was omitted in April from lists of approved materials for political study, and in May some propagandists were criticized for pushing ahead too fast with the idea expressed by Stalin in *Economic Problems* of substituting product-exchange for commercial transactions.

[4] On April 16 *Pravda* published an article by L. Slepov on collective leadership and followed this up with an editorial on July 13, after Beria's "unmasking." Both articles quoted Stalin.

[5] The English translation of the final volume appeared in 1955.

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at the Congress, but no one dared to say whose cult it was, choosing rather to circle around the corpse. When he disparaged Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Anastas Mikoyan became the first high official since Stalin's death to mention him by name in a negative context. But even this did nothing to alter the tone of the Congress, which sought merely to contract Stalin's influence and to criticize his performance as a leader of party and country only in very general terms.

The First Lament

Dear, beloved, eternally entered in the history of the present and future generations, he lies in the immobility of the rest which he had known so seldom—he, the never wearying toiler and guardian of all of us, of all mankind. . . .

The sorrowful melody of the orchestra resounds, files of people in two endless streams pass by—men, women, old people, youths, mothers raising their children in their hands. And the eyes of all, eyes which are full of tears of insurmountable sorrow and pain, are turned to him, to the wise and solicitous father of the people, who for almost six decades of his life bestowed on his own people and mankind the infinite generosity of his enlightening genius. . . .

At the head of the party and state stand faithful comrades-in-arms and disciples of Comrade Stalin, who will consistently pursue the policy of the Soviet state and the program for the construction of communism worked out by the party.

Our own leader has placed in their faithful hands, steeled in heroic works, the battle standard of the bright ideas of Lenin and Stalin. He has handed over to their courageous hearts the precious sense of responsibility for the fate of the people, for the great cause of realizing communism. The Soviet people pass and pass and look into the eyes of the comrades-in-arms of the brilliant Stalin, and they see in these eyes firm and clear confidence: everything of the construction projects which the wise architect left in scaffolding will be built; everything which the great architect designated to be erected will be erected and multiplied. . . .

—Remarks by Alexei Surkov at the bier of J. V. Stalin, from Pravda, March 7, 1953.

The Controversy Begins

The gradual destalinization of 1953-56 focused on the deflation of Stalin as a symbol. It involved, first, the removal of Stalin's name from national political "institutions" such as the party, the Constitution, and the ideology, and ultimately from even the most insignificant organizations and localities of the USSR, followed by the discrediting, minimization, or 'forgetting" of Stalin's writings and doctrines. Khrushchev's blast at Stalin's rule in the closed session of the Congress on February 25, 1956, dramatically changed all the ground rules. Although the speech was not published then or later in the Soviet Union, its contents became known after the Congress, particularly after a version was published in the United States,[6] and caused intense repercussions both inside and outside the USSR. The resulting agitation was held down within the Soviet Union, but a similar containment proved difficult in Poland and impossible in Hungary. These unfavorable domestic and foreign repercussions in turn weakened Khrushchev's position and contributed to the leadership crisis of 1957 which almost unseated him.

It turned out to be even more risky to assail Stalin by directly associating him with activities not previously attributed to him, notably the dramatic purges of hundreds of Soviet leaders in the late 1930's and after the war. Since Stalin's name had not previously been linked to these acts, it was necessary to make public hitherto secret archives and accounts of the Soviet leader's machinations. While this effectively blackened Stalin, it revealed practices of such a vivid and gruesome character that not even the most loyal party member could remain indifferent. Vague allusions to arbitrary and unjust acts under the "cult of personality" were one thing; attacks on Stalin as a psychopathic despot who wreaked vengeance on his comrades at specified times and places were quite another.

It is worth noting that such attacks on Stalin, not only in 1956 but in later years, especially in 1961,

[6] The US Department of State published a version of the speech on June 4, 1956. The stenographic report of the Congress, appearing later in the year, acknowledged that Khrushchev had given a report on February 25 concerning "the cult of personality and its consequences." It quoted a one-paragraph Congress decision approving the conclusions of the speech and calling on the Central Committee to liquidate the cult and guard the principle of collective leadership.

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were ordinarily voiced only by very high officials, a limitation which testified to the sensitivity of the material as well as to the fact that archives containing relevant data were closed to most researchers. Those who did use them often left out the most compromising facts and crude details in their bland histories and monographs.

The serious repercussions of Khrushchev's "secret" speech forced a halt to the sharp personal attacks on Stalin. The official line on "destalinization," established by the June 30, 1956, statement issued in the name of the Central Committee and published two days later,[7] was obviously drafted on orders from the highest party echelons inasmuch as the Central Committee did not meet in June. On the public level, the statement represented a further step toward Stalin's denigration, because it put the party on record against "cult" practices associated with him. However, it balanced admission of Stalin's grave faults with tributes to his services before 1934 and explained away the acts of terror as accidental phenomena due to a peculiar combination of situation and personality which, it was said, would never recur. To this day the June 30 statement remains the only authoritative party document devoted to destalinization, and in 1965 Soviet historians still referred to the resolution as "controlling."

Hewing to this line, a *Kommunist* editorial in September 1956 characterized Stalin as a Marxist and spoke approvingly of his pre-1934 writings.[8] Later, in the tense period following the Soviet intervention in Hungary, Khrushchev twice came publicly to Stalin's defense. In a speech on December 31, 1956, not published in the Soviet press, Khrushchev asserted that "in the fight against imperialism we can say that we are all Stalinists."[9] On January 19, 1957, *Pravda* also quoted Khrushchev as saying at a Chinese Embassy reception that "Stalinism, like Stalin himself, is inseparable from communism. May God allow, as they say, that every Communist fight as Stalin fought."

Such endorsements of the dictator did not, of course, mean a reversal of the movement to deemphasize Stalin. Although the *Kommunist* endorsement singled out four works of the 1924-28 period which had not been criticized, these works later ceased to be used. Khrushchev's remarks, for that matter, were consistent with the attitude he expressed in other speeches, although the absence of any hostile remarks on Stalin indicated that he was having to tread water. On subsequent occasions Khrushchev was forced to return to the defense of Stalin when confronted with pressure to push destalinization beyond the limits he and other party leaders desired. Even those leaders most committed to the debunking of Stalin never conceived of this process as an attack on the fundamental right of a single, omnipotent party to rule the country and the lives of its inhabitants.

Correcting the Ideological Manuals

The period following the leadership crisis of June 1957, when Khrushchev succeeded in ousting the Stalinist old guard, saw an intensive rewriting of history texts and other ideological handbooks. The *Short Course* was now completely discarded in favor of a new one-volume party history which appeared in 1959.[10] With each successive edition Stalin and his contributions shrank in importance. Similar changes occurred in the basic texts of general Russian and Soviet history and in various specialized handbooks and encyclopedias. Another essential volume in all indoctrination courses, the authoritative biography of Lenin, was drastically rewritten to alter the image of Stalin as one of the dual leaders of the revolution. Since biographies in the USSR are generally published only about positive characters, Stalin's biography went into discard.

In the 1957-64 period, intellectuals and ideologists writing in their specialized subject-areas were forced to reconsider the lines followed in the Stalinist past. In the field of Russian history, for example, demands for eliminating the effects of the personality cult required redefining attitudes toward the Tsarist past, the role of various Tsars, military and civilian leaders, and toward relations between the Russian revolutionary movement and European democratic and socialist movements.[11] It was easy enough to scratch out the name of Stalin as the source of truth and substitute another authority. It was more difficult, however, to decide whether a given doctrine stemming from Stalin should be criticized and abandoned as an emanation of the Stalinist cult, or should be restated as a settled truth without attribution.

[7] This document, along with Khrushchev's "secret" speech, is reprinted in *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1956.

[8] *Kommunist*, No. 14, September 1956, pp. 3-13.

[9] *The New York Times*, Jan. 1, 1957.

[10] *History of the CPSU*, Moscow, Institute of Marxism-Leninism, 1960 (1959 Russian edition) and 1962.

[11] Many of these issues were discussed at the important 1962 conference of historians, reported in: *Vsesoiuznoe soveshchanie o merakh uluchsheniia podgotovki nauchno-pedagogicheskikh kadrov po istoricheskim naukam, 18-21 dekabria 1962 g.*, Moscow, 1964.

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The guidelines of 1956 on the importance of 1934 as the dividing line between Stalin's good and bad behavior began to wear away in the years after 1957. Stalin received less and less credit for his activities in support of Lenin during the latter's lifetime, and instances of their divergence were highlighted. His role in crushing the opposition within the party in the 1920's and in promoting industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture was similarly minimized.

This effort to reduce the impact of the Stalin image had its perils for the ideologists. For publishing negative remarks on Stalin's role in Russia before Lenin's return in April 1917 (which were said to cast doubt on the infallibility of the party), the historian F. N. Burdzhalov was removed in 1957 from an editorial post on the journal *Problems of History*. Eventually, however, much of what Burdzhalov wrote was incorporated into accepted treatments.[12] Ideologists were also frequently criticized for doing too little rather than too much in shortening Stalin's shadow over the heroic past.[13]

While this steady squeeze was taking place, violent attacks such as that made by Khrushchev at the closed session of the 20th Congress diminished. It is true that the attacks on members of the so-called "anti-party group" in 1957 and succeeding years tended to damn Stalin, but this aspect of the destalinization program received no strong push until 1961, when the 22nd Party Congress met. Without any warning, the Congress launched a new series of strong assaults on Stalin as party-government leader, linking his crimes with those of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich. This time charges similar to those made by Khrushchev in 1956 were put on public record, and the opprobrium was shared by Presidium members along with some lesser-ranking officials.[14] The Congress chose to add a dramatic climax to the proceedings by removing Stalin's remains from the mausoleum he shared with Lenin to a less prestigious though still honorable spot in the Kremlin wall. No one, however, failed to read the significance of the second burial. At last the ghost was laid, or so it seemed.

After the Congress, the process of eliminating reminders of Stalin rose to a new pitch. Within a short time all remaining organizations and localities still bearing his name were rebaptized, including—after some hesitation—the famous battle-city now known as Volgograd, which as Stalingrad had stood as a lonely but magnificent memorial to the dead dictator. At the 22nd Congress there were still dozens of delegates who represented collective farms and localities named after Stalin. Such places were soon renamed, so that at the 23rd Congress in 1966 none of the delegates bore such reminders.

Partial Resurrection

During his last 18 months in office, Khrushchev returned once again to the defense of Stalin against those who sought to push destalinization too far. The chief offenders this time were writers, artists and intellectuals who sought to use criticism of Stalin as a means to free intellectual life from the heavy hand of party control. Some wanted a more "realistic" kind of Socialist Realism; some wanted a more "scientific" kind of social science; and a great many simply wanted more intellectual freedom. But even though the limits of the permissible in both the creative arts and social sciences had been considerably enlarged after 1956, the party leadership never contemplated any pervasive *laissez faire* in intellectual life.

In 1962, for example, Khrushchev had given the go-ahead signal for publication of works treating previously untouchable subjects, including Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, the first Soviet story of life in a forced labor camp. The subject and treatment, however, did not appeal to party ideologists, who wanted optimism and uplift, not gloom and doom. (Although Khrushchev continued to defend the Solzhenitsyn work, it received a basically negative appraisal by *Pravda* in 1964 when proposed for a Lenin Prize in literature, and after Khrushchev's ouster it was criticized even more severely.[15]) Tendencies among artists and writers toward more realistic or non-conformist works alarmed party leaders and led to a series of bitter confrontations. One such occurred in March 1963, when Khrushchev objected to pessimistic portrayals of Soviet life and argued that the Stalin period was not a period of stagnation. He praised Stalin for his struggle against

[12] Martin Dewhirst, "L'Historiographie Soviétique récente de l'histoire de la Révolution," *Cahiers du monde Russe et Soviétique*, Vol. V (No. 4, 1964), pp. 549-566. The 1957 decision on *Voprosy istorii* is reflected in a *Kommunist* editorial, No. 4, March 1957, pp. 17-29.

[13] See the Central Committee decision of 1962, (*Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 22, 1962) which criticized *Voprosy istorii KPSS*.

[14] *XXII Sezd KPSS, Stenograficheskii otchet*, 3 vols., Moscow, 1962. A recent booklet on the 22nd Congress does not mention the attacks on Stalin. A. I. Yermolaev, *KPSS v period razvernutovo stroitelstva kommunizma* (*XXII Sezd KPSS*), Moscow, 1965.

[15] *Pravda*, April 11, 1964. More recently *Pravda* of March 6, 1965, reported similar attacks made by Yegorychev at the RSFSR Writers' Congress.

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Trotsky and other oppositionists of the 1920's and for his leading role in the industrialization and collectivization drives. Shifting his emphasis, he reminded the party that Lenin, despite his misgivings about Stalin's character, considered him a Marxist and an eminent party figure. "We believe even today," Khrushchev explained, "that Stalin was devoted to communism; he was a Marxist." [16]

The unusual recurrence of the "good Stalin" line should not obscure the fact that there was an equally consistent and far more evident tendency throughout this period to minimize and criticize Stalin's role in history. This process, as we shall see, continued without significant change after Khrushchev was ousted. Violent attacks on Stalin the tyrant, however, have not survived Khrushchev's fall. These made it more difficult to brandish the respectable Stalin against liberals and non-conformists at home. At the same time, they played into the hands of the "dogmatic" Chinese, who could take up the cudgels for Stalin in the continuing Sino-Soviet polemic.[17]

The New Regime and Destalinization

Although destalinization was an important factor in the leadership crisis of 1957, it does not appear to have been significant in Khrushchev's ouster in Oc-

[16] Khrushchev's speech of March 8, in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, March 10-11, 1963.

[17] In articles of Sept. 6 and 13, 1963, of the *People's Daily-Red Flag* series, the Chinese claimed that they had protested in 1956 against the Soviet manner of criticizing Stalin. Although these articles defended Stalin, the appreciation was not fulsome in the pre-1953 style.

The Change in Stalin's Role

By his active participation in the struggle for the Leninist general line of the party and for building socialism, Stalin won authority in the party, among the people, and among the working people the world over. However, as time passed, Stalin's authority as a leader of the party and government began gradually, and at first unnoticeably, to develop into a cult of an individual, a cult supported and nurtured by Stalin himself.

The negative traits of Stalin's character as a man and as a leader—coarseness, lack of flexibility and of proper attention to colleagues, and lack of personal modesty—contributed to this. Up to a certain period these negative traits . . . did not have a noticeable influence on the work of the party. . . . In the 1930's however, these shortcomings . . . became vices that left a negative imprint on Stalin's work and led him to serious mistakes. . . .

In the last period of Stalin's life and work, the cult of his person assumed monstrous forms and caused great harm to the cause of communism. Stalin considerably overestimated his own role in the building of socialism; he actually departed from the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the role of the people, the party, and the individual in the struggle for socialism; he elevated himself above the party and the people; he ceased to consider the opinion of the Central Committee; he made one-man decisions on many questions that were often erroneous. . . .

Occupying high posts in the party and government, Stalin did not take all the measures necessary to strengthen still further the military might and defense capacity of the socialist state at a time when war was raging in Europe and when it was clear that Hitlerite Germany would carry out a military attack on the USSR.

In the postwar years, when the principle of collective leadership had already been violated, Stalin, who did not know much about the state of affairs in the countryside, carried out on his own initiative certain economically unsound measures [that] . . . greatly retarded the development of the productive forces in agriculture. . . .

There were also other shortcomings and defects in Stalin's activity In the latter period of his life they were of such a nature that Stalin's role as an outstanding individual in the historical process underwent a substantial change. From an individual assisting the progress of our society he became an individual who began to have a retarding influence on many sectors of Communist construction. . . .

—From Kommunist, April 5, 1956.

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tober 1964. There was probably some dissatisfaction with the violence and personal quality of Khrushchev's "subjective" attacks on Stalin's rule, but no hint of this was reflected in the months that followed. By repeatedly praising the decisions of the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses, the new leaders have implicitly endorsed the campaign against the cult of personality.[18] Yet they have avoided, and probably rejected, dramatic assaults on Stalin of the kind occasionally indulged in by Khrushchev, preferring to give a little more credit to Stalin for services rendered.

At the 23rd Party Congress in March-April 1966, Stalin was not mentioned at all. A few discreet references to the cult of personality (obviously Stalin's from the context) echoed only faintly the numerous and sharp attacks at the preceding congresses. The silence on Stalin sounded rather loud, especially since there were events in the pre-Congress skirmishing which suggested that the time might be ripe for another invocation of Stalin's name against dissident writers. For example, on January 30, 1966, *Pravda* published an article by three prominent historians urging abandonment of the "un-Marxist phrase, *the period* of the cult of personality," on the grounds that it exaggerated Stalin's role and minimized the positive achievements which occurred in Stalin's years. More important, the trial and conviction of Soviet writers Daniel and Siniavski in early February showed that the regime was prepared to use stern measures in disciplining dissident writers. In addition, at some of the preceding republican party congresses, party ideologists struck sharply at deviant intellectuals, and nowhere more strongly than in Georgia, where the tone was pro-Stalin and anti-Khrushchev.[19]

Despite these preliminaries, the CPSU Congress in Moscow skirted the Stalin issue and confined itself to relatively mild attacks on non-conformist intellectuals and writers. Perhaps the consensus-minded national leadership drew back from even small gestures to Stalin because of the apprehensions expressed by the more liberal Soviet intellectuals over the trend of events.[20]

Public gestures recognizing Stalin's positive contributions a short time later were likewise characterized by caution. In a speech delivered in Moscow on May 8, 1965, celebrating the anniversary of the end of the war in Europe, First Secretary Brezhnev did refer to Stalin's role as Chairman of the State Defense Committee in World War II. However, it should be remembered that Stalin was listed precisely this way in the various party and Soviet history books published in the last years of Khrushchev's tenure.[21] In still another speech in Georgia on November 1, 1966, Stalin was only casually mentioned among the various Georgian revolutionaries of the early years, surely a modest bow to that Georgian whose fate was so closely linked with the history of the Soviet Union.[22] The fact that the mention of Stalin's name drew applause from Brezhnev's Moscow audience was obscured in the account published by *Pravda*. Reporting another speech by Moscow City Party Secretary N. G. Yegorychev in December 1966,[23] the press also failed to mention the ovation that greeted Stalin's name. Such handling by editors suggests that the party authorities had not yet overcome their acute sensitivity over public reactions to Stalin's memory.

On a less politically-sensitive level, destalinization has continued to trouble a number of historians and other scholars. At an Academy of Sciences meeting in December 1964, Professor V. G. Trukhanovski complained of oversimplification in official accounts of the Stalin era, saying that it was impossible to explain all the difficulties and failures of the period by blaming the Stalin cult.[24] During a

[18] *Partinaia zhizn* (No. 2, 1965) explicitly said that the Central Committee plenum which ousted Khrushchev had not rejected in any way the campaign against the personality cult.

[19] The Georgian Party Secretary for ideology, D. G. Sturua, complained of the "costs" of criticism of the personality cult, of too much attention to the "shady side" of life under Stalin, of portrayals showing Lenin as "tenderhearted and sentimental" rather than "pitiless" toward his "ideological enemies." Sturua claimed that students heard lectures praising collectivization of agriculture and then read in (unspecified) works written by "those from the 'criticizing' and 'denying' camp that collectivization was a grandiose chain of mistakes, violations, crimes, etc." I. A. Abashidze, the Georgian poet who heads the republic's Writers' Union, damned the whole decade of Khrushchev's ascendancy, when there was "a reappraisal of all values," during which "much was written off that we considered the very fundamentals of our work, which, in the course of decades, we had produced, guarded and defended with all our energy, talent and experience." Both speeches were reported in *Zaria vostoka* (Tbilisi), March 10, 1966.

[20] A group of some 25 Soviet scientists, writers and artists signed a statement to the authorities opposing moves to rehabilitate Stalin, claiming that such steps would be disapproved by the people and would lead to a new split in Communist ranks. *The New York Times*, March 21, 1966.

[21] *Istoriia SSSR, Epokha Sotsializma*, Moscow, 1957, 1964; *History of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1960, 1962; *Istoriia velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, 1941-1945 gg.*, Moscow, Vol. 2, 1961; and the one-volume *Istoriia SSSR*, Moscow, 1963.

[22] *Pravda*, Nov. 2, 1966.

[23] *Pravda*, Dec. 7, 1966; *The New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1966. As to Yegorychev's citation of Stalin concerning the battle for Moscow, Marshal G. K. Zhukov has just published an account, somewhat disparaging of Stalin, in a collection entitled *Bitva za Moskvu*, Moscow, 1966. He reported a telephone conversation with Stalin while the battle was raging in November 1941, in which Stalin said that he was "sick at heart" over the situation and had to be reassured by Zhukov that Moscow would be held.

[24] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 6, 1965, pp. 140-151.

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rather cloudy dispute over the reasons for the Stalinist cult of personality at an April 1965 conference of over 600 philosophers, Academician and party Central Committee member, P. N. Fedoseev, argued that the cult arose not only because of the "subjectivism" of the leaders, but also because of the spread of "subjectivist moods" to other circles.[25] When a national conference of historians assembled a month later at Kiev, they agreed that treatment of the Stalin cult should be guided by the Central Committee decision of June 30, 1956, with its "balanced" portrayal of Stalin. At this same conference a Leningrad historian, N. P. Maslov, called for a more objective appraisal of the famous *Short Course*, implying that it had been damned too categorically in the recent past.[26] There are no other signs, however, suggesting that the *Short Course* will be restored to favor.

One of the unsettled issues about Stalin concerns his war record. Khrushchev's deprecatory portrayal of Stalin as an incompetent war leader (in the 1956 secret speech) never received much support in later writings, particularly his description of Stalin as stupefied by the German attack and crudely planning military operations with the use of a small globe. It is significant that the present Soviet leaders have singled out Stalin's war leadership as one of his few praiseworthy virtues.

A more sympathetic attitude toward Stalin characterized the *Short History of the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945*, published in March 1965 as a one-volume condensation of the six-volume history which appeared under Khrushchev. Military historians met in late 1965 to discuss this volume. A principal issue involved the validity of the *Short History*'s conclusion, favorable to Stalin, that the leader had been surprised by the German attack in 1941. The editor, Professor M. M. Minasian, agreed with his critics that Stalin had made crude political miscalculations regarding the threat of war, but he argued that the events of June 22, 1941, had burst upon Stalin, as upon the Army and the people, like "thunder out of a clear sky."[27]

Memoirs of military leaders published since 1964 also tend to give a more balanced picture of Stalin as a military commander. This is notably true of General M. I. Kazakov's *Over the Map of Past Battles*, published in 1965. While ignoring neither the harmful effects of the purges on the military command nor some of Stalin's injustices during the war years, Kazakov portrayed Stalin as sometimes wiser in his military judgment than the professional soldiers. A balanced treatment of Stalin also appeared in the memoirs of Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, Marshal N. N. Voronov, General D. Leliushenko, Marshal Ivan Konev, and Marshal Bagramian, among others. Despite this clear trend, *Pravda*, on January 4, 1967, called for even more objectivity toward Stalin in military memoirs.

[25] *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 10, 1965, pp. 130-164.
[26] *Istoriia SSSR* (journal), No. 6, 1965, pp. 210-214.
[27] *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 2, 1966, pp. 154-156.

Searching for a Formula

The question is often raised now as to why the violations of legality and abuses of power were not disclosed and halted during Stalin's lifetime and whether this could have been done then. Our viewpoint on this question has been fully and quite clearly explained more than once in party documents. Unfortunately, there are still people, including some in the arts, who try to present events in a distorted light. Therefore today we must concern ourselves once again with the Stalin cult.

It is asked, Did the leading cadres of the Party know of, let us say, the arrests of people at the time? Yes, they knew. But did they know that people who were innocent of any wrongdoing were being arrested? No. This they did not know. They believed Stalin and did not admit the thought that repression could be applied against honest people devoted to our cause. . . .

The Party has implacably condemned and condemns the gross violations of Leninist norms of party life, the arbitrariness and abuse of power, committed by Stalin. For all this, however, the party renders Stalin's services to the party and the Communist movement their due. We believe even today that Stalin was devoted to communism; he was a Marxist, and this cannot and must not be denied. His fault was that he committed gross mistakes of a theoretical and political nature, violated Leninist principles of state and party leadership, and abused the power entrusted to him by the party and the people.

At Stalin's funeral many people, myself among them, had tears in their eyes. They were sincere tears. Although we did know of some of Stalin's personal shortcomings, we still believed him.

—From N.S. Khrushchev's speech in Pravda, March 10, 1963.

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No Rehabilitation

If Khrushchev's successors have treated Stalin somewhat more kindly, the shift has not gone very far. Criticisms of Stalin's cult of personality continue to appear, and for every positive reference there are ten negative ones. On the scholarly level, for example, the leading Soviet historical journal, *Problems of History*, celebrated its 40th anniversary with an article pointing to the great damage done to historical science by the Stalin cult, which produced "dogmatism, schematism, and departures from historical truth." [28] More recently the party's own historical journal, *Problems of History of the CPSU*, reported criticism from its readers for remaining silent about the "darker" events connected with the cult of personality.[29]

Stalin also continues to be given a good deal less credit than is due him for his major role in developments that remain above criticism. For example, a draft chapter on the 14th Party Congress in a new, multivolume party history cites Stalin only once, and rather inconspicuously. Yet Stalin played a key role at this 1925 Congress, and his position in the party struggles of the period has never been questioned.[30] Another article praising the 14th Congress, published by *Kommunist* in December 1965, managed to avoid any mention of Stalin.[31] To take a very recent and much more significant example, the party guidelines for the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution do not even include a nod to Stalin. These directives, issued by the Central Committee on January 4, 1967, and published in *Kommunist* (No. 1, 1967) and in *Pravda* (January 8), carried not a single reference to him.

In sum, one can say that the regime in power since October 1964 has shifted only slightly on Stalin, erasing some of the black marks. In the main it has followed the basic line of destalinization worked out over the years since 1953, which treats Stalin as a figure of minor importance whose errors and faults outweigh his contributions and services. In keeping with its cautious tone, the new regime has avoided any attack on Stalin of the kind which proved so unsettling in the past, and it has resisted any efforts to restore him to glory.

The more moderate treatment of Stalin after 1964 can be partly explained by the need to focus criticism on Khrushchev's faults. These were so pedestrian compared to the grandiose crimes of Stalin that criticism of the latter had to be toned down to highlight the errors of his successor. Contributing to this situation was the manner in which Khrushchev was relieved from office, ostensibly on grounds of age and health. This artificial handling forced his successors to criticize him in largely veiled terms, consequently obliging them also to mask their criticism of Stalin. Despite these changes, however, it is unthinkable that the present leadership will seek to restore Stalin to his pedestal.

Nor is objectivity likely to become the criterion for evaluating Stalin, any more than it was prior to 1964. To be sure, a certain measure of objectivity has now replaced the frequently excessive aspects of Khrushchev's destalinization drive, as well as of the irrational "cult" of the Stalin era. This has been achieved by presenting the early Stalin in a more modest light, and in adding somber tones to the depiction of his later activities. But the gain in objectivity is indeed small. All in all, Stalin's image today bears as much resemblance to the real man as did his image before 1953: an omnipotent and omniscient demi-god has now been supplanted by a rather obscure apparatchik who had very little to do with governing the Soviet Union from 1924 to 1953.

Was destalinization a success for the Soviet regime? In the form of vigorous attacks on Stalin it produced results which the present leaders appear to regret and to be unwilling to tolerate in the future. As a break with significant traditions of the past, both in the political and intellectual realms, its consequences have been far more beneficial to the regime. It has facilitated the abandonment of a mode of rule which proved costly and, in the last analysis, inefficient. The deflation of the "good Stalin" and the rejection of the "bad Stalin" brought an end to the deification of a living leader and stigmatized terror as an instrument of enforcing political and intellectual conformity. Destalinization has involved a break with one Soviet past, but it also has meant the restoration of links with a different past, one which Stalinist historiography had done its best to suppress. It has opened up the country to winds from the outside world and has rescued prominent individuals, as well as political ideas and cultural trends, from oblivion, thus wittingly or unwittingly encouraging the growth of skepticism and liberalism in Soviet society. Finally, destalinization made it more possible for subsequent regimes in the USSR to experiment with different approaches to domestic and external problems, and for the population at large, perhaps, to play a larger role in the shaping of its destiny.

[28] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1, 1966, pp. 3-14.
[29] *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 12, 1966, p. 148.
[30] The chapter is a draft for the fourth volume of the multivolume history, of which only the first two volumes have appeared. *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 1, 1966, pp. 40-61.
[31] *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1965, pp. 75-82.

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More on Maoism

EDITORS' NOTE: In its September-October issue last year, this journal initiated a symposium on Maoism, presenting as the basis of discussion widely divergent analyses by Messrs. Stuart R. Schram ("The Man and His Doctrine") and Arthur A. Cohen ("The Man and His Policies"), supplemented by the comments of several other scholars. The discussion is continued here with Professor Chou's commentary, which focuses primarily on the ideological derivations of Maoist doctrine and the relative importance of nationalism and Communist ideology in Mao's thinking and policies. This is followed by a further, and final, exchange between Messrs. Schram and Cohen growing out of the latter's concluding remarks to the original symposium.

The Mind of a Revolutionary

By I-Kua Chou

That Mao is a Marxist is not generally contested. The fact that he and his associates use elements of Chinese culture to substantiate their theory, relying upon Chinese patterns of thought in their efforts to mold opinion, and reaching distinctively "Chinese" conclusions, does not affect the overall Marxist orientation of Mao's thought and policies. Marxism-Leninism, as a theory of revolution, leaves room for versatility, tactical change, and strategic realignment: local adaptations to fit the "objective conditions" of a given country are presupposed; and so-called creative Marxism is essential to all revolutionary activists who would rely on the Marxist ideology to guide their actions. Therefore, to say that Maoism is not Marxism is nothing more than to say that Mao's interpretation of Marxism in the conditions of 20th-century China is not the same as Marx's doctrine as conceived in the conditions of 19th-century Europe. Marx spent all his life trying to demonstrate why the mid-19th-century type of capitalism had to fall, whereas Mao has spent the last seventeen years trying to show why his brand of socialism must succeed in China. The exigencies that Mao faces call for solutions for which there is no Marxist guidance. He has to improvise or borrow from Lenin and Stalin. But so long as he adheres to such broad Marxist principles as dialectical and historical materialism, class struggle, the inevitable

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fall of capitalism, the dictatorship of the proletariat as the only form of state during the transition to communism, the certainty of the development of civilization through socialism, and the abolition of classes as a prerequisite to the emancipation of mankind, his claim to being a Marxist should be regarded as secure.

It should be emphasized, however, that Maoism is a direct offshoot of Bolshevism, that Mao knew Marx only through Lenin. Without Lenin, Mao would probably never have become a Marxist. It was Lenin who showed him how a revolution could be introduced into any society regardless of its stage of social development, how the Marxist "truth" is universally applicable, and why the pivotal point of world revolution lies in the synchronization of a centrally-directed program of industrialization at home and a campaign against imperialism abroad. It was also Lenin who showed him how the two distinctly separate revolutions conceived by Marx—the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian-socialist—which supposedly would require a significant interval of time, could be telescoped into one operation under the direction of the Communist party, without the necessary materialist foundation.

When Mao became a Communist, Lenin had already done an efficient job of emasculating the determinism, spontaneity, rationality, and consequently the predictability of Marxism. He had converted Marxism into Bolshevism, a totalitarian and voluntarist creed for nations yet to reach industrial maturity. But it was precisely the Leninist idea of an all-powerful party overseeing the entire historical process of overthrowing the existing system, liquidating the old classes, converting the peasantry into proletariat, building the economic base for socialism, and reconstructing the whole of society from the top down, that appealed to Mao. It was the belief that a society can be projected from backwardness to modernity within a relatively short time under the supervision of a revolutionary élite that made Mao a Marxist-Leninist. If here lies the origin of Mao's voluntarism, it can indeed be traced directly to Marx, who acknowledged the role of human will in realizing the determinist process of history. However, it was Lenin, rather than Marx, who heavily emphasized man's will and duty to give history a helping hand. Stalin enlarged Leninist voluntarism, and Mao has glorified it into an evangelical crusade and a melodramatic saga of the rebirth of man.

There is no doubt that Chinese communism is going through a "nationalist phase." In all likelihood, it will remain in this phase as long as China's nationalist goals, such as control of Taiwan, equality with the great powers, and the consolidation of China's frontiers, are unfulfilled. It is in this particular context that Mao identifies the cause of the Chinese revolution with the nationalist aspirations of other less developed nations. However, it is difficult to state in categorical terms, as Mr. Schram does, that Mao always puts nationalism before communism. A strong case can be made to show that the opposite is true. For example, in 1949 the United States hinted at the possibility of extending aid to Peking if Mao would adopt an eclectic position. Thus, had the recovery of Chinese territories and a program of modernization and industrialization been all that Mao desired, China in 1949 had the best opportunity in a hundred years to rid herself of the last vestiges of colonial influence, to take the place of a great power in the family of nations, and to receive aid from both the Soviet Union and the United States. But Mao decided against a policy that would put China's national interests before the tasks of world communism. Insisting on "leaning to one side," he arbitrarily severed China's relations with the United States.

Secondly, Mao's attack on Tito, which began in 1948 when Stalin forced a break between the Soviet and Yugoslav parties, cannot be properly explained without referring to the Chinese leader's ideological commitments. Tito has been castigated by Mao not because Yugoslav communism developed a syndicalist tendency displaying unique national characteristics, but because Tito has demonstrated that his loyalty to Yugoslavia takes precedence over his loyalty to international communism.

Thirdly, an essential part of the Sino-Soviet dispute centers around Mao's fear that Soviet communism has become conservative, nationalistic, and non-revolutionary. He believes that bitter inter-party struggles are absolutely essential to bring about the restoration of a more positive leadership in the Soviet Union and to reactivate world communism as a dynamic and coherent movement. The worldwide division of Communists into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions testifies to the profound dilemma facing all Communists in apportioning their loyalties between nationalism and communism. The pro-Soviet factions generally tend to give higher priority to national problems, while the pro-Chinese elements view their nations only as parts of a gigantic world movement.

Finally, in spite of its provincialism, the most significant feature of Maoism is the hypothesis that the building of a new social order in China must begin with a clear break with the past. Aside from the preservation of some relics of Chinese culture (archaeological finds, for instance), no part of the superstructure of the old society is to be saved. To construct a new one, the Chinese Communist Party has undertaken the task of harnessing new "productive forces" (factories, applied science, etc.) and creating new "productive

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relations" (from the land reform of 1949 to the agricultural cooperatives of 1952, the communes of 1958, and the production brigades of 1959) in the best Stalinist tradition. If Mao's objective is to make China *fu-ch'iang* (rich and powerful), he is doing it within the only frame of reference he understands, namely, the view that the Chinese revolution constitutes a part of the world revolution, and that the success of the former depends upon that of the latter.

It is misleading to say that Chinese communism fosters anti-Western sentiments. What it seeks to do is to foster class antagonism in all non-Communist countries, supporting their masses against their privileged and ruling classes. To the extent that Western civilization represents advanced technology and industrial maturity, Mao views it as a part of the common heritage of man. He pays as much tribute to the achievements of the working people of America as he does to those of the Soviet Union. It is their rulers that he believes ought to be replaced. Aside from the anti-revisionist drive against the Soviet leadership and the anti-imperialist policy against the United States government, there is no anti-Western policy as such.

Apart from these points, Mr. Schram's analysis seems to be benefited by a broad understanding of the history and culture of China. I am in general agreement with his conclusions, particularly some of the points rejected by Mr. Cohen as products of intuition, such as the belief that Mao's feeling of solidarity with other peoples opposing imperialism is genuine and spontaneous, and that in China there is probably more consensus, and less blind obedience, than in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Mr. Cohen must be credited for having pointed out the Stalinist tendency in Mao. This is important simply because explanations of Mao in recent years have centered largely around such themes as ethnocentrism, the cultural gap, and paranoid psychosis—things which really do not have a direct bearing on the formulation of Mao's thoughts and policies.

Having said this, however, I must hasten to add that I disagree with Mr. Cohen on the specific Stalinist components in Maoism. He points to such things as the cult of Mao's personality, the periodic purges, the system of bureaucratic controls, and some evidences of forced labor camps as indications of Mao's Stalinism. These manifestations may look plausible at first glance, but it becomes apparent upon closer scrutiny that they are not really representative of Maoism. I submit that the cult of Mao's personality bears little resemblance to that of Stalin. Mao has never been the one-man dictator that Stalin was. For a long time, Mao worked closely with several other members of the top echelon of the CCP as a group, although his status as the undisputed leader of the party had been established since the Tsunyi conference of 1935. Until recently, there had always been more harmony, greater consultation, and closer collaboration between Mao and his associates than ever existed between Stalin and his subordinates. Mao's position within the CCP Politburo is akin to that of a board chairman. Although he may overrule the recommendations of his colleagues, vital decisions are usually taken collectively by the standing committee of the Politburo as a whole (the break with Khrushchev in 1959, for example). In spite of the rituals of adulation widely practiced by the party zealots, Mao has never ruled by caprice or ruthless personal power, nor by a nationwide apparatus of terror such as was characteristic of the Stalinist era. The very fact that he now has to rely upon a nationwide movement to deal with opposition within his own party is proof that he does not possess the absolute power that Stalin once wielded.

The technique used by Mao to purge the opposition is thus different from that employed by Stalin. So far as we yet know, no one in the Chinese Communist hierarchy who disagreed with Mao has suffered the fate of a Zinoviev, a Kamenev, a Bukharin, a Rykov, a Tomsky, a Trotsky or a Marshal Tukhachevsky. There has been no "Yezhovschchina" in China. Dismissal and public denunciation were all that such men as P'eng Teh-huai, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Chou Yang, P'eng Chen and Lo Juich'ing had to face. Some party leaders, such as Marshal Hsu Hsiang-chien and Politburo member Chen Yun, who were dropped from officialdom for some time, have been reinstated after completing a successful tour of self-reformation. "Rectification" is Mao's method of purging the opposition. The emphasis is on repentance, reform, and "self-liquidation as a class" rather than on terror and physical extermination.

It is true that the fate of Chinese landlords in the early 1950's was similar to that of the Russian kulaks in the late 1920's and early 1930's. But there is a difference between the means used by Mao for the purpose of seizing power, "smashing" the old system, and dealing with class enemies (antagonistic contradictions), and the means he has used for the purpose of pacifying dissent and opposition within the ranks of the party, the army and the masses (non-antagonistic contradictions). The current "cultural revolution" belongs to the latter category. Instead of executing his opponents, Mao and his supporters have mobilized the military and the youth to overwhelm the opposition by a massive campaign of persuasion. The key to Mao's method of control is mass support. He is counting on the army, the students, and the masses to sustain his rule

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now and to perpetuate his thought in the future. The fundamental difference between Mao and Stalin is that Mao, believing (under the influence of Chinese classical teachings) that human nature is basically good, attempts to remold man, whereas Stalin, holding a low opinion of man, tried to eliminate the undesirables so as to make room for those who conformed to his will.

A rigid system of bureaucratic control is characteristic of any modern dictatorship. While it is true that Mao borrowed from the Soviet Union all forms of political, economic and military organization, the practice of extensive control is inherent in the Communist system generally rather in Stalinism as such. Forced labor camps are not characteristic of Chinese communism for two reasons: First, Mao's methods of enforcing discipline and exacting compliance through such means as indoctrination, *hsia-fang* (assignment to a farm or a factory for a year or longer), self-criticism, and public denunciation are usually sufficient to bend a man's will and break his resistance. Secondly, in spite of the widespread discontent among the intelligentsia, particularly among university professors and newspaper editors with Western training, there has been much more voluntary cooperation on the part of the masses in carrying out Mao's schemes than there was in Stalinist Russia in the 1920's and 1930's, the comparable period of development. Mao's rule has appeared more benevolent not so much because it has been less despotic than that of Stalin as because the Chinese masses, having suffered from war, famine, and foreign aggression for more than a hundred years, have been more amenable to Mao's manipulations and more anxious to identify themselves with policies designed to improve their own lot.

However, Mao still draws heavily from Stalin in formulating his thoughts and policies. The Stalinist components in Maoism lie mainly in the realm of ideology rather than in practice.

The processes of Mao's thinking that have affected all his major policy decisions are permanently imbedded in a series of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist concepts, the Stalinist elements of which can be listed as follows: the belief that the leadership and assistance of the Soviet Union are indispensable to the success of the world revolution (Mao now accuses Moscow of having forfeited this leadership and apparently believes that only another revolution in the Soviet Union can put things right); the doctrine of two world outlooks; the theory that the nature of imperialism will never change (an extension of Lenin's thesis), that imperialism begets war, and that so long as it exists war is inevitable; the conviction that armed struggle is necessary against imperialism; the emphasis on class struggle as the paramount instrument of social change; the belief in the need to maximize the role of the state before the advent of the classless society, etc. Most observers today, inhibited by the interdictions of behavioral science, attach little importance to ideological explanations of Mao's actions. But so long as Mao and his associates do in fact rely so heavily upon ideology to guide their actions, we can ignore the ideological element only at the sacrifice of a fully accurate assessment of their policies.

Finally, Mr. Cohen's statement that "Mao is attempting to keep the minds of all Chinese artificially 'revolutionized' in a situation where revolution no longer exists" calls for some discussion. Obviously, Mr. Cohen's definition of revolution is a narrow one that covers only the single phase of overthrowing the existing system. But the Marxist definition of revolution is quite broad, encompassing the whole historical epoch of transition from the time capitalism falls to the time communism rises (see Marx's *Gotha Program* and Lenin's *State and Revolution*). Thus, from the Communist standpoint, the act of overthrowing capitalism is a part of the revolution, and so are the acts of smashing the old state machinery, of setting up a dictatorship of the proletariat, of liquidating the remnants of the bourgeoisie, of building socialism, of creating new human relations, of achieving the material abundance prerequisite to communism, and of molding the new Communist man. In short, any act that alters the existing relationship between productive forces and productive relations is revolution. Castro may call his effort to improve sugar production through the reorganization of Cuban village life a part of the Cuban revolution; Kosygin may call the latest reorganization of the Soviet regional production councils a part of the Soviet revolution; and Mao may call his transfer of production responsibility from the commune to the production brigade a part of the Chinese revolution. All acts leading toward world communism constitute revolution; and so long as the world is divided into two opposing camps, revolutionary conditions always exist.

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A Discussion Extended

Having had my say at some length, both in my original article (September-October 1966) and in a concluding comment, I did not intend to intervene further in the debate on "Maoism"—at least until some months had elapsed. . . . But Mr. Cohen leaves me no choice. When this symposium was originally planned, it was clearly stipulated that the authors of the two central articles should deal with the issues, and not engage in polemics with one another. Despite this explicit understanding, Mr. Cohen not only devoted virtually the whole of his concluding remarks to attacking me, but went about this with the manifest intention of discrediting me and casting doubt on my intellectual integrity. Under the circumstances, I cannot do otherwise than reply.

Let us begin with the question of methods. . . . According to him, my "intuitionist" approach consists in relying solely on my imagination, rather than on factual evidence, to justify my interpretation of Mao's behavior. This is a wholly frivolous accusation, and Mr. Cohen knows it. If he and I were invited to contribute to this symposium, it was on the basis of our previous work on Mao. My own book on Mao's thought, which Mr. Cohen saw fit to cite several times, was based on the study of hundreds of pages of Mao's writings in their original contemporary versions. Mr. Cohen has a perfect right to believe that I carried out this research badly, and drew false conclusions from it, but he has no grounds for suggesting that it never took place, and that I made up my ideas about Mao out of my head.

It is perfectly true that, having assembled a certain amount of evidence regarding Mao's ideas and behavior, I have sometimes tried to make use of such imagination as I possess to seek an explanation of his aims and motives. Mr. Cohen, who is largely uninterested in understanding the genesis of Mao's attitudes, regards such undertakings as frivolous at best —except, of course, when he indulges in them himself, as when he discovers in Mao "an almost nostalgic desire to revive the climate of the early years of the Communist regime." But though he disapproves of the use of the imagination—at least by others —in analyzing Mao's writings, he has suddenly revealed, in interpreting my own modest productions, quite extraordinary inventive powers.

"Mr. Schram," he writes, "implies that Peking was probably not involved in the Indonesian coup to bring down Sukarno." In fact, it is perfectly obvious to anyone from the text of the paragraph of my article to which he is referring that I assume Peking *was* involved. The point I was discussing was whether this particular blunder marked the beginning of a systematic policy of overthrowing *all* "bourgeois" nationalist leaders, even the most "progressive," throughout Asia and Africa, or whether it was based (as I think it probably was) on the false assumption that Sukarno was dying and therefore the Communists should strike first rather than take any chances on the attitude of his successor. (Mr. Cohen, incidentally, muddles the issue by his suggestion that the coup was designed to "bring down Sukarno"; in fact it is much more likely that the aim of the conspirators was to capture Sukarno for their own purposes.)

Mr. Cohen further declares that my portrait of Mao shows him as a man "whose relations with foreign leaders, including the Russians, are characterized by dignity and tact—a portrait which conveniently leaves out the staggering fact that *Mao's arrogance* in the Sino-Soviet dispute has been so extreme and so crude as to outrage even his prospective supporters." It is true that I have often referred to Mao's concern with the dignity of China—but this does not imply that he necessarily goes about defending it in a calm and dignified manner. As for his "tact" in dealing with the Soviets, I should like to know where, in my essay or anywhere else, I have suggested anything of the kind. In fact, my article on "Mao as a Poet" in a previous issue of this journal (September-October 1964) was largely devoted to illustrating Mao's overwhelming attitude of superiority toward his Soviet comrades.

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And in the present symposium, I suggested that his "tactless handling" of Castro was inspired in part by "an exaggerated susceptibility to behavior which Peking judges to be disrespectful." Mr. Cohen has more imagination than I have if he can read into this praise for Mao's tact.

But it is time to come to the essential point, which is Mr. Cohen's attack on me as an apologist for totalitarian regimentation. . . . In order to present me in this light, he resorts to misrepresentation of my views very similar to that which I have illustrated above with reference to more trivial issues. Thus he would make me say that Mao's destruction of the liberty of conscience "perhaps reflects a nostalgia for the idea of individual liberation." The last ten words are, of course, an accurate quotation from my article, but what I meant by them is perfectly clear from the context and bears little relation to Mr. Cohen's interpretation. It is nowhere stated or implied in my text that I believe Mao's measures to ensure that all Chinese shall think alike constitute a contribution to freedom of conscience. I linked the ideal of individual liberation not to the various enterprises of regimentation in which Mao has engaged since 1949, but to the manner in which he perhaps rationalizes and justifies these enterprises in his own mind, and to his desire to combine the conformity thus imposed with a degree of spontaneity and initiative on the part of the citizens. My explanation of the roots of Mao's behavior may or may not be correct, but to read into it approval on my part of an ambition which I describe in the same paragraph as "contradictory and absurd" does not show much of that regard for the evidence on which Mr. Cohen prides himself.

Similarly, he suggests that, in calling Mao a "romantic," I meant to describe him as a tender and gentle soul. Readers of your journal who saw my earlier article on Mao's "Military Deviation" (January-February 1964) will hardly take this seriously.

Leaving aside Mr. Cohen's polemical exaggerations, there is, of course, a genuine area of disagreement between us. He cites a sentence from my book of 1963 in which I stated that "Mao's passionate desire to transform man has a curious mixture of humanistic and totalitarian motives." I will still stand by this today, though it is obvious that in the China of the Red Guards such humanistic motives as remain are rapidly being swallowed up by totalitarianism. There was a great deal in pre-1949 China that genuinely represented oppression of the individual: the inhuman treatment of the peasants by the landlords, the subordinate position of women, the exaggerated respect for age and hierarchy. In his youth, Mao denounced these evils in terms that even Mr. Cohen would have to regard as liberal and humanist. The fact that Mao has abandoned individualism for collectivism and, in struggling against ancient forms of servitude, has created new and in some respects worse forms of oppression does not in itself demonstrate that he is no longer concerned with the fate of human beings. My belief that he is still so concerned rests not merely on my imagination, but on the study of Mao's intellectual and political itinerary and the conviction that, though men often distort and betray their earlier conceptions, they do not easily slough off all traces of the past.

This belief on my part may be erroneous—but Mr. Cohen is not concerned merely to prove me wrong. He finds in my "peculiar explanation of totalitarian regimentation" an "all-too-familiar apologetic ring." I can only reply that his smear tactics are all too familiar as well.

My first reaction to Mr. Cohen's gross misrepresentation of what I had written in a text which your readers had before their eyes was that it could only be explained by an extreme polemical bias that would not allow him to read anything I might say with an open mind. A flagrant example of this is his dismissal of my statement that "there is probably more consensus, and less blind obedience," in China today (*i.e.*, in January 1966, when I wrote my article) than in the Soviet Union "at the corresponding stage in its development" (*i.e.*, at the time of the great purges of the late 1930's). (Characteristically, Mr. Cohen omits the qualifying words "at the corresponding stage in its development," thus suggesting that I am comparing China and the Soviet Union today.) Mr. Cohen himself wrote in his essay that "whereas Stalin imposed his will mainly by means of brute force and physical terror, Mao has relied to a significantly greater degree on mental suasion." Mr. Schapiro found precisely in this point one of the striking instances of the similarity between my conclusions and those of Mr. Cohen. But the latter will have none of this; he cannot bear to admit that there is any resemblance between my views and his.

Certain other points in Mr. Cohen's final comment lead me to wonder whether his misreading of my text results only from prejudice, or whether he is not somewhat obtuse. Thus he finds it "logically incongruous" that I should say that Mao's nationalism is not necessarily the most important factor in his thought, but that it *is* chronologically and psychologically primary. That it is chronologically primary simply means that it came first in his intellectual development—a fact which does not imply anything about its present importance. By saying it was "psychologically primary" I meant (as is clear from my text) that it was likely to inspire his first instinctive reaction to most problems. But this

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obviously does not mean that it is necessarily the most important factor, *i.e.*, the factor which *determines* his conduct in any given situation. If Mr. Cohen cannot understand this obvious distinction, it is no wonder he missed the point repeatedly in his commentaries.

A word, by way of conclusion, about the matter of Stalinism. Mr. Cohen is filled with contempt because I have found it useful, in my article, to devote a certain amount of space to the "hoary issue" of the relative importance of Communist and Chinese factors in Mao's motivation. I quite agree with him that it *should not* be necessary today to tell people that Mao is both Communist and Chinese, and that full weight must be given to both of these factors. But Mr. Cohen's own contribution to this symposium shows conclusively that, alas, it *is* still necessary.

Mr. Cohen affirms flatly (though he does not offer any evidence to support his assertion) that I am "wrong" in regarding the communes as a fundamentally un-Marxist enterprise. Writing in July 1966, he still finds it possible to affirm that current developments in China can, on the whole, be adequately characterized as simply an attempt on Mao's part to apply the lessons he has learned from Stalin. To be sure, he adds, "the parallels are not always exact," and "Mao has innovated in all these matters," but "whether the innovations represent a continuation or a divergence from Stalin is a point for academic disputation." For Mr. Cohen, Marxist ideology in general, and the Stalinist heritage in particular, is the crucial thing.

That Mao has learned a great deal from Stalin, and that there are striking parallels between China today and the Soviet Union of the great purges and the "doctors' plot," no one, as I said in my concluding remarks, would think of denying. But if Mr. Cohen really regards as Marxist the utopian enterprise of the communes, which goes altogether against the grain of Marx's own thought, with its emphasis on technical rationality and imitation of the West as the key to progress in Asia; if he really believes that Stalin's bureaucratic repression of opposition within the party by the use of the police apparatus can be equated with a policy which relies on mass action by adolescents; that the current policy of "proletarian culture" can be usefully explained by invoking the name of the man who ruthlessly repressed similar tendencies in the Soviet Union; or that "Down with the foreign devils!" is a Stalinist battle cry, then he is even more unimaginative than I had hitherto believed him to be. . . .

Stuart Schram

* * *

Remembering that good causes are sometimes defended by bad arguments, I have tried to comply with Professor Schram's demand that I accept his procedure as valid. But he has obscured the standard he would have me use. That is, sometimes he demands evaluation of what he has written, and sometimes he insists on his *later explanation* of what he has written. Professor Schram need only make his words correspond to his meaning and make his meaning correspond to reality to avoid misrepresentation.

On the main point—namely, Professor Schram's apology for Mao's thought-reform practice—he concedes that I quoted his words accurately but asserts that I confounded what he "meant." But he continues to conceal from any rational inquiry the route he used in arriving at Mao's motivation—*viz.*, a yearning for individual liberation. He retreats and now says that he wanted to show how Mao "perhaps rationalizes and justifies" thought-reform practice "in his own mind." Actually, Professor Schram seems to have been engaged in his own operation to rationalize and justify Mao's attack on autonomous reason.

Apologetic literature feeds on ambiguity and contradictory argument, enabling the apologist to cite one side of a position when another side has been exposed. Professor Schram first declares that he will stand by his image of Mao as a mental engineer who is moved by "humanistic and totalitarian motives," and then would seem to contradict this by saying that the former of the two motives is (suddenly, it appears) being consumed by the latter. Nevertheless, he is quick to erect a new fortress: Mao is "concerned" with the fate of man. No doubt, but he does not say in what sense. He stops short and begs the question by relying on the *ambiguity* of the word "concerned."

Apologetic literature—and I use this phrase advisedly—also employs the device of crucial omission.[1] Professor Schram is careful to remain silent about a very decisive fact—namely, Mao's craving for adulation, to which the recent excesses of the "cultural revolution" bear such eloquent testimony. He suppresses the cultist aspect of Mao-study and invites

[1] Crucial omission is employed by Professor Schram at many points in his book. For example, he invites the reader to view Mao as a liberal opponent of the traditional system of arranged marriages, which had led a young girl to commit suicide. Significantly, however, he fails to mention the suicides caused by the terror campaigns of the 1950's after his hero attained power. And the current discrepancy between Professor Schram's sustained *image* of Mao as a semi-humanist and Mao's *practice* in persecuting creative intellectuals —some of whom have committed suicide, including Lao She, in Peking in September 1966—is enormous. It is this discrepancy and others in Professor Schram's work that are decisive in any consideration of whether his analytical procedure is valid. (Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, New York, 1963, p. 213.)

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his readers to look in a different direction, beyond "fanaticism" and toward a positive and rational search for attitudes "long current in the West and useful for promoting experiment and economic growth" (see his concluding comment in the symposium).

What are the attitudes that Mao has recently tried to inculcate in his subjects? Contempt for a qualitative grading system in middle schools and universities; contempt for the independence of scientific researchers; acceptance of political orthodoxy before technical competence as the standard of excellence of all specialists; and acceptance of increased regimentation and of even less remuneration for more work. Are these the attitudes honored by leaders of democratic governments and "long current in the West"? [2]

Most totalitarian rulers (including Hitler, Stalin, and Mao) have justified their actions—to others and, no doubt, to themselves—in terms of some greater good which their actions would supposedly bring to their subjects. What Mao shares with Hitler, however, is the frank and explicit rejection of "humanism" as a motive or goal of his policies. The explicit onslaughts against humanism in Mao's China began *long before* the events of the last year which Professor Schram finds so embarrassing, and one of the gravest charges hurled by Mao at the Soviet "revisionists" was the alleged humanistic direction of their policies after Stalin's death. Within China, even Mao's most abject apologists and adulators have refrained from employing this term in regard to their leader.

A semi-humanist—or even a quarter-humanist—tolerates the ethical, religious, and political views of other men. The deprivation which men subjected to Mao's thought reform must suffer is crucially omitted from Professor Schram's image of Mao. By insisting on a semi-humanistic *motivation*, he downgrades the anti-humanistic *consequences* of Mao's practice. Other observers have not concealed the fact that Mao's criteria of mental purity are frequently altered, and that his demand for intelligent men to adjust mentally to each change of policy through painful self-disparagement imposes a harried life of uncertainty and tension.

Professor Schram feels that there are only certain "striking parallels" between Maoist China and Stalinist Russia. Yet if we take the essence of Stalinism to mean the perpetuation of a one-man *cultist* control over a Leninist (that is, highly centralized and undemocratic) party, then Stalinism is at the very center of Mao's political rule. It is misleading to suggest, as does Professor Schram, that the Red Guards ("mass action by adolescents") and not a "police apparatus" were the means employed by Mao to repress opposition in the CCP.[3] The real Stalinist means was the *secret arrest* of some real opponents, including Lo Jui-ch'ing, P'eng Chen and his committee secretaries, Lu Ting-yi, and Chou Yang, and close surveillance of others—including Liu Shao-ch'i, Madame Liu, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Only *after* these arrests took place was Mao ready to use the Red Guards to terrorize party leaders whom he and his new lieutenants had marked for public intimidation. The Red Guard "arrest" of P'eng Chen and his secretaries was an *ex post facto* sham affair; for the real secret arrest took place nine months earlier, in March 1966. It is not the Red Guards but Mao and his new sextet (including Madame Mao) who will decide whether former Politburo members will survive and whether regional, provincial, and municipal party secretaries will be purged or permitted to continue in their posts.

Like Stalin, Mao is terrorizing the entire party apparatus because it is not absolutely submissive to him (though, admittedly unlike Stalin, he has used his wife to single out important victims). Like Stalin, he has formed new "sextets" and "octets" among the leaders in order to change the power alignment so that it remains below him in the Politburo. Like Stalin, he has placed former well-trusted lieutenants on semi-public "trial" and has used the ritual of leveling false charges and extorting false confessions. Like Stalin, he insists on being designated the "supreme commander" at home and the "leader" of all true Marxist-Leninists abroad. Indeed, in fostering a near-religious cult of his person and of his writings, he has not only borrowed a leaf from his predecessor but easily surpassed him.

Where, then, is the evidence that Mao has "never" lost sight of the individual (Professor Schram's earlier position), and in what sense is he "concerned" with the fate of man (the new position)? Professor Schram may still stand by his image of Mao as a semi-humanist, but to do so would be a matter of "belief" (Professor Schram's word)

[2] The Peking *Jen-min Jih-pao*, on December 26, 1966, called for "revolution" in the factories, and on December 31, the paper instructed peasants to join in the economically irrational frenzy, which now includes grossly falsified economic claims.

[3] An almost identical position is taken by Professor Franz Schurmann on this important point: "Mao, unlike Stalin, has long since learned that the use of instruments of violence, such as the army and police, to resolve political disputes can create a chain of escalating violence without end." (H. F. Schurmann, "What is Happening in China?," *The New York Review of Books*, Oct. 20, 1966). Actually Mao's police apparatus removed the oppositionist Politburo members from their real power positions well before the Red Guards were organized and encouraged to denounce them.

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not supported by any demonstrable facts. He may even say that this "belief" is an article of fundamental personal faith. But even that would not prove it true, or even dispose of the doubts raised by those who have valid rational grounds for challenging it.

Political conjectures must correspond with political reality. Of what conceivable value are conjectures about Mao's private thought processes *except in relation to Mao's actions in the real world?* And of what value are such conjectures when they are not correlated with Mao's concrete practice *because the discrepancy is too enormous and too obvious?*[4]

Arthur A. Cohen

[4] Professor Schram departs furthest from reality whenever he depicts regimentation as an example of Mao's yearning for freedom of the individual. "Mao's hatred of the older limitations placed on freedom of the individual by religion and family ties has by no means diminished and is probably one of the reasons for the experiment of the communes." (Schram, *op. cit.*, p. 33). Similar logic might also be employed to explain Mao's forced labor camps, which also overcome the limitations placed on freedom of the individual by religion and family ties!

Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

Views on Yugoslavia

TO THE EDITORS: There are important points in the F.W. Neal - W.M. Fisk article "Yugoslavia: Towards a Market Socialism" (November-December 1966) that need to be corrected or clarified. The very title of the article, purportedly descriptive of Yugoslavia's economic system, is quite vague unless the term "market socialism" is carefully defined. This the article does not do.

The essence of the Marxian notion of socialism is collective ownership of the material means of production. Market economy, on the other hand, means, first of all, mutual independence of demand and supply, with various degrees of effective pluralism on each side of the market depending on the divisibility of specific demands, and on the technology of production and size of particular markets on the supply side. Thus the market principle requires not only autonomy of individual persons and spontaneous groups of persons in consumption, but also autonomy of individual enterprises in quest of external (demand-oriented) and internal (cost-reducing) efficiency. These essential requirements of a market economy are to assure that production will serve genuine human wants and will do so with an unceasing effort at lower unit costs, which is the only way to minimize universal scarcity.

It follows that the possibility of a "socialist market economy" depends on whether collective ownership of productive assets is compatible with the necessary autonomy of individual enterprises. In the Yugoslav system this problem has in principle been resolved by making individual enterprises virtual "collective owners" of their assets and revenues, subject only to an average four-percent "rent" and some other tax payments to the state. Whether such a splintering of collective ownership still adds up to "socialism" is debatable, especially since the application of the market requirements of autonomy and pluralism of firms also tends to generate and multiply individually managed small enterprises in farming, handicrafts, professions and other services.

Beyond the problematic concept of Yugoslavia's economic system itself, there are three further questions that must be answered. To what extent has the Yugoslav economy in fact been transformed into such a hybrid "socialist market economy"; at what pace is its further transformation taking place; and what are the observable effects of this transformation on the efficiency of the system's performance?

From the Neal-Fisk article we learn that actual transformation of the Yugoslav system has been slow and uneven. Although the principle of "self-management" as the operational lever of "socialist market economy" had been proclaimed as early as 1950, its implementation and operation were obstructed until July 1966 when Aleksandar Ranković was removed. It is only since the fall of Ranković that a vigorous effort has been under way to implement the reform of July 1965, which was irrevocably to commit Yugoslavia to the proclaimed socialist market economy.

The crucial change is the transfer of the bulk of the industrial investment function from the political center to the enterprise. For this purpose, firms are to retain a considerably larger share of their sales revenues. But to make this transfer both effective and efficient, a capital market had to be established. A fundamental reorganization of the banking system was to create the mechanism for this. It is too early to assess the working of this rearrange-

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ment. In the past, Yugoslav banks acted as transmission belts for an essentially political allocation of fiscal investment funds among various industries. Now, the opposite danger exists. Banks may become too dependent on specific enterprises that supply their capital funds. In the absence of a truly open market in long-term securities, the emerging capital market may not acquire sufficient flexibility for efficient allocation of investment funds.

The Yugoslav system is still grappling with the fundamental problem of how to establish and maintain a flexible price system in its product markets. If the danger of chronic inflation or recurring recessions in the framework of a flexible price system is to be contained, the latter must be backed up by a sophisticated monetary policy. But in Yugoslavia such a monetary policy is yet to evolve. In the meantime inflationary pressures are being checked by an almost comprehensive price freeze, which goes against the very essence of a market economy.

On the enterprise level, the most serious remaining problem in the Yugoslav system is the lack of a dependable mechanism for orderly management-employee relations in a system where employees of each firm are to be their own collective managers (self-management). Internal frictions therefore multiply and could seriously impair the efficiency of the system. There are even signs of an emerging general antagonism between the trade union leadership and enterprise managements. (See on this several reports and articles in *Ekonomska politika* of October 22 and 29, and November 12, 1966.)

On the political plane, Messrs. Neal and Fisk do not seem to have grasped the basic rationale of the federal character of Yugoslavia. They seem to equate the rising pressure for a consistent implementation of the constitutionally established federal principle with a "narrow ethnic-national particularism." In this they are certainly wrong. For it is a historical fact that Yugoslavia is a multinational country. Genuine liberalization is therefore bound to lead to a far-reaching federal rearrangement of the existing political system resulting from twenty years of Ranković's manipulations.

Since the fall of Ranković, pressures for such a change appear to have become irresistible and are spearheaded by the constitutional courts of Yugoslavia's constituent republics. Their immediate demand is that, in accordance with the constitution, federal legislation be limited to establishing basic guidelines only. Beyond this, it has already been announced, for example, that the Assembly of Nationalities is to be revived as the principal political body at the federal level. The resignation of the government of the Republic of Slovenia in December 1966 focused worldwide attention not only on the growing importance of parliamentary bodies in Yugoslavia's system of government, but also on the growing assertion of national republics as the locus of a new polycentric system in which the federal government is to serve only as a coordinating center. . . .

Finally, the article is vague on the changing role of the League of Communists in the evolving Yugloslav system.

Messrs. Neal and Fisk speak of the possibility that the regime "might pioneer in the political realm by establishing a socialist opposition." Yet the regime does not tire of repeating that it will never tolerate any kind of an opposition party. (See on this a recent statement by Koca Popović as quoted in *Life* magazine, Dec. 9, 1966 p. 130.) But it is fascinating to speculate about the possibility that the regime could transform the existing front organization—the Socialist Alliance—into an independent second political organization by simply freeing it of its present Communist party leadership and membership, and still stay completely within the formal limits of the existing constitution. This, in my view, appears to be the only realistic hope for a two-party system to emerge in Yugoslavia, short of a major upheaval.

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Notice

In identifying Dr. Shanti S. Tangri, author of the article "China and Peaceful Coexistence: Some Considerations" which appeared in the January-February issue, the Editors neglected to mention that Dr. Tangri, in addition to being Associate Professor of Economics at Wayne State University (Detroit), is also Research Associate at the Center of South and Southeast Asia Studies, The University of Michigan (Ann Arbor). We regret this omission.

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